Implementation of the Directive 2011/77/EU: copyright term of protection by Ramalho, Ana & López-Tarruella Martínez, Aurelio
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEGAL AFFAIRS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementation of the 
Directive 2011/77/EU: 
copyright term of 
protection  
 
 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union  
PE 604.957 - April 2018  EN 
STUDY 
Requested by the JURI committee 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Implementation of the Directive 
2011/77/EU: copyright term of 
protection 
 
 
 
 
STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The objective of this study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy 
Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI 
Committee, is to examine the current status quo of implementation of the Directive, and 
to carry out an in-depth review of the practices in selected Member States. The study 
provides a brief overview of the international framework concerning the term of 
protection for performers and phonogram producers, and analyses the main objectives 
and provisions of the Term Extension Directive. It explores in-depth the implementation 
and practices in seven selected Member States, and identifies best practices that can 
serve as a model for other EU Member States. In addition, the long term effects of the 
Directive are considered, both within the EU (in relation to relevant EU policies) and 
outside the EU (in relation to its main trading partners). 
 
 
 ABOUT THE PUBLICATION 
This research paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs and 
commissioned, overseen and published by the Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs. 
 
Policy Departments provide independent expertise, both in-house and externally, to support 
European Parliament committees and other parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and 
exercising democratic scrutiny over EU external and internal policies.  
 
To contact the Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs or to subscribe to its 
newsletter please write to: poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu 
 
RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH ADMINISTRATOR 
Giorgio MUSSA 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
European Parliament 
B-1047 Brussels 
E-mail: poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu 
 
 
AUTHORS 
Dr. Ana RAMALHO, Assistant Professor of Intellectual Property Law at Maastricht University 
(Netherlands), 
Dr. Aurelio LOPEZ-TARRUELLA, is Senior Lecturer of Private International Law at University of Alicante 
(Spain), 
coordinated by ARCA Consortium, S.A. 
 
 
LINGUISTIC VERSION(S) 
Original: EN 
 
Manuscript completed in March 2018 
© European Union, 2018 
 
This document is available on the internet at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses 
 
 
DISCLAIMER 
The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. 
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is 
acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy. 
Implementation of the Directive 2011/77/EU: copyright term of protection 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 3 
CONTENTS     
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 5 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 
1. INTRODUCTION 10 
2. CHAPTER BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK, OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT OF 
THE DIRECTIVE 12 
2.1. International framework 12 
2.2. Objectives of the Directive 13 
2.3. Content of the Directive 14 
2.3.1. The Term Extension 14 
2.3.2. Accompanying Measures 17 
2.3.3. The “Use it or Lose it” Clause 18 
2.3.4. Annual Supplementary Remuneration 19 
2.3.5. The “Clean Slate” Provision 20 
2.3.6. Right to renegotiate the contract following the 50th year 21 
3. STATUS QUO OF NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATIONS 22 
3.1. Term Extension 22 
3.2. Use it or lose it clause 23 
3.3. Annual Supplementary Remuneration 26 
3.4. “Clean Slate” Provision 29 
3.5. Right to renegotiate the contract following the 50th year 30 
4. BEST PRACTICES 33 
4.1. Term extension 33 
4.2. “Use it or lose it” clause 33 
4.3. Annual Supplementary Remuneration 35 
4.4. “Clean Slate” provision 36 
4.5. Right to renegotiate the contract following the 50th year 37 
5. POTENTIAL LONG TERM EFFECTS OF TERM EXTENSION 38 
5.1. Effects in the EU 38 
5.1.1. The Cultural and Creative Sectors 38 
5.1.2. Other EU Policy Areas 39 
5.2. Effects on competitiveness vis-à-vis third countries 42 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 4 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 47 
7. REFERENCES 52 
ANNEX 1 – NATIONAL REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE DIRECTIVE 54 
ANNEX 2 – LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS CONTACTED BY THE AUTHORS 67 
ANNEX 3 – NATIONAL REPORTS 68 
 
Implementation of the Directive 2011/77/EU: copyright term of protection 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 5 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Berne 
Convention 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted in 1886 
CDPA Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988 (United Kingdom) 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
CMO Collective Management Organisation 
CMO 
Directive  
Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial 
licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market (OJ L 84, 
20.3.2014) 
CPI Code de la propriété intellectuelle (France) 
Impact 
Assessment 
Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Proposal for a Council 
Directive amending Council Directive 2006/116 as regards the term of protection of 
copyright and related rights – Impact Assessment on the legal and economic 
situation of performers and record producers in the European Union, Doc. SEC(2008) 
2287, 16.07.2008 
Phonograms 
Convention 
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized 
Duplication of Their Phonograms, adopted in Geneva in 1971 
PMA Post Mortem Auctoris (after the death of the author) 
Proposal for 
a DSM 
Directive 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright 
in the Digital Single Market - COM(2016)593 
Rome 
Convention 
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organizations, adopted in Rome, 1961 
Term of 
Protection 
Directive 
Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (OJ 
L 372, 27.12.2006) 
Term of 
Protection 
Directive 
2011 
Directive 2011/77/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
September 2011 amending Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of protection of 
copyright and certain related rights (OJ L 265, 11.10.2011) 
TEU Treaty on European Union (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012) 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012) 
TRIPS 
Agreement 
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994 
US Copyright 
 Law 
Title 17 United States Code 
WCT WIPO Copyright Treaty adopted in Geneva, December 20, 1996 
WPPT WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty adopted in Geneva, December 20, 1996 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 6 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The objective of this Study is to evaluate the status quo of implementation of the Term of Protection 
Directive 2011, to identify best practices in the Member States, and to consider the potential long-
term effects of the term extension of protection, both within and outside the EU. 
For that purpose, the Study provides a brief overview of the background of the term extension. At 
the international level, several legal instruments regulate the duration of protection for performers 
and/or phonogram producers, including the Rome Convention, the Phonograms Convention, the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) and the TRIPS Agreement. The protection term 
set forth in these treaties varies between 20 and 50 years (counting from the performance, fixation or 
publication, depending on the instrument). These treaties only apply to performances fixed in 
phonograms, and do not address audio-visual performances. At the EU level, the Impact Assessment 
accompanying the Proposal for a Term of Protection Directive clarifies that the specific policy 
objectives underpinning EU intervention must contribute to enhancing the welfare of performers and 
the competitiveness of the EU music industry, and to increase the available music repertoire. 
Regarding performers, the Commission considered that they needed extended protection to secure 
income at the end of their lifetimes, and that certain mechanisms were required to strengthen their 
position in contracts with phonogram producers. In what concerns producers, the Commission noted 
their decreasing revenues and their disadvantage vis-à-vis their US counterparts.  
The different provisions in the Term of Protection Directive 2011 were adopted with the aim of 
addressing these concerns. The central measure of the Directive is the extension of the protection 
term for performers and phonogram producers. For the former, if the performance is fixed in a 
phonogram lawfully published or lawfully communicated to the public within 50 years, the rights 
shall expire 70 years from the date on which such event took place (whichever is the earliest). For the 
latter, if the phonogram is lawfully published within 50 years, their rights shall expire 70 years from 
the date of such event. If no lawful publication was made but the phonogram was lawfully 
communicated to the public within that period, the rights shall expire 70 years from the date of the 
first lawful communication to the public. When computing the term of protection for producers, 
preference is given to publication of the phonogram as the relevant event: if the phonogram is 
communicated to the public and later it is published, the 70-year term is counted from publication. 
This may lead to a discrepancy, in terms of duration of protection, between performers and 
producers: producers can delay the publication of records to a later date, which would mean their 
term of protection could potentially expand to almost 120 years. Moreover, the relevance given to 
publication might not be justified in view of the practices of the music industry, which increasingly 
exploit phonograms on the Internet. 
The term extension does not apply when the performance is fixed in a medium other than a 
phonogram, such as an audio-visual file. None of the Member States surveyed has extended the term 
of protection for audio-visual performers and producers. Several stakeholders have underlined that, 
this creates inconsistencies where the same performance is recorded both on a phonogram and an 
audio-visual media. A deeper analysis of a possible legislative intervention on this matter is needed.  
The Directive sets the term of protection of a musical composition with words to 70 years after the 
death of the last author to survive, whether it be the author of the lyrics or the composer of the music, 
provided that both the music and lyrics have been created specifically for the musical composition. 
For calculating this term of protection, it is irrelevant whether these persons are designated as co-
authors under the applicable national law. The provision did not cause many problems at the 
implementation stage and all the Member States surveyed except for one implemented it. 
Implementation of the Directive 2011/77/EU: copyright term of protection 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 7 
The Directive also includes a few accompanying measures, with the objective of protecting 
performers in their contractual relations with producers: the “use it or lose it” clause, the 
supplementary annual remuneration, the “clean slate” clause, and the right to renegotiate the 
contract after the 50th year. These measures are only applicable during the extension period. This 
seems to be at odds with the objective they pursue (as performers are subjected to poor contractual 
conditions throughout the whole period of protection), although transparency obligations and 
adjustment mechanisms provided by Arts. 14-16 of the Proposal for a DSM Directive might, if 
adopted, provide some relief. 
The main problems identified in relation to the accompanying measures are the lack of information of 
performers about their rights, and the identification of performers entitled to enjoy said measures. 
The Directive does not establish an obligation for CMOs to inform performers, but Art. 13(3) of the 
CMO Directive establishes a general obligation to adopt the necessary measures in order to identify 
and locate right holders who are entitled to remuneration. Member States should ensure that such 
obligation also includes the necessary information to facilitate the exercise of the rights provided for 
in this Directive. Producers typically hold such information, but their obligation to provide it is very 
limited: it is circumscribed to information necessary to secure the payment of the annual 
supplementary remuneration (but it does not cover any other aspects necessary for the exercise of 
other rights provided for in the Directive), and is dependent on request. None of the Member States 
surveyed has expanded the scope of this obligation. The obligation of producers to provide 
information should thus be reinforced. Chiefly, the information should be provided within a 
reasonable period of time, and it should be made clear that producers cannot charge for it. The type 
of information that producers are obliged to provide could also be identified in guidelines published 
by the competent authorities in the Member States. 
The first of these measures, the “use it or lose it” clause, grants performers an unwaivable right to 
terminate the contract with a producer for the exploitation of a phonogram, after the 50th year from 
its lawful publication or, failing such publication, its lawful communication to the public. The 
performer will be entitled to terminate the contract if the phonogram producer does not offer copies 
of the phonogram for sale in sufficient quantity, or does not make it available to the public. The right 
to terminate the contract may be exercised if the producer, within one year of the notification by the 
performer of her intention to terminate the contract, does not carry out both acts of exploitation. 
Where the phonogram contains the fixation of the performances of a plurality of performers, it is for 
national law to determine how they may enforce this right. Member States have regulated this matter 
differently. This Study concluded that the best solution is for the majority of performers to agree to 
terminate the contract, and to have a representative selected to exercise the right.  
The “use it or lose it” clause raises several difficulties, one of which is the prevalence of the lawful 
publication over lawful communication, already identified above. Moreover, the definition of 
“sufficient quantity” is unclear. It should be considered that “offering for sale in sufficient quantity” 
exists where the performance is made available on the Internet in a manner that satisfies the 
reasonable needs of the public, taking into account the nature and aim of the phonogram. This would 
entail, contrary to what is explicitly or implicitly required in the laws of the Member States surveyed, 
that the producer would not have to carry out both the publication and communication to the public 
in order to avoid the performer triggering the clause: the latter would be enough.  
The Directive does not contemplate those situations where the producer has transferred the rights to 
a third party. A couple of Member States have however envisaged that possibility, making it clear that 
the clause can be exercised against exclusive licensees as well. The Study found that this should be 
followed by other Member States as well. 
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The second measure put forth by the Directive is the annual supplementary remuneration (20% 
fund), which establishes an unswayable right to an annual supplementary remuneration for 
performers, consisting of 20% of the revenue which the phonogram producer has derived, during the 
preceding year, from the reproduction, distribution and making available of the phonogram. The 
beneficiaries of the remuneration are performers who have signed a contract in exchange for a non-
recurring remuneration, where the lawful publication (or, failing that, lawful communication) of the 
phonogram occurred 50 years ago. This right is administered by CMOs. 
Phonogram producers are obliged to provide, upon request, any information that may be necessary 
to secure payment of the supplementary remuneration. Member States’ laws differ regarding the 
person entitled to request that information to the producer. It should be the case that such request 
can be made either by the CMO administering the right, or by the performer herself. 
The right to the annual supplementary remuneration might prove ineffective in the case of remasters. 
These should be considered as original recordings, so as to incentivize phonogram producers to 
release their back catalogues. In principle, this should not prejudice performers, who will still be able 
to enjoy the supplementary remuneration in relation to the original performances. However, 
problems may arise if producers stop commercializing the original record – in this case, performers 
can no longer enjoy remuneration from the original recording (nor from the remaster, as it will not 
have reached the extension period yet).  
In contrast to the annual supplementary remuneration, the “clean slate” provision is meant to 
benefit performers who contractually transfer or assign their rights in exchange for a royalty-based 
remuneration. Such contracts provide deductions of several producers’ costs from the royalty 
payments performers are entitled to, which decreases the amount of royalties received by 
performers. Under the “clean slate” provision, however, neither advance payments nor any 
contractually defined deductions will be deducted from the payments made to them the 50th year 
after the phonogram was lawfully published or, failing such publication, lawfully communicated to 
the public. In line with the suggestions above, the prevalence of the lawful publication over the 
lawful communication to the public should be abolished. 
Since nothing is explicitly said in the Directive regarding the mandatory character of this provision, 
Member States may decide not to implement it. This happened in one of the Member States 
surveyed. To avoid diminishing the effectiveness of the Directive, the “clean slate” clause should be 
understood as an overriding mandatory rule in the sense of Art. 9 of the Regulation 593/2008 on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). 
The Directive has also introduced a transitional measure (Art. 10a), applicable to contracts concluded 
before 1 November 2013. The provision allows Member States to implement a right of performers to 
renegotiate, in their favor, contracts that entitled them to recurring payments following the 50th 
year after the phonogram was lawfully published or, failing such publication, the 50th year after it was 
lawfully communicated to the public. Only France out of the Member States surveyed has 
implemented this provision, and the implementing measure does not clarify how this right can be 
enforced, or which kind of modifications can be asked for. However, Art. 15 of the Proposal for a DSM 
Directive, if or when approved, might deem this right superfluous, seeing as the Proposal envisages a 
contract adjustment mechanism whereby performers may request an adjustment of their 
remuneration in cases where the remuneration originally agreed is disproportionately low compared 
to subsequent revenues. 
More conclusions on the term extension and the accompanying measures could not be drawn 
because of lack of data. Many Member States have not put into practice the provisions of the 
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Directive. Very few performers are so far entitled to benefit from the rights established therein. Little 
amounts have been collected and distributed. 
Likewise, regarding the potential long-term effects of the Directive in the EU, it is too early to 
draw solid conclusions. No data exists in relation to the impact on other EU policies and sectors. 
There is no information on whether users and their business models have been affected by the 
Directive, or on whether prices have increased to the detriment of consumers. It is also too early to 
say whether the term extension will have consequences from the point of view of competition law or 
cultural diversity. It is foreseeable that the term extension’s impact on performers and producers, 
while marginal in the first years, might grow steadily, but again no evidence is available to support 
this forecast. 
Regarding the competitiveness of the European music industry vis-à-vis foreign trading 
partners, the Study shows that, from a legal point of view, the term extension does not make the EU 
music industry more competitive. EU trading partners that had longer terms of protection are not 
allowed to discriminate against EU right holders. Importantly, that is the case of the US, whose longer 
term of protection applies equally to national and foreign sound recordings (provided of course that 
such sound recordings are protectable under US law). The exception is India, which is allowed to deny 
to foreign right holders its longer term of protection. However, any negative impact on the EU’s 
exports to India likely derives from the latter’s weak enforcement and rampant piracy, rather than any 
discrimination based on different terms of protection.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the Impact Assessment on the legal and economic situation of performers and producers in the EU, 
the Commission stated as a general policy objective the promotion of music production in Europe.1 
Specific objectives were listed too: to improve the social situation of performers; to enhance the 
competitiveness of the EU music industry; and to increase the available music repertoire.2 The 
Commission estimated that the majority of performers faced an income gap at the end of their 
lifetime due to the limited duration of protection for their rights.3 Performers were also deemed to be 
in a weak contractual position vis-à-vis record producers, as they usually transfer their exclusive rights 
in exchange either for a one-off payment, or for recurring royalties that are paid only once the 
producer has deducted her costs.4 In turn, according to the Commission, producers were facing 
decreasing revenues due to piracy and were at a disadvantage when compared to their US 
counterparts.5 As a result, it was feared that creative efforts would be deviated away from the EU and 
towards the US, with resulting losses, inter alia, for EU cultural diversity.6 
In order to achieve these objectives, the Term of Protection Directive 2011 was passed. The Directive 
puts forth several legal measures. First, it extended the term of protection of performers’ and 
producers’ rights to 70 years after publication or communication to the public of the fixation of the 
performance. The term extension was highly debated during the legislative procedure, with several 
scholars warning that it could have detrimental effects for users, cultural diversity and competition in 
the music sector (e.g. van Eechoud et al., 2009; Hilty et al., 2009). Next to the term extension, the 
Directive provides for accompanying measures: the “use it or lose it” clause, granting performers the 
right to terminate the contract with a producer after 50 years in case the latter does not exploit the 
phonogram; the annual supplementary remuneration (20% fund), granting performers who only 
received a lump sum payment the right to obtain an annual supplementary remuneration from the 
phonogram producer for each full year following the 50th year of publication or communication of 
the phonogram; and the “clean slate” provision, which establishes that neither advance payments nor 
any contractually defined deductions can be deducted from the payments made to performers as 
from the 50th year after the phonogram was published or communicated to the public. The adoption 
of these measures was not as controversial as the extension of the term of protection, even though 
they are conditional of that extension. The deadline for implementing the Directive was 1 November 
2013. While not every Member State complied with that deadline, the Directive is currently 
implemented in all Member States of the EU.   
1.1.  Outline and methodology 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the implementation of the Term of Protection Directive 2011, 
to identify best practices in the Member States, and to consider the potential long-term effects of the 
term of protection extension, including its impact outside the EU.  
For these purposes, the study provides an overview of implementation in all EU Member States 
(Annex 1), and carries out an in-depth analysis of the implementation of the Directive in selected 
Member States (France, Germany, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the UK). The sample of Member 
States was chosen according to a criterion of diversity regarding size of the country, its geographic 
                                                 
1 Impact Assessment, p. 22. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Commission Proposal, pp. 2-5. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Impact Assessment, pp. 19-20. 
6 Ibid. 
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place in the EU, date of accession to the EU, and size of the music market. The data from these 
Member States was gathered through questionnaires completed by national experts, all of whom 
have experience in the field. The questionnaires were conceived by the authors of this study 
considering its main objectives and the diversity of the sample. Therefore, the questionnaires reflect 
the methodological choice for semi-structured or semi-standardized interviews – a methodology for 
qualitative research where pre-determined (yet often open) questions give the interviewer leeway to 
explore specific issues (which differed depending on the Member State concerned). The national 
experts contacted stakeholders representative of the different interests involved in the directive: 
performers, producers, and users of music repertoires.  
In addition to the stakeholders contacted by national experts at national level, several stakeholders 
were contacted directly by the authors of the study at the pan-European level, with the objective of 
clarifying their views on how the Directive works in practice, and how its implementation has affected 
them. This list of stakeholders can be found in Annex 2.  
The data thus gathered was combined with traditional literature review and legal analysis, in order to 
meet the objectives of the study. 
The study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 will review the international background of the term of 
protection for performers and producers, as well as the objectives and content of the Directive. 
Chapter 3 will discuss national implementations of the Directive, relying on empirical research and 
data collected from the selected Member States (France, Germany, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, 
and the UK). Based on the data collected, Chapter 4 follows to identify the best practices in the 
Member States concerned. The best practices will be selected having the compliance with the 
objectives of the Directive as a benchmark. Particular attention will be paid to the mechanisms 
implemented by the Member States (and by collecting societies in those Member States) to facilitate 
the enforcement by performers of the “use it or lose it” clause, of the “clean slate” provision, and of 
the right to claim the annual supplementary remuneration. Chapter 5 evaluates the potential long 
term effects of the term extension, and will be based on both the data collected and desk research. 
This chapter analyses, first, the effects that the term extension might have within the EU in relation to 
the cultural and creative sector, as well as in relation to other policy areas (namely, consumer 
protection, competition and cultural diversity). Next, the chapter will analyze how the term extension 
might affect the competitiveness of the EU music sector in relation to third markets. Chapter 6 offers 
conclusions and recommendations. 
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2. BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK, OBJECTIVES AND 
CONTENT OF THE DIRECTIVE 
2.1. International framework 
At the international level, protection of performers and phonogram producers was first established in 
the Rome Convention of 1961 (92 contracting parties), which also included the protection of 
broadcasters. Despite the fact that the Rome Convention deals with these three right holders’ 
categories (commonly called “related rights”), the justifications underlying their protection are 
different from one another. In particular, the protection of performers is closer to that of authors 
under copyright, and therefore natural- and social justice arguments for protection apply to them as 
well; conversely, the protection of producers is based on the protection of, and incentive to, 
investment (van Eechoud et al., 2009).   
According to Art. 3 of the Rome Convention, performers are “actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and 
other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise perform literary or artistic works”. 
The provision also includes a definition of producer of phonograms: “the person who, or the legal 
entity which, first fixes the sounds of a performance or other sounds”. 
The Convention provides for a limited set of exclusive rights (Arts. 7 to 12) and a minimum term of 
protection of 20 years from the end of the year in which the fixation, performance or broadcast was 
made (Art. 14). Subsequently, the scope of protection was increased in several treaties. The 
Phonograms Convention of 1971 (79 Contracting States) protects producers against the specific acts 
of importation of unauthorized copies of phonograms and their distribution (Art. 3 of the 
Phonograms Convention), and sets a minimum term of protection of 20 years from the end of the 
year in which fixation was carried out, or from its first publication (Art. 4). The WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty 1996 (WPPT, 95 ratifications) and the TRIPS Agreement in the framework of WTO 
extend the minimum term of protection to 50 years, even though the relevant event from which to 
start counting the term of protection differs in these two instruments. In the WPPT, performers are 
entitled to a 50-year term of protection counting from the fixation of the performance, while 
phonogram producers are protected for 50 years from publication or, failing such publication, for 50 
years from the fixation of the phonogram (Art 17 of the WPPT). By contrast, the TRIPS Agreement 
calculates the term of protection for phonograms from fixation only (Art. 14(5)) of TRIPS). As a result, 
phonogram producers might enjoy a longer term of protection under the WPPT if the publication 
occurred several years after the fixation (Reinbothe & von Lewinski, 2015; Sterling, 2015). 
These treaties only apply to performances fixed on phonograms. Thus, the increase of protection 
applies to music performers, but not audio-visual performers. For this latter category, the applicable 
international instrument is the Beijing Treaty on Audio-visual Performances, signed in 2012. So far, 
the treaty has been ratified by 18 contracting states (including Slovakia, the only EU country to have 
ratified it at the time of writing), but it has not yet entered into force (30 ratifications are required). 
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2.2. Objectives of the Directive 
Several EU Directives have put forth the goal of promoting creativity and innovation.7 In line with 
such goal, they have increased the level of protection for both copyright and related rights in relation 
to the level of protection found in international treaties.8 At first sight, the Term of Protection 
Directive 2011 responds to this idea of increasing the level of protection for a specific category of 
right holders - music performers and phonogram producers. However, the increased protection 
relates solely to the duration of the right (and, in the case of music performers, also contractual 
conditions), rather than affecting any other aspect of the right(s). 
The ultimate objective of the Term of Protection Directive 2011 is to promote music production in the 
EU.9 However, neither the Commission Proposal nor the recitals of the Directive make any explicit 
reference to this general objective. Instead, they refer to more specific objectives, mentioned in the 
Impact Assessment: to contribute to enhancing the welfare of performers and the competitiveness of 
the EU music industry, and to increase the available music repertoire.10 
In relation to the first objective – enhancing the welfare of performers -, the Commission Proposal 
states that “the current employment status and conditions for the average European performer are 
not very rewarding.”11 According to the Commission, a number of reasons explain this situation: first, 
having in mind the term of protection applicable at the time the Directive was adopted (50 years), 
musicians or singers that started their career in their early 20’s face an income gap at the end of their 
lifetimes because their performances would enter the public domain in their 70’s. Second, 
discrepancies between the earnings of a minority of “superstar” performers and a majority of little-
known performers are endemic to the music industry. Third, individual performers have little 
bargaining power when signing contracts with phonogram producers. As a consequence, unfair 
situations appear where session musicians are paid a flat-fee for their contribution to songs that may 
turn out to be a huge success and generate a lot of revenues, or featured artists do not receive royalty 
payments because of a variety of record producers’ costs that need to be deducted from those 
royalties. Fourth, performers are at a disadvantage as compared to authors (whose works are 
protected until 70 years after their death) even though there are cases where performers are more 
identifiable with the success of a sound recording than authors12. 
In relation to the second and third objectives – enhancing the competitiveness of the EU music 
industry and increasing the available music repertoire -, the Commission refers to the challenges 
phonogram producers are encountering as a consequence of digital piracy: “revenues in general and 
profits in particular have decreased, largely due to increased piracy”.13 In these circumstances, the 
European record industry arguably faces the challenge of keeping up the steady revenue stream 
necessary to invest in new talent14. Furthermore, the Commission is of the opinion that performers 
and phonogram producers in Europe are at a disadvantage when compared to those in the USA15. 
                                                 
7 Recital 2 Directive 2001/29: “Copyright and related rights play an important role in this context as they protect and stimulate the 
development and marketing of new products and services and the creation and exploitation of their creative content.” In the same vein, 
Recital 11 of the Term of Protection Directive (2006): “The level of protection of copyright and related rights should be high, since those 
rights are fundamental to intellectual creation. Their protection ensures the maintenance and development of creativity in the interest of 
authors, cultural industries, consumers and society as a whole”. 
8 See e.g. the Term of Protection Directive (2006), which increased the term of protection of copyright to 70 years p.m.a., while the 
international treaties prescribed 50 years p.m.a. 
9 Impact Assessment, p. 22 
10 Ibid. 
11 Commission Proposal, p.2. 
12 Commission Proposal, pp. 3-4 
13 Commission Proposal, p. 4. 
14 Commission Proposal, p. 6. 
15 Impact Assessment, pp. 8 and 13. 
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This may divert creative efforts away from Europe and toward the American market, and record 
producers may orient their productions to cater to the taste of that market where most revenues 
could be gained.16 
The different measures in the Directive were adopted with the purpose of achieving these objectives. 
In turn, (part of) the objectives of the Directive are seemingly in alignment with the rationales for 
related rights: enhancing the welfare of performers conforms to the rationale of protecting 
performers due to natural rights arguments; enhancing the competitiveness of the EU music industry 
can act as an incentive and protection to the industry’s investment.  
2.3. Content of the Directive 
The main measure in the Directive is the extension of the term of protection from 50 to 70 years. The 
Directive also includes complementary measures in relation to contractual practices in the music 
sector: the “use it or lose it” clause, the 20%-fund for an annual supplementary remuneration, and the 
“clear slate” clause. 
2.3.1. The Term Extension 
The term extension provided by the Term of Protection Directive 2011 applies to music performers 
and phonogram producers. According to the new Art. 3(1) of the Term of Protection Directive 
(introduced by Art. 1(2)(a) of the 2011 Directive), the rights of performers expire 50 years after the 
date of performance. However, if that performance is fixed in a phonogram lawfully published or 
lawfully communicated to the public within those 50 years, the rights shall expire 70 years from the 
date on which such event took place (whichever is the earlier). The 70-year term was introduced by 
the Term of Protection Directive 2011. Previously, the provision stated 50 years. 
Example: A band played a concert in 1950. The performance is protected until 2000. However, 
if the concert was released as a record in 1953, the fixation of the performance is protected 
until 2023. If the phonogram where the performance is fixed was made available on the 
Internet in 2000, the term of protection still expires in 2023. 
In the case of phonogram producers, their rights expire 50 years after the fixation is made (Art. 3(2) of 
the Directive). However, if the phonogram is lawfully published within that period, said rights shall 
expire 70 years from the date of such event. If no lawful publication was made but the phonogram 
was lawfully communicated to the public within that period, the rights shall expire 70 years from the 
date of the first lawful communication to the public. The 70-year period was also introduced by the 
Term of Protection Directive 2011. Before, the provision provided for 50 years. 
Contrary to the provision concerning the rights of performers, Art. 3(2) gives preference to the 
publication of the phonogram as the relevant event: the provision makes clear that, if the 
phonogram is communicated to the public and later it is published, the 70-year term is counted from 
publication.  
Example: A band recorded an album in 1990. The rights of the record producer are protected 
until 2040. If the record is released in 1999, the producer’s rights are protected until 2069. If 
the phonogram where the performance is fixed was made available on the Internet in 1996, 
the term of protection expires in 2069 because the date of publication takes precedence over 
that of communication to the public. 
                                                 
16 Impact Assessment, p. 13. 
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The 70-year protection does not apply when the performance is fixed in a medium other than a 
phonogram (e.g. in an audio-visual file). In such a case, if the fixation of the performance is lawfully 
published or communicated to the public, the rights shall expire 50 years from the date of the 
relevant event, whichever is the earlier. 
 Example: A theatre company played a piece by Shakespeare in 1970. The performance of the 
piece is protected until 2020. The piece was recorded in video and broadcasted in 1973. The 
fixation of the piece is protected until 2023. If the video is commercialized on DVD in 2000, 
the term of protection still expires in 2023. 
Finally, Art. 1(1) of the Term of Protection Directive 2011 introduces a new paragraph 7 in Art. 1 of the 
original Term of Protection Directive, in relation to co-ownership of musical compositions. Member 
States had different solutions to calculate the term of protection of these works. Some applied 
different terms of protection to the music and to the lyrics (Hungary, Germany, United Kingdom), 
while others applied a unitary term (France, Portugal, Spain).17 These divergences created legal 
uncertainty when these works were exploited in different Member States.18 According to new Art. 
1(7), the term of protection of a musical composition with words expires 70 years after the death of 
the last one to survive, between the author of the lyrics and the composer of the music. For 
calculating this term of protection, it is irrelevant whether or not these persons are designated as co-
authors under the applicable national law. As a condition to apply this rule, Art. 1(7) states that both 
contributions (music and lyrics) must have been created specifically for the musical composition.  
While Art. 1(1) does not seem controversial, the amendments introduced by the Term of Protection 
Directive 2011 in relation to the extension of the term of protection raise at least four concerns. 
The first one relates to the interpretation of the terms “lawfully published” and “lawfully 
communicated”. As previously explained, in relation to producers’ rights, the first event prevails over 
the second even if it takes place later in time. Moreover, this is not only important for the calculation 
of the term of protection of phonogram producers, but also to determine the time where performers 
may exercise the rights that the accompanying measures provide for them (see the following 
section). The interpretation of these two concepts may create problems in the long-term. 
In relation to the definition of “lawfully published”, Art. 2(e) WPPT states that “publication of a fixed 
performance or a phonogram means the offering of copies of the fixed performance or the 
phonogram to the public, with the consent of the right holder, and provided that copies are offered 
to the public in reasonable quantity”. According to the Agreed Statement concerning this provision, it 
does not seem that the making available of copies of the phonogram on the Internet can be covered 
by this provision: “the expressions “copies” and “original and copies,” […] refer exclusively to fixed 
copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects”. Thus, it refers to the commercialization of 
the fixation of the performance in tangible supports such as CDs or DVDs.  
Generally speaking, performances that will enter the extension period (from 50 to 70 years) in the 
short term were released as records (lawfully published) because that was the only means of 
commercialization available 50 years ago. However, since the beginning of the 2000’s the making 
available of performances on the Internet is increasingly gaining relevance.19 Having in mind the cost-
reduction that it implies and the change of habits in music consumption, it is not difficult to imagine 
                                                 
17 Commission Proposal, p. 5. 
18 Recital 19 of the Term of Protection Directive 2011. 
19 According to the IFPI, 45% of consumers use audio streaming, and 75% video streaming, to consume music. Furthermore, a comparison 
of the share of time spent listening to licensed music shows that 18% refers to audio streaming, while 22% refers to purchased music. IFPI, 
Connecting with music – Music consumer insight report (September 2017), pp. 9 and 11. Available at http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Music-
Consumer-Insight-Report-2017.pdf (last accessed 3 December 2017). 
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that the “lawful communication” may become the rule and the “lawful publication” the exception in 
the near future. In such a scenario, it is hard to sustain that the second should prevail over the first to 
calculate the term of protection. In fact, record companies may make an abusive use of the provision, 
although the consequences would not be felt in the short-medium term: a record company that 
made a record available on the Internet in year 2008 may decide to wait until 2028 to publish the 
record as an album. In this case, the term of protection of the phonogram would extend until 2098. 
Certainly, performers will also benefit because their rights would be protected for a longer time; 
however, they would have to wait until 2078 to enjoy the rights provided by the accompanying 
measures (analyzed below in 2.3.2.).  
A related problem is the treatment to be granted to remasters of original recordings. It can be 
questioned whether a remaster ought to be considered a new phonogram (and, if so, whether the 
term of protection ought to be calculated from the date of publication or communication to the 
public of the remastered recording). Should a remaster be considered an original recording, 
performers would not necessarily be prejudiced, as they will be able to enjoy their rights in the 
extension period in relation to the original performances. Furthermore, this solution would abide by 
one of the objectives of the extension of the term of protection, which is to incentivize record 
companies to release their back catalogues.   
A second concern refers to the lack of alignment between the terms of protection of performers’ 
rights and producers’ rights (Sanchez Aristi, 2017). As explained, the former is calculated from the 
date of lawful publication or lawful communication to the public, whichever is the earlier. In the 
calculation of the latter, lawful publication takes preference. Therefore, the performer’s right in a 
performance might have entered the public domain, while the producer still enjoys his rights in the 
performance. 
Example: A fixation of a performance in a phonogram is made available on the Internet in 
2000, and in 2010 it is published as a record. Performer’s rights will last until 2071, while 
producers rights will expire in 2081.  
The third concern relates to the rationale of the term extension. This issue was highly debated 
during the preparatory works. In fact, the Commission received 36 responses to the public 
consultation in favor of the term extension and 29 against it. The Commission submitted a proposal 
that established a term of protection of 95 years (which was subsequently reduced to 70), because it 
was understood that it would bring benefits to performers and would thus allow more performers to 
dedicate more time to their artistic activities.20 It would also increase the pool of Artist & Repertoire 
(A&R) resources available to record producers, and could thus have an additional positive impact on 
cultural diversity.21 The impact on users was considered minimal because there was no clear evidence 
that prices of sound recordings would increase due to the term extension. On the contrary, the 
measure should have an impact on consumer choice and cultural diversity since more producers 
would have more resources to fund and develop new talent, and would have an incentive to digitize 
and market their back catalogue of old recordings.22 Finally, the impact on so-called public domain 
producers was considered minimal because, independently of the expiration of performer’s rights, 
the work performed on a phonogram remains protected for the life of the author who wrote the 
song.23 
                                                 
20 Commission Proposal, pp. 8-9. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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The proposal was criticized in a few studies that have refuted some of these arguments used by the 
European Commission (Helberger et al, 2008; Hilty et al, 2009; VVAA, 2008). The present study will not 
carry out an in-depth review of such studies, since the Term of Protection Directive 2011 has entered 
into force and these discussions are thus of limited relevance. A reduction of the term of protection 
would create legal uncertainty. However, some of the arguments used to support the term extension 
should be carefully revised in future proposals. This is particularly the case of the need to address the 
loss of revenue due to digital piracy. The extension of the term of protection of phonogram producers 
may benefit record labels, but it does not reduce digital piracy (Hilty et al, 2009). Even if record 
producers enjoy a longer term of protection of their rights, the losses from digital piracy do not 
decrease. Furthermore, in relation to the improvement of the current employment status and 
conditions of performers in Europe, it can be questioned whether a term extension was necessary. 
Performers are subjected to poor contractual conditions during their whole life, not only during the 
extension period (Hilty et al, 2009). Hence, it would likely be more effective to adopt measures to 
protect performers throughout their professional life. This shortcoming seems to have been 
addressed by the Proposal for a DSM Directive, which introduces provisions to protect performers 
during their entire career (Arts. 14 to 16 of the Proposal).  
The fourth concern amounts to the exclusion of audio-visual performers and producers from the 
scope of application of the Directive. According to the Impact Assessment, these categories of right 
holders were excluded because their economic and legal situation is significantly different: for 
instance, film producers are in some Member States considered as co-authors of films, and 
contractual practices in the film industry are different from those in the music industry (when it 
comes, for example, to presumption of transfer of rights).24 However, with the adoption of the Term of 
Protection Directive 2011, audio-visual artists seem to be lagging behind music performers, as was 
pointed out by several stakeholders contacted by the authors of the present report (e.g. AISGE in 
Spain, GVL in German or the pan-European association AEPO-ARTIS). The argument used by the 
Commission in relation to music performers appears to be applicable also to audio-visual artists: 
several times, the commercial success of certain films is more identifiable with actors than with their 
authors (directors, producers or script-writers). Thus, even if international treaties do not oblige the 
European Union to do so, the different treatment awarded to music and audio-visual artists might 
merit some legislative intervention.  
2.3.2. Accompanying Measures 
Art. 1(2) of the Term of Protection Directive 2011 includes a few accompanying measures, the 
purpose of which is to protect performers in their contractual relations with producers: the “use it or 
lose it” clause, the supplementary annual remuneration, the “clean slate” clause, and the right to 
modify the contract after the 50th year. These measures are a novelty in EU Copyright Law; the 
regulation of copyright contracts was in the past not considered a priority.25  
These measures are dependent on the term extension since they provide for rights, obligations or 
prohibitions that are only applicable in the extension period. As previously mentioned, this does not 
seem coherent. Performers can suffer from abusive contractual practices throughout the whole term 
of protection of their rights. Legal doctrine has criticized the fact that the accompanying measures 
are only effective after the 50th year of protection (Hilty et al., 2009). Since a performer in his/her 20’s 
                                                 
24 Impact Assessment, p. 11. 
25 Following the study carried out by IVIR (Hugenholtz et al, 2002), the European Commission stated in 2004 that differences between 
contractual rules were not significant enough to require harmonisation (Commission Communication “The Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Internal Market”, Doc COM(2004) 261 final).  
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will not enjoy these measures until he/she is in his/her 70’s, the link between said measures and the 
promotion of creativity becomes frail.   
Nevertheless, copyright laws in some Member States already contain provisions that protect 
performers during the whole contractual relationship.26In addition, the Proposal for a DSM Directive 
includes certain provisions on contractual practices that apply not only to authors but also to 
performers (Arts. 14-16).27If adopted, these provisions will harmonize the protection of performers in 
the EU: they aim at imposing transparency obligations to those contracting with performers, and at 
providing for adjustment mechanisms for cases where the remuneration originally agreed is 
disproportionately low compared to the subsequent revenues derived from the exploitation of the 
performances. Art. 16 of the Proposal for a DSM Directive further promotes the use of alternative 
dispute mechanisms in these contracts.28 
2.3.3. The “Use it or Lose it” Clause 
The new Art. 3(2a) of the Term of Protection Directive, introduced by Art.1(2)(c) of the Term of 
Protection Directive 2011, grants performers an unwaivable right to terminate the contract with a 
producer for the exploitation of a phonogram under certain cumulative conditions: 
a) This right can only be enforced 50 years after the phonogram was lawfully published or, 
failing such publication, 50 years after its lawful communication to the public. 
b) The phonogram producer does not offer copies of the phonogram for sale in sufficient 
quantity or does not make it available to the public. 
c) The producer has been notified by the performer of his/her intention to terminate the 
contract and after one year from that notification he/she has not carried out both acts of 
exploitation referred to in b). 
 Where the phonogram contains the fixation of the performances of a plurality of performers, it is for 
national law to determine how they may enforce this right. 
 If the performer enforces the “use it or lose it” clause, the rights of the phonogram producer in the 
phonogram expire in the EU territory (not abroad) (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2017). Although the Directive 
does not specify this, it is assumed that in those cases where the subject matter of the contract are 
performers’ rights in EU territory and in third countries, the termination of the contract in accordance 
with this provision would exclusively affect the rights in EU territory (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2017).  
 The wording of the provision raises some questions. 
 The first one is related to the interpretation of “lawfully published” and “lawfully communicated 
to the public”, since the first event prevails over the second. As explained in the previous section, 
while this might not be problematic in the short term, problems may appear in the long term. Once a 
record is “lawfully communicated to the public” on the Internet, the more the record company delays 
the “lawful publication” of the album the later performers would be able to make use of the use it or 
lose it clause. To avoid this problem, the prevalence of the “lawful publication” over the “lawful 
communication to the public” should be eliminated. 
The interpretation of the second requirement, according to which the performer can exercise this 
right when “the producer does not offer copies of the phonogram for sale in sufficient quantity or 
does not make it available to the public”, also raises some issues. The definition of “sufficient 
                                                 
26 See Bentley et al. 2017.  
27 In 2015, following another study (Europe Economics et al., 2015) the European Commission formed the view that contract regulation was 
then appropriate at the European level. 
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quantity” is unclear. According to Recital 8, reference should be made to the meaning of these words 
in the Rome Convention. However, there is no definition of the concept in the Convention. Probably 
the reference is to the meaning of “publication”, but it does not provide much help: “publication 
means the offering of copies of a phonogram to the public in reasonable quantity” (Art. 3). As 
analyzed in the following Chapter, national implementation regulations show certain discrepancies in 
relation to this requirement.  
A different question concerning the provision is the relation between “lawfully published” and 
“communicated to the public”. If the Directive requires the producer to carry out either one of these 
acts, the performer will be able to exercise the “use it or lose it” clause only where the producer does 
not publish and does not communicate the performance to the public. If however the Directive 
requires the producer to carry out both acts, the performer would be able to exercise the clause 
where the producer does not publish or communicate the performance to the public. The second 
interpretation is supported not only by a literal interpretation of the Directive, but also by the Impact 
Assessment.29 So for example if a producer only offers the phonogram online, the performer could 
activate the clause to make the producer distribute physical copies. This interpretation is certainly 
more beneficial for performers since it increases the number of situations where they would be able 
to make use of the clause. However, the interpretation does not seem consistent with current (and 
most probably future) practices of the music business. It is likely to become increasingly common that 
sound recordings are exclusively made available on the Internet, and not released in CDs, vinyl or 
DVDs. If the sound recording is exclusively made available on the Internet, the performer should not 
be entitled to terminate the contract.  
Finally, by referring exclusively to the “producer”, the Directive does not contemplate those situations 
where the producer has assigned the rights over the performance to a third party. In such cases, it is 
not clear whether the performer(s) should notify the original producer or the third party of his/her 
intention to terminate the contract. The answer is not necessarily straightforward, since the producer 
might have assigned the right without giving any notice to performers.  
2.3.4. Annual Supplementary Remuneration 
The new Art. 3(2b) to (2d) of the Term of Protection Directive aim to protect performers who are paid 
a flat fee (non-recurring remuneration) for the transfer or assignment of their exclusive rights. This is 
the case of session musicians (musicians who are hired on an ad hoc basis to play for a recording 
session). Generally, these musicians cannot negotiate their contracts and have to transfer their rights 
in perpetuity against a one-off payment. In cases where a song or a record is a success, these 
musicians do not have the right to ask for a percentage of the revenues generated by their 
performance.30 
To offset this situation, the provisions establish an unwaivable right to an annual supplementary 
remuneration for performers, consisting of 20% of the revenue which the phonogram producer has 
derived, during the preceding year, from the reproduction, distribution and making available of each 
fixation in phonogram of their performances in the Member State concerned. 
 The supplementary remuneration is supposed to benefit performers who have signed a contract that 
only gives them a right to claim a non-recurring remuneration. Performers who have a right to claim 
royalty payments over the revenues generated by their performances fixed in phonograms cannot 
claim this right. 
                                                                                                                                                            
28 An analysis of these provisions can be found in the Study by Bently et al., 2017. 
29 Impact Assessment, p. 26. 
30 Commission Proposal, p. 3. 
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The eligible category of performers enjoys this supplementary remuneration each year from the 50th 
until the 70th year after the phonogram was lawfully published or, failing such publication, lawfully 
communicated.  
Phonogram producers are obliged to provide, upon request, any information that may be necessary 
to secure payment of that remuneration. 
The right is administered by Collective Management Organisations (CMOs)31.It is understood that the 
reference in the provision is to CMOs administering performers’ rights. These need to work closely 
with CMOs representing phonogram producers to ensure the effectiveness of the remuneration. In 
certain Member States, performers and phonogram producers are represented by the same collecting 
society; hence at first sight the collection and distribution of the 20% fund should be easier. As will be 
analyzed in Chapter 3, much of the effectiveness of this provision depends on the measures adopted 
by the legislators and the CMOs in the Member States to identify performers entitled to this right and 
to inform them about it. In that regard, it should be recalled that Art. 13.3 of the CMO Directive 
requires CMOs to take all necessary measures to identify and locate the right holders. Furthermore, 
Art. 14 of the Proposal for a DSM Directive establishes an obligation for those contracting with 
performers to provide “adequate and sufficient information on the exploitation of their […] 
performances […], notably as regards modes of exploitation, revenues generated and remuneration 
due”. 
The provision might also prove ineffective where remasters are at stake. As explained in Section 
2.3.1, remasters should be considered a new phonogram, so a new term of protection should apply to 
them. Therefore, performers will only start enjoying the annual supplementary remuneration 50 years 
after the release of the remaster. At first sight, this does not prejudice performers because they will be 
able to enjoy the supplementary remuneration in relation to the original performances. However, as 
explained in the UK Report, problems may arise if record companies make the original recording no 
longer available to users and to the public. In this case, performers will not enjoy the supplementary 
remuneration from the remaster (because it has not reached the extension period), but also not from 
the original recording (because it is not generating any revenue since it was removed from 
commerce).  
2.3.5. The “Clean Slate” Provision 
While the annual supplementary remuneration aims to improve the position of performers who 
receive a flat-fee payment, the “clean slate” provision is devised for performers who contractually 
transfer or assign their rights in exchange for a royalty-based remuneration. This is usually the case of 
featured artists (performers who appear in the credits). 
 These contracts provide deductions of a variety of record producers’ costs (e.g. music videos, 
promotion, master costs) from the royalty payments performers are entitled to. As a consequence, 
the average percentage of royalties actually received by them is very low. According to the 
Commission, having in mind that only 1 in 8 CD is profitable, royalty payments are often not paid out 
at all.32 
To protect this category of performers, the new Art. 3(2e) of the Term of Protection Directive 
establishes that neither advance payments nor any contractually defined deductions will be 
                                                 
31 CMOs are defined in the CMO Directive as “any organisation which is authorised by law or by way of assignment, licence or any other 
contractual arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one rightholder, for the collective 
benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main purpose, and which fulfils one or both of the following criteria: (i) it is owned or controlled 
by its members; (ii) it is organised on a not-for-profit basis.” 
32 Commission proposal, pp. 3-4. 
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deducted from the payments made to them the 50th year after the phonogram was lawfully 
published or, failing such publication, lawfully communicated to the public. 
Again, the interpretation of “lawfully published” should not be an issue in the short-term. 
However, it may cause problems in the future due to the changes brought by digital technologies to 
the music market. 
Furthermore, as Chapter 3 will explain, the effectiveness of this provision resides on the measures 
taken by the Member States and the CMOs to identify which performances and which performers 
benefit from this provision, and under which terms. The effectiveness of the provision will also 
depend on informing performers about this right. In addition, as explained in the UK Report, it is not 
easy to identify which terms of a contract might be considered “deductions from royalty 
payments”. 
2.3.6. Right to renegotiate the contract following the 50th year 
The Term of Protection Directive 2011 has introduced a transitional measure (Art. 10a), which relates 
to contracts concluded before 1 November 2013 (the date when the Directive entered into force). 
According to this provision, Member States may introduce a right of performers to renegotiate in 
their favor those contracts which entitled them to recurring payments following the 50th year after 
the phonogram was lawfully published or, failing such publication, the 50th year after it was lawfully 
communicated to the public. 
The provision does not provide much information about how this right can be enforced by 
performers or which kind of modifications can be asked for. Neither does it clarify whether 
producers are obliged to accept the modifications proposed by performers, although Recital 16 of the 
Directive is an indication that the producers have some negotiation leeway.33It is optional for the 
Member States to introduce this right into national legislation. As explained in Chapter 3, only France 
has implemented this provision in national law, and the implementing measure does not address 
these questions. However, if the Proposal for a DSM Directive is adopted, performers would benefit 
from a clearer right to modify their contracts (Arts. 14 to 16). 
                                                 
33 Recital 16 of the Term of Protection Directive 2011: “(…) Member States should have procedures in place to cover the eventuality that the 
renegotiation fails.” 
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3. STATUS QUO OF NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATIONS  
The analysis of the implementation of the Directive in selected Member States (France, Germany, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) has three different purposes: first, to obtain detailed 
information on the adequacy of implementation; second, to find out if the objectives of the Directive 
are already being accomplished; third, to determine whether Member States have solved the 
problems identified in Chapter 2. Since it is too early to have relevant case law on the implemented 
measures, we will analyze their drafting in national laws, as well as the actions taken by CMOs and 
other stakeholders. This analysis will allow us to identify best practices of implementation that may 
help in interpreting the Directive’s provisions, or that may facilitate the accomplishment of its 
objectives. The best practices will be identified in Chapter 4.  
The analysis of the implementation of the Directive in selected Member States (France, Germany, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) has three different purposes: first, to obtain detailed 
information on the adequacy of implementation; second, to find out if the objectives of the Directive 
are already being accomplished; third, to determine whether Member States have solved the 
problems identified in Chapter 2. Since it is too early to have relevant case law on the implemented 
measures, we will analyze their drafting in national laws, as well as the actions taken by CMOs and 
other stakeholders. This analysis will allow us to identify best practices of implementation that may 
help in interpreting the Directive’s provisions, or that may facilitate the accomplishment of its 
objectives. The best practices will be identified in Chapter 4.  
3.1. Term Extension 
The provisions concerning the term extension were mostly complied with and implemented without 
much problem by the Member States. This was the case in Sweden, France, Spain, Romania and the 
UK. This however was not the case in Portugal. Portuguese Copyright Law does not have a distinction 
between the term extension for performers and for producers. The provision referring expressly to 
the term of protection for producer’s rights (Art. 183(4) of the Portuguese Copyright Law) was 
revoked and never substituted. This leaves one provision on term extension – Art. 183(3) – to be 
applied to both. The provision reads: “If the fixation of the performance of a performer in a 
phonogram is lawfully published or lawfully communicated to the public, within the period 
mentioned in paragraph 1, the term of protection of the right is 70 years following the date of the first 
publication or the first communication to the public, whichever is the earlier” (the relevant period 
mentioned in the current version of Art. 183(1) is the 50-year period following the date of the 
performance; the 50-year period following the fixation was revoked). The term “right” could then be 
interpreted to refer to either performer or phonogram producer, but this is shrouded in uncertainty 
and does not seem consistent with the fact that Art. 183(1)(a) only refers to the performance as the 
relevant act (and not to fixation as well). 
As explained in Chapter 2, the Directive does not indicate what is meant by “lawful publication” 
and “lawful communication”, and the majority of countries surveyed have not provided a definition 
either (although the UK implemented these terms as meaning “authorized”, as is apparent from 
Section 13A(2) CDPA).34 In Portugal, in the first implementation attempt, the national lawmaker did 
not even state that the phonogram had to be lawfully published or lawfully communicated to the 
public within the 50-year period following the date of the performance. This error was later corrected.  
                                                 
34 The final part of Section 13A(2) CDPA reads: “(…) in determining whether a sound recording has been published, played in public or 
communicated to the public, no account shall be taken of any unauthorised act.”  
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The lack of a definition may create legal uncertainty, in particular in those cases where unauthorised 
fixations of a sound recording (so-called bootlegs) are released.  Still in relation to these terms, none 
of the Member States surveyed have introduced specific measures to deal with the question of 
remasters, and whether they are considered as new phonograms for purposes of computation of 
term. 
In what concerns co-written musical works, the provision hasn’t caused much difficulties in the 
implementation stage, again the exception being Portugal, which did not implement it. Under 
Portuguese law, works of joint authorship are given a single term of protection calculated from the 
death of the last surviving author, but a musical composition will not necessarily be a work of joint 
authorship under Portuguese law. 
When the performance is fixed in a medium different than a phonogram, some national laws were 
silent (Portugal, UK), which indicates that the term extension does not apply when the performance is 
fixed in other media (as the respective provisions on term extension only mention phonograms). 
Other countries (France, Romania, Germany, Spain, Sweden) make a clear differentiation between 
phonograms and video/other media, prescribing a different term of protection for the latter (50 
years). As a result, practical difficulties may arise when a performance has been recorded both on a 
phonogram and other (audio-visual) media, since such situation is not accounted for in any of the 
Member States covered by this study. None of the Member States surveyed opted for extending the 
term of protection of rights of audio-visual performers and producers.  
3.2. Use it or lose it clause 
The implementation of the use it or lose it clause has revealed several problems. Parts of the clause 
leave considerable leeway to national legislators, such as the termination of contracts on transfer 
and assignment in accordance with applicable national laws when the phonogram contains the 
fixation of the performances of a plurality of performers. The subject of joint ownership is not 
harmonised in the EU, and therefore the choice to leave this issue to national law is on the one hand 
understandable. On the other hand, EU law has in the past avoided harmonisation of 
authorship/ownership while still regulating particular situations – see the case, e.g., of the 
harmonisation of the term of protection of cinematographic or audio-visual works, which is attached 
to the death of the last person to survive out of a list of contributors, regardless of whether they are 
designated as authors; 35  or the term of protection of co-written musical works, again set 
independently of regulation of joint ownership and introduced in the Term of Protection Directive 
2011 itself. The regulation of termination of contracts in cases where a plurality of performers is 
involved might thus represent a missed opportunity to approximate national laws. The choice of the 
EU legislator to leave this issue to national law has dictated very different solutions across the EU. 
Having in mind that music performances with a plurality of performers is the general rule in many 
music styles, the effectiveness of the Directive is affected. The exercise of the use it or lose it clause by 
performers depends on how complex the answer to this question is in each Member State. Sweden 
requires that the performers exercise jointly the right to terminate the contracts on transfer or 
assignment. If only part of the performers does so, the producers will retain the rights in the other 
contributions. French law requires a common agreement of the performers, who will then have to 
jointly follow the specific procedure laid down in the law, which is also applicable to individual 
                                                 
35 Art. 2(2) of the Term of Protection Directive: “The term of protection of cinematographic or audiovisual works shall expire 70 years after 
the death of the last of the following persons to survive, whether or not these persons are designated as co-authors: the principal director, 
the author of the screenplay, the author of the dialogue and the composer of music specifically created for use in the cinematographic or 
audiovisual work.” 
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performers (R212-8, III of CPI); any disagreement is to be settled by civil courts. By contrast, in the UK, 
it seems that any one performer can trigger the use it or lose it clause, which would then cause the 
other performers to be entitled to terminate their contracts as well; however, they would have to 
agree on the exercise of their rights after that (e.g., joint exercise, or assignment of the rights to the 
performer who triggered the clause). Thus, in practice, this might mean that all the performers will 
need to act jointly (although each one of them would have to issue notices to terminate their 
individual contracts). Romania has not established any specific procedure, but the existing procedure 
for collective works states that the group’s rights (including, presumably, the right to termination) are 
exercised by a representative nominated by majority. Similarly, in Germany, the right to termination is 
to be exercised by an elected representative of the group or by the group leader. In Spain, the 
exercise of the right must be decided by a representative designated by a majority of the performers 
for that purpose, but some exceptions exist: orchestra directors and soloists can decide 
autonomously. So, in the end, the agreement of a majority of performers and of the soloist or the 
orchestra director is needed; in cases where the soloist and/or the orchestra director decide to 
terminate the contract, but the rest of the performers do not, this may create a stalemate. Portugal 
has unclear rules, as it prescribes that performers may terminate their contracts provided that the 
rules regarding works of joint authorship are respected. This might be interpreted to mean that said 
rules are applicable to performances, in which case performers would have to be in agreement to 
terminate their contracts. 
Another instance where countries had implementation leeway concerns the procedure to trigger the 
“use it or lose it” clause. So, for example, French law introduced a two-step procedure to 
operationalise the clause: the performer must first notify the producer of her intention to terminate 
the contract and – if after one year the producer does not engage in distribution or making available 
of the phonogram – then she exercises the termination right by notifying the producer of her decision 
to terminate said contract. Since in the other Member States no such procedure is mentioned, this 
may give the impression that the rights automatically expire after one year post the first notification 
(because there is no second step). This however does not seem to be the case in Spain, where Art. 
110bis(1) of the Spanish Copyright Act refers to the exercise of the right after one year, counted from 
notification. It appears thus that the performer must communicate the termination of the contract to 
the producers at that point in time (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2017). National reports from Germany, Romania, 
Sweden and Portugal are not conclusive about this issue.  
A second set of problems with the implementation of the “use it or lose it” clause are the obscure 
and/or undefined terms comprised in the provision. This is particularly the case of the term 
“sufficient quantity”. As explained in Chapter 2, the reference to “the meaning of the International 
Convention on the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations”, in Recital 8 of the Term of Protection Directive 2011, does not seem to be enough to 
avoid divergent interpretations. The majority of Member States surveyed have implemented the term 
without defining it. In the opinion of the CMO representing performers in Portugal, the expression 
should be interpreted as meaning “in sufficient quantity to be acquired in normal market conditions, 
that is with a balanced distribution in the territory at stake”. According to the same stakeholder, the 
“sufficient quantity” requirement should also be applied to the making available act, in order to mean 
that the producer should make the phonogram available not only in one online platform, but in a 
“significant part” of them that are active on the market. Unsurprisingly, the CMO representing 
producers in the same country disagreed with these interpretations – it held that “sufficient quantity” 
is tied to market demand, and that it is only applicable regarding physical copies. The difference in 
interpretation thus illustrated is likely to take place in other Member States as well.  
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Other Member States however have defined the term in legislation. It is the case of Spain, where Art. 
110bis(1) refers to “a sufficient quantity of copies so as to satisfy the reasonable needs of the public 
taking into account the nature and aim of the phonogram.” The definition derives from Art. 3(3) of the 
Berne Convention. As explained by legal doctrine (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2017), the definition requires an 
analysis of the particular circumstances of the phonogram in question (its content, the featured artist, 
the producer, its aim, the market and the targeted audience) to determine whether the offer of copies 
is sufficient. Similarly, in the UK, the law states that “sufficient quantity” means “such quantity as to 
satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public for copies of the sound recording” (Section 191HA7 
CDPA). 
Another problem in the implementation of this clause is its operationalisation in practice, and 
whether performers are sufficiently informed about their rights in the context of the “use it or 
lose it” mechanism. There does not seem to be concerted efforts in terms of informing performers 
about this clause. Information available on model contracts used by producers indicates that they 
have not amended such contracts to reflect the use it or lose it clause (Romania, UK, Germany, 
Portugal). Therefore, performers might be informed of it through the general, official information 
channels (such as websites of legislative institutions or official journals). Some CMOs representing 
performers have undertaken to inform their members through their usual channels of 
communications, chiefly their websites (such is the case of the Romanian CREDIDAM, the British PPL, 
or the Portuguese GDA). Some respondents point out that more could be done on the side of 
phonogram producers (or the bodies representing them), with performers in one country (Romania) 
indicating that producers were reluctant “to enter into a conversation on this topic”.  
There also seems to be a mismatch between the practices of the music industry and the “use it or lose 
it” clause. As explained in Chapter 2, a literal interpretation of the Directive implies that the right to 
terminate arises where the producer “fails to carry out both of the acts of exploitation” (i.e., 
offering copies in sufficient quantity and making the phonogram available). Such interpretation is 
supported by the Impact Assessment.36 So for example if a producer offers the phonogram online 
only, the performer could activate the clause to make the producer distribute physical copies. This 
can be at odds with existing practices in the music industry, where it is increasingly common to rely 
only on digital distribution methods (i.e., making the phonogram available on the Internet, as 
opposed to distributing physical copies such as CDs). Portugal appears to be the only one out of the 
countries surveyed that went against the text of the Directive and opted for a different solution: 
according to Art. 183-A(2) of the Portuguese Copyright Law, it is enough that the producer carries out 
one of the two acts to avoid the performer triggering the clause. The rest of the Member States 
surveyed have used the same wording as the Directive when implementing the measure in their 
national laws.  
Moreover, and following the Directive’s wording, most national laws do not envisage the possibility 
of the offering or making available of copies to be made by third parties. However, some countries 
have chosen to deviate from this, probably to comply with industry practices or at least to make the 
clause more efficient in practice. It is the case of the UK and Portugal, where the offering of copies and 
making available can be carried out respectively by an exclusive licensee or assignees. In the case of 
Spain, legal doctrine has interpreted the relevant provision (Art. 110bis (1)) to refer also to third 
parties (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2017). However, the wording of the second paragraph of the provision 
refers exclusively to producers.  
                                                 
36 Impact Assessment, p. 26 
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 According to data retrieved, the use it or lose it clause has not been invoked by performers in any of 
the selected countries. This might be due to the fact that the number of performers that fits this 
particular “window of time” (given that the right can only be exercised 50 years after the lawful 
publication or communication to the public of the performance) is still limited (this was pointed out 
by stakeholders in the UK and Portugal). In addition, in countries such as the UK it is likely that the use 
it or lose it clause will never be enforced. This is because the equitable remuneration of performers for 
certain uses of the recording (namely communication to the public) is payable by the owner of the 
copyright in the phonogram (i.e., the producer).37 But copyright in the phonogram expires if the 
performer triggers the use it or lose it clause (Section 191HA4 CDPA), causing the performer to lose 
the right to claim equitable remuneration from the producer during the extension period. Instead, 
the performer will have to claim it from the “person who plays the sound recording in public or 
communicates the sound recording to the public” (Section 182D CDPA).38 The uncertainty as to how 
this remuneration will be paid might thus act as a disincentive to trigger the use it or lose it clause. 
3.3. Annual Supplementary Remuneration 
The first and most important conclusion that can be extracted from the national reports in relation to 
the annual supplementary remuneration is that it is not fully working in practice in all of the 
surveyed Member States. Only the CMOs in Spain and the UK are presently distributing the 20% 
fund among their members. In Spain, more than 1.000 performers have benefited so far; and in the 
United Kingdom 2.000 performers received until 2016(collectively) GBP 241.857 relating to 11.600 
recordings. GDA in Portugal has initiated the process of collection of the remuneration, but due to the 
low amount to be collected so far (about EUR 3.000) it has not distributed it among performers yet. 
GDA expects to start distributing the 20% fund still in 2017. In the case of Germany, according to the 
information provided by GVL, a pilot phase has started in 2014 and a reasonable amount has already 
been collected (about EUR 11.400 for 2014 and EUR 32.800 for 2015). However, the remuneration has 
not yet been distributed among their members because the number of entitled performers is still to 
be  determined, and the way to distribute the remuneration has not been decided. In Romania, the 
administration of the 20% fund has not been formally discussed, and none of the three CMOs 
representing performers has been designated to administer it. Finally, information available from 
CMOs in Sweden and France does not reveal whether they are already collecting and distributing the 
remuneration39.  
The second conclusion relates to the measures adopted in law and in practice in each of the 
Member States to identify performers who are entitled to the annual supplementary 
remuneration. Having in mind the time that has passed since performances have been published or 
communicated to the public (50 years), certain scholars have pointed out that this is not an easy task 
(Gonzalez Gozalo, 2017). However, the effectiveness of the annual supplementary remuneration relies 
on these measures. Generally speaking, all CMOs have informed their members about it through their 
websites or newsletters. However, according to the information received, just a few of these CMOs 
have actively taken concrete steps towards identifying performers who are entitled to the 
remuneration. That is the case of AIE in Spain, which addressed the record companies either directly 
(in the case of the “majors”) or through AGEDI (the phonogram producers’ CMO); of GVL in Germany 
                                                 
37 Section 182D. (1.b) of the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996:"Where a commercially published sound recording of the whole 
or a substantial part of a qualifying performance is included in a broadcast or cable programme service, the performer is entitled to 
equitable remuneration from the owner of the copyright in the sound recording." 
38 As also stated in the UK Government Explanatory Notes, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/copyright-in-sound-
recordings/copyright-in-sound-recordings (last accessed 2 November 2017) 
39 Apart from the surveyed Member States, the questionnaire received from Younion/Musik sector states that Austria is already applying the 
annual suplementary fund and that 17.000 performers are already benefiting from it. 
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(which addressed the producers represented by the society); and of PPL in the UK, which was able to 
extract the necessary information for the collection and distribution of the remuneration due to its 
advanced IT systems and accurate database. GDA in Portugal has started to collect the necessary 
information but no payment has been distributed yet. According to the national reports, in France, 
Sweden and Romania no actions have been adopted by CMOs in this regard. AEPO-ARTIS has 
however pointed out that this is not always the fault of CMOs. Access to the information held by 
producers is not always easy, and apparently certain CMOs have been asked to pay producers to 
access their databases. 
A third conclusion refers to the implementation in national laws of the producers’ obligation to 
provide, upon request, any information which may be necessary in order to secure the 
payment of the remuneration. This is vital to the effectiveness of the annual supplementary fund, 
since the necessary information to identify the performances and performers entitled to it is held by 
producers. While the Directive states that the 20% fund is to be administered by a CMO, most of the 
Member States have established that the person who has to request the information from the 
producer is the performer herself (Germany: Section 79a (4), UK: Section 191HB (5), Portugal: Art. 183A 
(6), and Romania: Art. 102 (1) (5)). French legislation refers to both the performer and the CMO (Art. L-
212-3-3-III) Spain (Art. 110bis (2)) and Sweden (Section 45b) have established that the request has to 
be done by a CMO (and not by performers). So far, these contradictions have not created any problem 
to the functioning of the fund - probably because it can be presumed that CMOs requesting 
information to producers are acting on behalf of performers. In fact, in the surveyed Member States 
where the supplementary remuneration is already operating in practice  (Spain, UK, Germany and 
Portugal), it is the CMO who is contacting producers to obtain this information, and there is no 
evidence that producers have not provided it. However, it should be recalled that so far the 
supplementary remuneration system is only working in a few Member States. It is thus not known if 
any questions will arise in other Member States because of this contradiction. In any case, it should be 
noted that the regulation of these issues is complemented by Art. 13(3) of the CMO Directive, which 
establishes a general obligation for CMOs to adopt the necessary measures to identify and locate 
right holders who are entitled to remuneration.  
An additional question related to the obligation to provide information refers to the measures that 
can be adopted against those producers who do not provide information, or who provide 
incomplete information. Certain CMOs have raised concerns about this issue. Only UK legislation 
has envisaged a solution to this hypothetical problem: the performer may apply to the county court if 
the producer does not comply with the obligation within 90 days after the request. Furthermore, 
performers have a statutory right to apply to the Copyright Tribunal to determine the correct amount 
which should be remitted by the record company to the CMO (Section 191HB of CDPA). Presumably, 
even though the CDPA refers exclusively to the performer as the person entitled to go to court, the 
CMOs will also be able to file these complaints on behalf of the performers they represent, since the 
Term of Protection Directive 2011 (Art. 2d) requires Member States to ensure that this remuneration is 
administered by CMOs. 
Another issue concerning the obligation to provide information refers to its scope. UK legislation 
obliges producers to provide the necessary information to ascertain the amount due, or to secure its 
distribution by the CMO. In Germany, the obligation exclusively relates to information about 
“generated revenues”, so it is more limited in scope. According to the national report, it does not 
entitle performers to check the books of the producer to determine who participated in which 
fixation and under which terms, for example. By contrast, in Sweden, the Government has interpreted 
the provision very broadly as entailing an obligation for producers to report such material as is 
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necessary to make it possible to check the amount of the annual supplementary remuneration. Thus, 
if an organization so requests, the producer may be required to issue documents that allow for such 
control. GDA (Portugal) has also raised concerns about the difficulties in operationalising the 
payment of the remuneration if accurate information is not provided by producers. In fact, GDA 
considers it advisable to monitor the records that are marketed in order to double-check the amounts 
payable. Other Member States (Spain) have used the same wording as the Directive to implement this 
obligation, but it is still to be seen how it is interpreted by the competent authorities. 
Regarding the identification of the person responsible for paying the 20% fund, the British 
(Section 191HB (1) (b)) and Spanish (Art. 110bis.2) legislations refer to the producer or “the exclusive 
licensee.” However, following the wording of the Directive, most national laws refer exclusively to the 
“producer”. Problems may arise since, as some CMOs have explained, it is often someone else other 
than the original producer who exploits and derives income from the exploitation of the sound 
recording. In those cases, questions can be raised as to who is supposed to pay the remuneration. At 
least in Germany and according to the national report, scholars have criticized the legal provision and 
have sustained that, in case of “band-transfer agreement”, the original producer should be exempted 
from paying the annual supplementary remuneration. 
In relation to the calculation of the 20% fund, Art. 3 (2c) of the Directive refers to “20 % of the 
revenue which the phonogram producer has derived, during the year preceding that for which the 
said remuneration is paid, from the reproduction, distribution and making available of the 
phonogram in question”. Furthermore, Recitals 11-13 make clear that “revenue” refers to gross 
revenue (before deducting costs) and that “no account should be taken of revenue which the 
phonogram producer has derived from the rental of phonograms, of the single equitable 
remuneration received for broadcasting and communication to the public or of the fair compensation 
received for private copying.” Just a few Member States (Spain and UK) have introduced these 
clarifications in their national laws. In the case of the UK, it is further said that the remuneration “is 
payable within 6 months of the end of each relevant period and is recoverable by the collecting 
society as a debt.” In other Member States, either the law does not refer to gross revenues (Sweden, 
France, Portugal), or the excluded acts are not mentioned (Germany, Portugal). These omissions 
might generate legal uncertainty both for performers and producers.  
The Swedish Artists' and Musicians' Interest Organisation (SAMI) has criticised that the Swedish 
implementing measures do not make entirely clear which uses of the performances are covered, and 
whether the remuneration applies to foreign fixations exploited in the country. The legislative works 
support the interpretation that only producers whose contracts are governed by Swedish law (so, 
phonograms produced in Sweden) are covered by the provision. However, this interpretation is not 
compatible with the Directive. None of its provisions can be interpreted as limiting the scope of 
application of the annual supplementary fund.  
In the case of Spain, legal doctrine has pointed out that the implementing measures are not in 
conformity with EU Law, the reason being that Art. 108(3) of the Spanish Copyright Act already grants 
performers a right to a single equitable remuneration for the making available of their performances 
(Gonzalez Gozalo, 2017). The introduction of the annual supplementary remuneration in Spanish 
legislation should then have been accompanied by the revocation of Art. 108 (3), so that performers 
are not paid twice for the same acts of exploitation of their performances (Gonzales Gozalo, 2017). 
Finally, in relation to the possibility of exempting micro-entreprises from the obligation to pay the 
annual supplementary remuneration (Recital 12 of the Term of Protection Directive 2011), only France 
has made use of this possibility (Art. 212-3-3 CPI). 
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3.4. “Clean Slate” Provision 
Out of the seven Member States surveyed, two of them do not seem to have properly 
implemented the “clean slate” provision: Sweden and Portugal. In the case of Sweden, art. 45C of 
the Copyright Act is very similar to the wording in the Directive. However, according to SAMI, the last 
sentence of the provision states that “Offsetting may be made if the artist explicitly approved it.” This 
means that the “clean slate” clause is not mandatory and can be derogated by explicit agreement of 
the parties. According to the national expert report, the Swedish government understood that the 
existing legislation offers enough means of protection to performers. In particular, contract law 
(section 36) sets out that contractual terms may be adjusted if a clause is unfair in view of the content 
of the agreement, the circumstances surrounding it and the circumstances in general. A contract 
where a “clean slate” clause has been contracted out may still then be consider null and void if, in the 
view of the circumstances, it is considered unfair. It is doubtful whether this is enough to implement 
the provision.  
In the case of Portugal, the lawmaker seems to have misinterpreted Art. 3(2)(e) of the Directive. It was 
considered that this obligation is related to the annual supplementary remuneration. This is the 
reason why Art. 183.a(5) of the Portuguese Copyright Law states that the overall amount that the 
producer should set aside for performers who receive non-recurring payments shall be 
unencumbered by advance payments or contractually defined deductions. An amendment to the 
Copyright Law should be introduced to solve this problem.  
The implementations in Spain, UK, France, Germany and Romania are in conformity with the 
Directive. In fact, most of them are a verbatim copy of the text in Art. 3 (2)(e).  
Nevertheless, the implementation of this provision raises some concerns. Firstly, it can be concluded 
from the national reports that very few measures have been adopted to inform performers and/or 
to help them in enquiring producers about this right. Producers have not amended their model 
contracts to introduce a “clean slate” clause either. Certainly, they are not obliged to do so, but it 
shows that so far the clause has not been adopted as a contractual practice in the music sector.  
Secondly, none of the reports provides information about cases where performers have asked for 
the application of this right. This might be due to the fact that, as mentioned by SAMI (Sweden), 
advance payments and deductions were not common contractual practices in the music sector 50 
years ago. Another report (UK) provides a different explanation: it is not unusual that a featured artist 
will be un-recouped for GBP 100.000 or more. In any case, very few performers (those whose 
performances have already entered the extension period) might have benefitted from this right so 
far.  
Thirdly, as mentioned in the Report from the UK, the exercise of this right by performers can be 
made quite difficult since not all of their performances will come into the extension period at the 
same time. Most probably, they will come two at a time (if they were originally released as singles) or 
ten (album). In addition, it is very difficult for producers to find 50-year old accounting and write off 
the appropriate amount for that individual recording or album.  
Finally, some national reports (Spain, Germany, UK) point out that there are some problems in 
interpreting the terms “advance payments” and “contractually defined deductions”. As 
mentioned in the UK report, further guidance on this issue would facilitate the fulfilment of the 
obligation by producers. For instance, it is not clear whether the producer can use the royalties 
generated by the performances already in the extension period to compensate advance payments of 
performances of the same performers that have not reached that period.  
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3.5. Right to renegotiate the contract following the 50th year 
France is the only Member State that has made use of this optional measure included in Art. 10a(2) of 
the Directive. According to art. 8.III Loi 2015-195, a recurring remuneration agreed prior to 1 
November 2013 can be renegotiated for the benefit of performers. However, the way the provision 
has been implemented does not necessarily improve the position of performers in contractual 
relations. In particular, the provision does not clarify important questions surrounding this right to 
modify the contract, such as: a) how shall this renegotiation take place?; b) are producers obliged to 
renegotiate?; c) can performers sue producers if they do not agree to renegotiate the terms of the 
contract?. Without those questions being answered by the legislator, this right does not appear to be 
fully effective. 
In any event, certain Member States already provide performers with “contractual adjustment 
mechanisms” (Bently et al, 2017). That is the case in France, where there are rules aimed at 
guaranteeing music performers a minimum share in remuneration (Art. 212.13 CPI); and Germany, 
where the courts have held that the contract adjustment mechanism provided for authors in Art. 32a 
of German Copyright Law could be exercised by a dubbing actor.40 In Spain, performers are not 
covered by the equitable remuneration action provided for in Art. 47 of the Spanish Copyright Act. In 
the UK, minimal regulation of copyright contracts exists. Judicial intervention to reformulate 
contractual terms only occurs under the general doctrines applicable to cases of unreasonable 
restraint of trade and undue diligence (Bently et al, 2017). Moreover, Arts. 14-16 of the Proposal for a 
DSM Directive (if and when approved) will ensure the availability of contractual adjustment 
mechanisms throughout the EU territory. 
 
                                                 
40 BGH I ZR 145/11, 10 May 2012, “Fluch der Karibik” 
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COUNTRY Term extension Use it or lose it clause Annual Supplementary Remuneration 
“Clean Slate” 
Provision 
Right to 
renegotiate the 
contract following 
the 50th year 
FRANCE Implemented verbatim. 
In case of multiple performers, a common 
agreement is needed  
A two-step procedure to operationalise the 
clause is introduced: first a notification to the 
producer, if after one year the producer does 
not engage in distribution or making available 
of the phonogram; second, a new notification 
to terminate the contract. 
Still not working in practice. 
The person who has to request the 
information from the producer can be 
either the performer of the CMO. 
Micro-enterprises are exempted from 
the 20% fund. 
Implemented 
verbatim. 
Implemented quasi 
verbatim. 
GERMANY Implemented verbatim. 
In case of multiple performers, the right of 
termination is to be exercised by an elected 
representative of the group or by the group 
leader. 
The remuneration is already being 
collected, but not distributed. 
The person who has to request the 
information from the producer is the 
performer herself. 
Implemented 
verbatim. 
This optional measure 
has not been 
implemented. 
PORTUGAL 
The provision was not 
adequately 
implemented. A 
distinction is not 
made between 
performers and 
phonogram 
producers. 
In case of multiple performers, rules on joint 
ownership must be followed. 
The offering of copies and making available 
can be carried out respectively by an exclusive 
licensee or assignees instead of the producer. 
The remuneration is already being 
collected, distribution is expected to 
start still in 2017. 
The person who has to request the 
information from the producer is the 
performer herself. 
The provision has not 
been adequately 
implemented. 
This optional measure 
has not been 
implemented. 
ROMANIA Implemented verbatim. 
In case of multiple performers, the general 
procedure for collective works applies. 
Still not working in practice. 
The person who has to request the 
information from the producer is the 
performer herself. 
Implemented 
verbatim. 
This optional measure 
has not been 
implemented. 
SPAIN Implemented verbatim. 
In case of multiple performers, an agreement 
by a majority is needed. A representative will 
be appointed to exercise the right. Soloist and 
The remuneration is being collected 
and distributed in an adequate 
manner. 
Implemented 
verbatim. 
This optional measure 
has not been 
implemented. 
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COUNTRY Term extension Use it or lose it clause Annual Supplementary Remuneration 
“Clean Slate” 
Provision 
Right to 
renegotiate the 
contract following 
the 50th year 
orchestra directors can act autonomously. 
A definition of “sufficient quantity” is included: 
“a sufficient quantity of copies so as to satisfy 
the reasonable needs of the public taking into 
account the nature and aim of the 
phonogram.” 
The person who has to request the 
information from the producer is the 
CMO. 
The person responsible for paying the 
20% fund is the producer or “the 
exclusive licensee”. 
SWEDEN Implemented verbatim. 
In case of multiple performers, they must 
jointly exercise the right. 
Still not working in practice. 
The person who has to request the 
information from the producer is the 
CMO. 
The implementing 
provision states that 
“Offsetting may be 
made if the artist 
explicitly approved 
it.” 
This optional measure 
has not been 
implemented. 
UK  Implemented verbatim. 
In case of multiple performers, any of them 
can trigger the clause, which would then 
cause the other performers to be entitled to 
terminate their contracts as well. 
A definition of “sufficient quantity” is included: 
“such quantity as to satisfy the reasonable 
requirements of the public for copies of the 
sound recording.” 
The offering of copies and making available 
can be carried out by an exclusive licensee or 
assignee instead of the producer. 
The remuneration is being collected 
and distributed in an adequate 
manner. 
The person who has to request the 
information from the producer is the 
performer herself. 
Performers can bring producers to 
court if the latter do not provide the 
information needed for payment of 
the remuneration within 90 days. 
The person responsible for paying the 
20% fund is the producer or the 
exclusive licensee. 
Implemented 
verbatim 
This optional measure 
has not been 
implemented. 
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4. BEST PRACTICES 
The analysis of national implementations of the Term of Protection Directive 2011 in selected 
Member States allows for the extraction of best practices. The best practices were selected taking into 
account its contribution to achieve the main objectives of the Directive, identified in 2.2.: contributing 
to enhancing the welfare of performers and the competitiveness of the music industry, and 
increasing the available music repertoire. The best practices identified may thus be used as a model in 
other Member States to provide a solution to the problems identified in Chapter 2, and to facilitate 
the accomplishment of the Directive’s objectives.  
4.1. Term extension 
The implementation of the provisions concerning the term extension is very similar in the Member 
States surveyed, making it challenging to select best practices. Only one is worth mentioning: the 
clarification in UK law that “lawfully published” or “lawfully communicated” means authorised by the 
right holder concerned. This would make clear that the unlawful publication or communication to 
the public of the phonogram (such as the so-called “bootleg”) should not be taken into account in the 
calculation of the term of protection.  
All the Member States surveyed have kept the distinction between “lawful publication” and “lawful 
communication to the public”, as well as the more relevant role of the former in the calculation of the 
term of protection of producers’ rights. As explained in Chapter 2, this preference does not seem to 
be in conformity with the actual practices in the music sector, where making available on the Internet 
is becoming the rule, and the lawful publication of an album in tangible format will soon be the 
exception. Still, none of the Member States have understood that this problem deserved a detailed 
solution in national law. The same is true in the case of remasters: no particular provision is found in 
the implementation measures analysed.  
Considering the actual practices in the music market, it would be better to count the terms of 
protection from the date of the lawful publication or the lawful communication to the public, 
whichever takes place first. It is possible that the CJEU adopts a broad interpretation of the concept 
of “lawful publication” that includes the making available of the performance on the Internet, in 
which case an amendment of the Directive would not be necessary in the future. Such broad 
interpretation would not be incompatible with the WPPT and the Rome Convention, since both 
treaties provide for a “de minimis” protection: while the EU must consider as a publication the 
commercialization of the performance in tangible copies, it ought to be free to consider the making 
available on the Internet as a publication as well. If adopted, such interpretation would favour the 
protection of performers, since the extension period would start earlier (and thus performers would 
be able to enjoy the rights provided for in the accompanying measures earlier). 
None of the Member States have opted for an extension of the term of protection for audio-visual 
performers and producers either.  
4.2.  “Use it or lose it” clause 
The first problem concerning this provision is the termination of contracts in accordance with 
national law when the phonogram contains the fixation of the performances of a plurality of 
performers, something that is very common in practice. The analysis of the national laws has shown 
different approaches from one Member State to another. This creates legal uncertainty and 
diminishes the protection of performers in those Member States where the solution provided in 
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national law is very complex. Following the solution in most of them, the decision to exercise the 
right of termination should be adopted by a majority of performers, so that no “blocking minority” 
stands in the way of the wishes of the majority. As established e. g. in Germany, performers should 
nominate a representative to exercise the right and to negotiate with the producers following the 
instructions previously agreed with the rest of performers. This solution lends fairness and clarity to 
the system, therefore enhancing the welfare of performers.  
Another cause for concern is the interpretation of the first condition that triggers the application of 
the clause: the fact that the “phonogram producer does not offer copies of the phonogram for sale in 
sufficient quantity or does not make it available to the public”. All the Member States surveyed 
(except for Portugal) have implemented this provision verbatim, and thus the performers’ right to 
terminate the contract arises where the producer fails to carry out both of the acts of exploitation. 
The obligation for the producer to carry out both acts of exploitation seems to be out of synch with 
the reality of the music industry. The solution provided in Portugal is better suited for that reality: one 
act of exploitation (making available on the Internet) is enough to avoid the application of the 
clause.  
Moreover, further clarification of the term “sufficient quantity” is needed. In this respect, the 
implementing measures in Spain and the UK provide a good example. In particular, Art. 110bis of the 
Spanish Copyright Act appears to be a sensible option: it takes Art. 3(3) of the Berne Convention as a 
reference, instead of the Rome Convention (which was mentioned in Recital 8 of the Term of 
Protection Directive 2011). The provision in the Spanish Copyright Act mentions “a sufficient quantity 
of copies so as to satisfy the reasonable needs of the public, taking into account the nature and aim of 
the phonogram”. As explained by legal doctrine (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2017), the definition requires an 
analysis of the circumstances of the phonogram in question (its content, the featured artist, the 
producer, its aim, the market and the targeted audience) to determine whether the offer of copies is 
sufficient. A similar interpretation could be adopted in other Member States, as the Spanish solution – 
by considering the context of the specific case – seems to strike a balance between the interests of 
the producers and the performers. 
Yet another problem identified refers to the procedure to terminate the contract. For the benefit of 
performers’ interests, and also in line with the aim of increasing the available music repertoire, this 
procedure should be as simple as possible, where permitted by national contract law. So a two-
step procedure such as the one in France should be avoided. Hence, once the producer has been 
notified, if a year passes without offering copies in sufficient quantity or making the performance 
available to the public, the contract should be automatically terminated.  
In addition, following the example of UK and Portugal, Member States should clarify that the right to 
terminate the contract can be enforced against producers or against third parties (exclusive 
licensees) to whom the rights have been assigned/transferred to. In such situations of 
assignment/transfer, the addressee of the notification that needs to be made by performers should 
be the exclusive licensee and not the original producer. It should be noted, however, that national 
laws do not necessarily provide a definition of “exclusive licensee”, and where they do such definition 
might differ from one Member State to another.  
Finally, a reference should be made to the relevance of adequately informing performers of their 
rights in the context of the “use it or lose it” clause. In all the Member States surveyed, CMOs have 
adopted measures to inform their members of this new right. However, only a few have reported that 
they have taken the initiative of contacting phonogram producers to obtain the necessary 
information that performers need to exercise the right. From the information in the national reports 
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and the questionnaires, the measures taken by AIE (Spain) and PPL (UK) are examples to follow. They 
show the relevance of an updated electronic database, and of a good communication scheme 
between performers’ CMOs and producers’ CMOs. Questionnaires have shown that more can be 
done. The fact that no performer has made use of the clause so far in the Member States surveyed 
might be explained by the limited number of performers who currently fulfil the conditions to trigger 
the clause. Still, an additional reason might be the lack of information these performers have about 
the new right. Similarly to what will be explained in relation to other provisions of the Directive, more 
can be done by CMOs, producers and national authorities to inform performers of their rights 
and to assist them in their exercise. This cannot be accomplished by CMOs alone, since the relevant 
information is held by producers, and it refers to performances that where recorded 50 years ago. 
Communication schemes between CMOs and producers are required. National authorities should 
provide for a mandatory obligation of producers to provide information about performances 
entering into the extension period at the beginning of each year. As explained by AEPO-Artis, this 
obligation exists in the CMO Directive in relation to users (art. 17) but not to producers.  
4.3. Annual Supplementary Remuneration 
Just as the “use it or lose it” clause, the effectiveness of the annual supplementary remuneration 
depends both on the legal measures adopted by the Member States to implement the obligation in 
national law, and on the measures taken by CMOs to inform performers and to obtain the 
necessary information about which of them participated in a particular performance and under 
which terms. In this sense, as the examples of AIE (Spain) and PPL (UK) confirm, good internal 
organisation and handling of advanced computer systems by CMOs is of great help. In cases where 
performers’ and producers’ rights are administered by different CMOs (e.g. Spain), efficient 
communication schemes are essential for the annual supplementary remuneration to effectively work 
in practice. 
In relation to the obligation of producers to provide the information needed to secure the payment, 
this obligation should be accompanied by three measures, which would contribute to enhance the 
welfare of performers.  
First, further clarification in relation to the person who can request the provision of that 
information. The wording of the national implementation measures shows discrepancies on this 
issue: some only mention the performer (Germany, UK, Portugal, Romania), others only mentioned 
CMOs (Spain, Sweden). The implementing measure in France is the only one that mentions both 
CMOs and performers. Since in practice CMOs are requesting this information in all the Member 
States, a reference to them should be included in the provision. However, performers should also be 
mentioned since in certain situations it might be easier for them than for the CMO to contact the 
producer to obtain that information. Therefore, a provision such as the one in French legislation is to 
be followed to avoid any uncertainty about the legal standing of performers or CMOs to request that 
information. 
Second, the obligation of producers to provide such information should be strengthened. As 
mentioned by AEPO-Artis, this obligation should be mandatory, and producers should provide the 
information free of charge. The rule imposed on users in Art. 17 of the CMO Directive, or in Art. 14 of 
the Proposal for a DSM Directive, could be taken as a model to follow. Legislation similar to the one 
adopted in the UK also seems appropriate. According to Section 191HB CDPA, if a producer does not 
provide the required information within 90 days, or if he/she provides incomplete information, the 
performer or the CMO should be entitled to bring the producer to court. If this procedure is used as a 
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model, it should be considered having exceptions to this rule; namely, the producer should be 
allowed to deny the provision of the information in justified cases (e.g., if the collection of the 
information is excessively burdensome). This would guarantee a balance between the interests of 
performers and producers.  
Third, national legislations should clarify what information a producer can be asked to provide. 
The broader the interpretation of the terms of the Directive – “any information which may be 
necessary in order to secure payment” – the better for the accomplishment of the Directive’s 
objective of increasing the protection of performers. While a broad interpretation is defended by the 
Swedish government regarding the Swedish implementing measures, the only law that presently 
allows for a broad interpretation is the UK’s, which refers to information that can enable the 
performer “to ascertain the amount of the annual payment to which the performer is entitled to”, or 
“to secure its distribution by the collecting society” – Section 191HB (5) CDPA. However, some limits 
should be established so that producers are not unfairly affected: the amount of information 
requested should not make its provision excessively burdensome for producers; and the obligation 
should not extend to information that can be considered trade secrets, or personal data of third 
parties. 
Another question where further clarification is needed refers to the identification of the person 
responsible for paying the annual supplementary remuneration. As established in UK and Spanish 
legislations, in those cases where the producer has assigned the rights to an exclusive licensee, the 
person who must pay the annual supplementary remuneration ought to be the latter. This should be 
replicated in the laws of other Member States, either by means of amending the law or by means of 
interpretation by the courts.  However, the producer should only be exempted from payment where 
exclusive licenses are implied. By contrast, in the case of a non-exclusive license, the producer should 
still be responsible for paying the remuneration. 
Finally, only Spain and the UK have elaborated on the calculation of the 20% fund. Still, according to 
the national experts, this does not seem to be enough. Providing more details on this issue is 
beneficial for performers (since it enables them to know how the annual supplementary 
remuneration is calculated), and it can give guidance to producers on how to adequately comply with 
their obligation. This is a practice that should be followed either by the administrative unit with 
competences in copyright, or by CMOs in other Member States.  
4.4. “Clean Slate” provision 
In relation to the “clean slate” provision, most Member States have followed closely the wording of 
the Directive, which means that there are not many best practices that can be derived from national 
experiences. 
Nevertheless, further action seems necessary in all the Member States to inform performers of this 
new right. CMOs are likely in the best position to provide this information, but other measures can be 
considered: e.g., producers could be obliged to send notices to performers to inform them of the 
possibility to exercise the “clean slate” right every time one or several of their performances enter the 
extended period of protection (from the 50th to 70th year).  
Furthermore, some guidance is needed on the interpretation of certain terms of the provision such 
as “advance payments” and “contractually defined deductions”.  
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Finally, it needs to be mentioned that the option taken by Sweden of adopting a provision on the 
“clean slate” right that can be derogated by the parties appears to be in contradiction with the 
Directive. To ensure a high level of protection of performers, this provision should be mandatory. 
4.5. Right to renegotiate the contract following the 50th year 
As mentioned by the UK expert, the optional measure established in Art. 10a(2) of the Directive - the 
right of performers to ask for the renegotiation of their contract - would improve their position in 
contractual relations. Only one of the Member States (France) has opted for introducing this 
right in national law and, as previously explained, the regulation is not satisfactory since many 
questions in relation to its exercise remain unanswered. Further development of the regulation is 
needed.  
Should Art. 15 of the Proposal for a DSM Directive be adopted, the lack of implementation of the right 
to ask for the modification of the contract is less problematic. Art. 15 would oblige Member States to 
introduce a much clearer and stronger right to request an adjustment of their remuneration in cases 
where the remuneration originally agreed is disproportionately low compared to the subsequent 
relevant revenues derived from the exploitation of the performance. Performers would be entitled to 
request the amendment of their contract at any moment (not as Art. 10a (2) states following the 50th 
year of protection).  
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 38 
5. POTENTIAL LONG TERM EFFECTS OF TERM EXTENSION 
5.1. Effects in the EU 
In its Digital Single Market Strategy from 2015, the Commission indicated the need to modernise EU 
copyright rules as a way forward to have “better access to digital content.”41 Still, while the need to 
increase (cross-border) access to copyright-protected content seems to underline the Strategy, the 
Commission also points out the key role, inter alia, of an “effective and balanced civil enforcement 
system against commercial scale infringements of  copyright”, as well as of measures safeguarding 
remuneration of creators. The Commission thus seeks to strike a balance between the protection of 
creators, on the one hand, and the dissemination and consumption of their creations, on the other 
hand.42 Having this balance in mind, the analysis of the effects of the term extension within the EU 
has to be carried out against the backdrop of its impact on the cultural and creative sectors (5.2.1.), 
but also on other EU policies that might be affected, such as consumer protection, competition and 
the protection of cultural diversity (5.2.2.) 
5.1.1. The Cultural and Creative Sectors 
Most collecting societies representing performers and/or producers (such as the Portuguese GDA, the 
UK Musician’s Union, or the Swedish SAMI) have indicated that the term extension was extremely 
important for the protection of performers and/or producers, because among other reasons it 
approximated EU laws to those of relevant markets (such as the US and Brazil), and also due to the 
incentive to investment that the potential increase in revenues represents. Nevertheless, it has also 
been pointed out that in Germany small or independent producers, as well as performers, have not 
yet benefitted from the term extension. Some performers in Portugal were not aware of the benefits 
brought by the Directive. In Romania, a collecting society representing performers stated that, even 
though performers are aware of the Directive, they need further assistance from collecting societies 
to actually accrue the benefits they might derive from it. The UK expert indicated that the Directive is 
beneficial to performers depending on their situation. Non-featured performers are benefitting from 
the supplementary remuneration and from extra 20 years of additional equitable remuneration 
(provided that no other performer triggers the “use it or lose it” clause). By contrast, featured 
performers, who are receiving recurring payments, benefit less from term extension due to the way 
the “use it or lose it” clause was drafted, the issues associated with the “clean slate” provision, and the 
fact that in the UK there is no contract renegotiation provision. Their main benefit is the equitable 
remuneration in the extension period (again, provided that none of the other performers triggers the 
“use it or lose it” clause). These performers receive royalties during the extension period, but the 
amount of such royalties may be low due to the age of the contract.   
The benefits of term extension are contested by some users rights’ associations (e.g., the Portuguese 
D3 Direitos Digitais, which is included in the Portuguese national report), which argue that it makes 
access to culture more expensive by prolonging the period of exclusivity. 
In the countries surveyed, no data was available regarding the global yearly benefits resulting from 
term extension (even though some data was available in relation to the 20% fund, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3). This might have to do with the fact that it is too early on to collect data (e.g. the 
Portuguese collecting society GDA admitted that they had not yet completely organised the 
                                                 
41 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM (2015) 192 final, 6.5.2015. 
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administration and distribution of benefits to its members), or with the method through which the 
data is gathered by the collecting society, which might not allow for the differentiation of records 
protected under the extension period (i.e., records which are older than 50 years and younger than 70 
years) vis-à-vis the other protected records (i.e., records younger than 50 years) - this is the case, for 
instance, of the Portuguese collecting society AUDIOGEST. The global music industry seems to be 
experiencing a “modest growth”,43 and particular EU countries (e.g. Sweden) confirm this,44 but no 
correlation can be established with the implementation of the Term of Protection Directive 2011. It is 
foreseeable that the term extension’s impact on performers and producers will be marginal in the first 
years, but it might grow steadily on a yearly basis – discounting of course the risk of unstable business 
models that characterise the music industry (as mentioned by the Impact Assessment carried out for 
the implementation in France).45 
Moreover, some stakeholders that operate at the European level (such as Spotify or Deezer) and 
national level (e.g., Radio France) were consulted, but did not provide a reply within the time frame of 
the preparation of this study. It is therefore not known whether their business models were affected 
by the Term of Protection Directive 2011. It is believed however (as pointed out by the UK expert) that 
users such as film and television companies will have to pay synchronisation licenses that they would 
not have to pay had the recordings in question been in the public domain (even though 
synchronisation accounted for only 2% of the global music revenues in 2016,46 which shows its 
relative unimportance). 
There is no concrete data on the development of new distribution channels, or on new means of 
revenue streams. One collecting society (the Swedish SAMI) has mentioned that “new areas of 
exploitation are popping up”, but did not provide any further details. 
5.1.2. Other EU Policy Areas  
● Consumer Protection 
The EU’s Consumer Policy is based on a high level of consumer protection (Art. 169 TFEU and Art. 38 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). Consumer protection requirements should be taken into 
account in the context of other EU policies (Arts. 12 and 114(3) TFEU). Some end users of copyright 
protected works can be seen as consumers under consumer law (chiefly, those who are the passive 
recipients of copyright goods and services - Ramalho, 2016). It follows that consumer protection 
imperatives ought to be taken into account in copyright lawmaking (Ramalho, 2016). 
Regarding potential positive effects of the Term of Protection Directive 2011 on consumer 
protection policies, the Commission has indicated in the Impact Assessment that public domain 
companies tend to re-release records without due regard for quality, and that few incentives were in 
place to market records in the public domain (i.e., where both copyright and related rights had 
expired). According to the Commission, this would affect both the quality of music products and 
                                                                                                                                                            
42 In the words of the Commission, “Europe needs a more harmonised copyright regime which provides incentives to create and invest 
while allowing transmission and consumption of content across borders, building on our rich cultural diversity (Digital Single Market 
Strategy, 2015). 
43 According to the IFPI’s “Global Music Report 2017”, available at http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2017.pdf (last accessed 26 November 
2017). In 2016, revenues from  recorded music in Europe amounted to ca. 4.3 billion Euro, which is an increase for the second year in a row 
after a decreasing tendency since 2001 (data available at https://www.statista.com/topics/3903/music-industry-in-europe/, last accessed 28 
November 2016). 
44 In Sweden, recorded music revenues have increased 6,2% in 2016, with streaming revenues accounting for 82,3%. 
45 French Impact Assessment available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/7258/102236/version/1/file/ei_dda_ue_propriete_artistique_patrimoine_culturel_cm_22
.10.2014.pdf (last accessed 21 November 2017). 
46 See IFPI’s “Global Music Report 2017”. 
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services offered to consumers, as well as the breadth of consumer choices, which might consequently 
increase as a result of the Directive.47  
The only instance where this has been confirmed by empirical data is Portugal, but even so said data 
relies on the views of one collecting society (which indicated that low-quality musical products had 
been forced out of the market as a result of the implementation of the Directive). Another Portuguese 
collecting society mentions that data show an increase in record releases in Portugal, but highlights 
that it cannot establish a correlation between such increase and the Directive.  
In terms of the potential negative effects of the Term of Protection Directive 2011 on consumer 
protection policies, the enlarged protection granted to performers and phonogram producers might 
erode the protection of some users of copyright protected works who are also consumers under 
consumer law. Namely, such enlarged protection might lead to a price increase of phonograms. The 
increase in price could be a consequence not only of the term extension, but also of the 
establishment of a 20% fund (which might lead producers to charge more for their services).  
The EU Commission has stated in the Impact Assessment that “there is no empirical evidence that 
price difference between sound recordings that are in- or out-of copyright would be significant.”48 
Some studies back up this conclusion, by finding no evidence that out-of-copyright sound recordings 
are systematically sold at cheaper prices (it is the case of a PriceWaterhouseCoopers study, cited by 
the Commission in its Impact Assessment, which analysed the impact of term extension in the UK)49. 
According to the Commission, this is all the more so since, after the expiry of neighbouring rights, the 
musical composition is still under copyright. This would in theory lead to less price fluctuation 
between works that are still protected and those that are not.50Other studies however hold that 
producers’ gains from term extension are derived from higher prices, and therefore from consumer 
losses (Kretschmer et al., 2008; see also Hilty et al., 2009 and van Eechoud et al., 2009). 
The different methodologies and outcomes of the various studies allow for one conclusion: it is 
indeed difficult to demonstrate a price increase, or a lack thereof, connected to an enlarged 
protection. Music is sold in different ways, many times as part of online subscription packages, and in 
some instances no pecuniary price is paid by the end user (who “pays” for music indirectly, through 
advertisements) (UNESCO, 2016). Moreover, the price of recordings is determined by several factors, 
which include its copyright status, but also production costs and demand due to e.g. genre 
popularity. In that sense, no two recordings are exactly the same, making it hard to find works that 
are completely identical save for its copyright status (CIPIL, 2006; Kretschmer et al., 2008) – and 
consequently making it difficult to demonstrate fluctuations of price (or the absence thereof) 
between protected and unprotected recordings. This difficulty has expressly been underlined by one 
of the Swedish experts. 
The extension of the term of protection has not been uncontroversial, with some organisations 
and/or governments (e.g. in Portugal and Sweden) raising concerns connected to the cost increase 
for users (including end-users or consumers). Such concerns were however not accompanied by 
specific data showing said cost increase. By contrast, the Swedish collecting society SAMI has stated 
that it has not carried out any changes in pricing, but this constitutes only one stakeholder and broad 
conclusions cannot be drawn. The impossibility to draw clear conclusions from the data available 
regarding the effect of the Directive’s provisions on the price of phonograms was in fact pointed out 
                                                 
47 Impact Assessment, p. 37-38. 
48 Impact Assessment, p. 29. 
49 Impact Assessment, p. 36, citing PriceWaterhouseCoopers, “The impact of copyright extension for sound recordings in the UK” (2006), a 
report prepared for the British Phonographic Industry. 
50 Impact Assessment, p. 36-37. 
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by some national experts.51 As mentioned above, stakeholders such as Spotify or Deezer did not 
provide an answer to the questionnaire, and it is therefore not known whether they bore costs 
deriving from the implementation of the Directive, that they then passed on to consumers. Likewise, 
even though it is believed that other users such as film and television companies will have to pay 
synchronisation licenses that they would not have to pay absent the Directive’s implementation, it is 
not clear if and how that extra cost would pass on to consumers. Other organisations that operate at 
the national level - e.g., the Portuguese Consumer Rights Association or the British consumer 
organisation Which? - reported not having enough data to assess whether the Directive had a 
negative impact on consumers.  
● Competition 
Arts 101 and 102 TFEU are aimed at preventing anti-competitive behaviour in the internal market and 
constitute the core of EU competition policy. Ownership of an intellectual property right coupled with 
an agreement, decision, or concerted practice which affects competition (Art. 101), or with an abuse 
of dominant position (Art. 102) will be at odds with EU competition law. For instance, a licensing 
agreement the effect of which is to avoid entirely the effects of competition would infringe Art. 101 
TFEU (Seville, 2016).52In what concerns Art. 102 TFEU, term extension could in theory consolidate the 
dominant position of the major market players, with effects on secondary markets (such as films or 
broadcasts) because, for example, of higher prices, or due to the fact that the producer refuses to 
license a particular work (van Eechoud et al., 2009). Either circumstance might constitute an abuse 
barred by Art. 102 TFEU in case the prices charged are unreasonable or if the refusal to license: 
prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand; is 
unjustified; and excludes competition in the secondary market (Seville, 2016).  
No evidence could be collected from the surveyed Member States that either of these situations took 
place since the implementation of the Directive, in relation to phonograms that fall under the 
extended period of protection. The Spanish Competition Authority was very critical of the term 
extension in general, and of its application to existing phonograms in particular, stating that the latter 
could not be based on the incentive function of copyright and created therefore an unjustified 
monopoly. However, this position did not have any consequences to the implementation of the term 
extension in Spain. According to the British report, some companies in the secondary market will find 
that they are paying more in licensing due to the term extension, but that observation was not 
accompanied by quantifiable data, and in any case that fact alone does not yield a distortion of 
competition.  
● Cultural Diversity 
One of the objectives of the EU is to “ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and 
enhanced” (Art. 3(3) TEU). Following Art. 167(4) TFEU, which sets forth an obligation for the EU to take 
cultural aspects into account in its actions, copyright legislation has to be compatible with the EU’s 
cultural objectives (including cultural diversity) (Ramalho, 2016; Psychogiopoulou, 2008). This implies 
inter alia a facilitation of access to culture and cultural works, as advocated by the Commission in its 
Communication on a European Agenda for Culture in A Globalizing World.53 In that sense, cultural 
diversity policies are inextricably linked to consumer protection policies, as more access to cultural 
                                                 
51 See e.g. report from Sweden. 
52 In 2007, the European Commission sent a Statement of Objectives to record companies and Apple against alleged territorial restrictions in 
online music sales, but there was no follow-up action because Apple announced that it would not engage in territorial price discrimination 
(Seville, 2016). 
53 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world, COM (2007) 242 final, 10.05.2007. 
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works will in theory benefit consumers. The arguments outlined below should also, therefore, be 
considered in the framework of consumer protection policies.  
In what concerns the positive effects of the Directive, the Commission has argued in the Impact 
Assessment that benefits deriving from the term extension would fund new talent.54This point is 
controversial, with some studies holding that increased profit deriving from term extension will not 
necessarily be channelled towards investing in new artists (van Eechoud et all, 2009; Hilty et al., 2009), 
while others state that future artists are typically financed from current revenues (LECG, 2007). One 
collecting society has indicated an increase in record releases in Portugal, and these releases concern 
mainly new artists. However, the collecting society itself underlined that it could not establish a 
correlation between that fact and the implementation of the Directive.  
It can also be argued that producers will be more willing to market back catalogue items, thereby 
making access to otherwise unmarketed items possible.55Some studies contradict this premise, 
stating that what would be needed to enable access to back catalogue music are limitations subject 
to remuneration, not an extension of protection (Hilty et al., 2009).  One national expert (UK) has 
stated that increased marketing spend on back catalogue items is likely to have happened, although 
he was not able to obtain quantifiable information on this.  
In terms of negative effects on cultural diversity, it is not clear whether the extra licenses to be paid 
by users such as film and television companies will have a chilling effect on the availability of works 
that would be in the public domain were it not for the Directive. If that is the case, such effect might 
be at odds with the facilitation of access to culture and cultural works that should underpin cultural 
diversity policies. The same can be said of a potential price increase - as mentioned by D3, an 
association advocating for users’ rights, access to culture will be more expensive due to price 
increase. However (as discussed in the previous section) it is not possible to draw definitive 
conclusions as to whether the Directive has indeed caused such price increase and consequently a 
decrease in access to culture and cultural works. 
 
5.2. Effects on competitiveness vis-à-vis third countries 
The potential long term effects on competitiveness in relation to third countries relate to the 
alignment of the EU term of protection with the terms of its trading partners, thus potentially 
improving the situation of the EU performers and record producers in the music market. The Impact 
Assessment identifies as an operational objective of the proposal for a Directive on Term Extension to 
decrease discrepancies in protection between the EU and US markets, and one of the specific 
objectives of the proposal relates also to enhancing the competitiveness of the European music 
industry.56 
Copyright and related rights treaties prescribe the principle of national treatment, which requires 
countries to grant foreigners the same treatment that they give to their own nationals.57 This would 
decrease the risk of discrepancies in protection between the EU and third countries. However, the 
principle of national treatment comprises limitations. One example of such limitations is the rule on 
comparison of terms of the Berne Convention, which allows member countries to shorten the 
                                                 
54 Impact Assessment, p. 39. 
55 Impact Assessment, p. 38. 
56 Impact Assessment at 22-23. 
57 Berne Convention, Arts. 5.1 and 5.3.; Rome Convention, Art. 2; TRIPS Agreement, Art. 3; WCT, Art. 3; and WPPT, Art. 4. 
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duration of copyright protection given to foreigners to the term enjoyed by them in their country of 
origin.58 
Arguably, the rule on comparison of terms can be used as an argument for national governments to 
increase their own term of copyright protection and align it with foreign trading partners – that is 
what happened, for example, in the United States, which chose to increase copyright duration from 
50 to 70 years pma following the original EU Term of Protection Directive (Brauneis, 2013). The rule on 
comparison of terms was also one of the arguments used to defend the extension of the term of 
protection of performers’ and producers’ rights to 70 years after publication or communication to the 
public of the fixation of the performance (van Eechoud et al, 2009). Such argument was based on the 
premise that non-EU countries were allowed to not grant longer protection to EU right holders as 
they granted their nationals, thus putting EU performers and producers at a disadvantage.  
However, when it comes to related rights such as those of performers and phonogram producers, not 
all international treaties put forth the limitation of comparison of terms. The majority of 
commentators is of the opinion that the Rome Convention does not give room to comparison of 
terms (van Eechoud et al, 2009, and references cited therein). In accordance with this interpretation, 
the Rome Convention applies a broad principle of national treatment: it requires a member country 
to grant to foreign right holders terms of protection longer than they would enjoy in their country of 
origin.59 By contrast, the TRIPS Agreement (Art. 3.1) and the WPPT (Art. 4) only require countries to 
apply the principle of national treatment in relation to the rights provided in their texts. Parties to 
these treaties may thus apply a comparison of terms by restricting the term of protection of foreign 
right holders to the minimum terms provided for in the treaties (i.e., 50 years) (van Eechoud et al, 
2009; WIPO, 2004). 
In order for EU performers and producers to be put at a disadvantage vis-à-vis third countries due to 
the rule on comparison of terms, three conditions must be met: (1) the non-EU country is a trading 
partner of the EU; (2) the non-EU country has a term of protection longer than 50 years (which was 
the term of protection before the Term of Protection Directive 2011); (3) the non-EU country applies a 
comparison of terms. These conditions shall be analysed in turn. The effects of competitiveness vis-à-
vis the countries that meet the three conditions will then be further examined. 
(1) Trading partners of the EU 
Statistics relating to trade in music are disperse and not always available. For example, while CDs 
come under trade of cultural goods, streaming and music downloads are factored in as trade in 
services. A recent study has found that physical formats still account for about half of the music 
industry’s total revenue (Europe Economics et al., 2015), and therefore it is necessary to establish who 
the main trading partners of the EU are in both music goods and music services. 
In statistics relating to EU exports of tangible cultural goods from 2014, CDs, DVDs and records 
(excluding licenses) represented 6% of the total trade (behind works of art, books, and antiques, 
which together amount to about 70%).60 That percentage dropped to 5.3% in 2015,61 and music 
                                                 
58 Berne Convention, Art. 7.8: “In any case, the term shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed; 
however, unless the legislation of that country otherwise provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the country of origin of the 
work.”  
59 With one exception: where the producer of a phonogram is a national of another Contracting State, Article 16.1.a.iv Rome Convention 
provides for a possibility of a country limiting the right to remuneration for the secondary use of phonograms for commercial purposes to 
the duration that that State grants protection to phonograms first fixed by a national of the country making use of that possibility. Some 
Member States of the EU have resorted to this clause - see van Eechoud et al., 2009. 
60 Data available in the Eurostat cultural statistics report 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/7551543/KS-
04-15-737-EN-N.pdf/648072f3-63c4-47d8-905a-6fdc742b8605 (las accessed 25 October 2017) 
61 Data available at 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 44 
consumption patterns evolving from physical to digital mean that this figure is bound to continue to 
decrease.  
In terms of trading partners for tangible cultural goods, in 2015 the United States were the leading 
export market (40.8%), followed by Switzerland (19%), Hong Kong (6.9%), Norway (2.7%), Australia 
(2.4%), China (2.2%) and Japan (2%). The central role of the US as an export market is more visible in 
comparison with previous years (e.g., 27.2% in 2014), but it is relatively safe to assume that the US has 
been a constant target for cultural exports (including music) throughout the years. The same can be 
said of Switzerland (21.7% in 2014), Hong Kong (2.3% in 2014), Norway (5% in 2014), Australia (2.5% in 
2014) and Japan (2.6% in 2014).62 Available statistics from 2009 per product show a similar tendency: 
the main export markets for CDs that year were Switzerland (23%), Norway (20%), the United States 
(17%), Japan (12%), Australia (4%) and Hong Kong (2%).63  
With regard to music services, these would come under the general category of trade in services and 
include personal, cultural and recreational services (which comprises audio-visual and related services 
such as music, television and radio), as well as charges for the use of intellectual property, which 
encompasses licenses. In 2015, these categories amounted to almost 10% of the total trade in 
services.64Information relating to the trading partners in these specific categories could not be 
retrieved, but statistics of trade in services reveal that the main EU trading partners regarding services 
in general from 2011 to 2016 were the United States, Switzerland, China, Japan, Norway, Russia, 
Canada, Turkey, India, Hong Kong and Brazil.65  
In addition, studies on the origin and number of downloads per country complete this picture and 
show that Switzerland, Norway, United States and Canada can be considered the main trading 
partners in that particular area: 45% of all the music downloaded in Switzerland, from 2006 to 2011, 
comes from 13 EU Member States. In Norway, music from the same 13 EU Members amounted to 45% 
of downloads in the same period. In Canada, the share was of 18,5% and in the United States, which 
has the major home consumption, it was of 14,3% (Gomez-Herrera et al.,2014).66 
This means that, according to the data available, the main trading partners of the EU in goods and 
services relating to phonograms are the United States (major partner), Switzerland, Norway, Canada, 
Japan, Australia, China + Hong Kong, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Russia.  
(2) Term of protection in the main trading partners  
Out of the main trading partners identified in the previous section, only a few had terms of protection 
longer than 50 years when the Term of Protection Directive 2011 was passed.67  
The US protects sound recordings under copyright (Section 102 (a)(7) US Copyright Law). The 
protectable elements of a sound recording include the contributions of both the performers and the 
record producers (Goldstein & Hugenholtz, 2010; Moser, 2006). The duration of protection of sound 
recordings in the US depends on the particular circumstances of a given sound recording: if it is a 
                                                                                                                                                            
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Exports_of_cultural_goods_by_group_of_products,_2015.png 
(last accessed 26 October 2017) 
62  Data available in the Eurostat cultural statistics report 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/7551543/KS-
04-15-737-EN-N.pdf/648072f3-63c4-47d8-905a-6fdc742b8605 (las accessed 25 October 2017). 
63 Data available in the Eurostat cultural statistics report 2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3930297/5967138/KS-
32-10-374-EN.PDF/07591da7-d016-4065-9676-27386f900857?version=1.0 (last accessed 25 October 2017). 
64 Data available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/themes-in-the-spotlight/trade-in-services (last accessed 21 November 2017) 
65  Data available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Trade_in_services_with_non-member_countries_(extra-
EU),_main_partners,_EU-28,_2011_and_2016_(billion_EUR).png (las accessed 21 November 2017) 
66 Note however that the study uses data, gathered by Nielsen Music, that is limited to downloads in only some countries in the world. 
67 Canada, which had a 50-year term of protection for performances and sound recordings when the Term of Protection Directive 2011 was 
enacted, has changed its legislation in 2015 to extend the term to 70 years after first publication or 100 years after first fixation, whichever 
occurs earlier (Section 23 of the Canadian Copyright Act). 
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work made for hire (which is often the case in the US, according to Goldstein & Hugenholtz, 2010 and 
van Eechoud et al, 2009)68, it will be protected for 95 years from the year of its first publication, or for a 
term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first (Section 302 (c) US Copyright 
Law). If the sound recording does not amount to a work made for hire, protection lasts for 70 years 
pma. These are the rules for works created on or after 1 January 1978; for sound recordings dating 
from before that, a complex map of rules applies, even though it can be stated that in general such 
sound recordings enjoy a term of protection of 95 years, counting from when copyright was secured 
(van Eechoud et al, 2009).69  
Other trading partners that have terms of protection longer than 50 years are Australia (70 years from 
first publication),70 Brazil (70 years from fixation or performance),71 Turkey (70 years from fixation),72 
and India (60 years from publication).73 
(3) Trading partners that apply a comparison of terms 
If a country is part of the Rome Convention, a broad principle of national treatment applies and the 
country is not allowed to discriminate against EU right holders. It is thus necessary to assess which 
relevant trading partners – i.e., trading partners that have terms of protection longer than 50 years, 
which is the term of protection pre-Term of Protection Directive 2011 – are part of the TRIPS 
Agreement and/or the WPPT while not being part of the Rome Convention. It is furthermore 
necessary that such countries apply a comparison of terms. Out of the countries analysed in (2), only 
the United States and India fulfil those conditions.  
Indeed, the United States have a term of protection longer than 50 years, and it is not a party to the 
Rome Convention. However, the US does not apply a comparison of terms. The US term of protection 
rules apply equally to national and foreign sound recordings, provided of course that such sound 
recordings are protectable under US law (van Eechoud et al, 2009). Foreign sound recordings can 
qualify for protection under US Copyright Law if first fixed in a country party to an international treaty 
to which the US is also a party, such as the Berne Convention or the WCT. That is the case of all EU 
countries (van Eechoud et al, 2009), with the result that EU sound recordings are theoretically not at a 
disadvantage in relation to US ones due to divergent terms of protection. 
Some studies from 2006 and 2009 report that European music was not significant in the US music 
market as a whole, revealing the little receptivity of said market to foreign music in general (including 
European local music) (van Eechoud et al., 2009; CIPIL, 2006). Recent statistics focusing only on the 
United States in the category of charges for the uses of intellectual property (which includes licences, 
as explained above) reveal that the exports of the EU to the United States have not increased much in 
recent years. 74It seems therefore that the term extension has not significantly enhanced the 
competitiveness of the EU music industry vis-à-vis the United States’.  
In what concerns India, the country did not ratify the Rome Convention. India applies a comparison 
of terms following Section S.O.228(E), paragraph 7 of the International Copyright Order 1999, which 
                                                 
68 As stated in Section 101 US Copyright Law, a “work made for hire” is a work prepared by an employee in the course of her employment, or 
a specially ordered or commissioned work that comes under one of the categories listed in the provision (among which, “contribution to a 
collective work”). 
69  A more detailed overview of the rules applying to sound recordings created before 1 January 1978 can be found at: 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15a.pdf (last accessed 11 October 2017) 
70 Section 93 of the Australian Copyright Act 1968. 
71 Art. 96 of Brazilian Copyright Law. 
72 Art. 82 of the Turkish Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works. 
73 Section 27 of the Indian Copyright Act. 
74 The figures for this category were at 17,793,000 USD in 2012; 15,835,000 USD in 2013; 17,099,000 USD in 2014; and 17.754 USD in 2015 - 
data available at http://www.trademap.org/Country_SelServiceCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|842||||||S08|1|3|1|1|2|1|2|1|1 (last accessed 24 
November 2017). 
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prescribes that “the term of copyright in a work shall not exceed that which is enjoyed by it in its 
country of origin.” The country is one of the main partners of the EU for services in general, which 
means that the part of EU-India trade that could be affected would be music services such as those 
coming under the category “Charges for the use of intellectual property”. No statistics on this 
particular issue could be retrieved. General imports by India on this category (i.e. without 
discriminating the country of origin of the intellectual property in question) show a steady increase 
between 2012 and 2014 and a drop in 2015,75 but these numbers can be explained by a variety of 
factors, such as e.g. an increase in piracy.  And indeed, any negative impact on a country’s exports to 
India likely derive from the latter’s weak enforcement and pervasive piracy: India ranked 43 out of 45 
countries surveyed for the international IP index, and one of the key weaknesses underlined was the 
enforcement environment.76 It is therefore not expected that European producers and performers are 
better positioned to market their assets in India due to term extension. 
The UK expert has mentioned that he expects opportunities in other countries will have increased (in 
the form of e.g. exclusive licenses), but no data supports this conclusion and no particular country is 
indicated. On the other hand, as pointed out by one Portuguese collecting society, it can be argued 
that the term extension is not hindering the music market either, insofar as users such as Spotify have 
never publicly stated their intention to leave markets where terms of protection for sound recordings 
are longer (like the United States or Brazil).77In relation to the United States specifically, authors have 
noted that, in terms of competitiveness, the linguistic and cultural diversity of the EU stands in the 
way of a truly pan-European music industry comparable to the American model (Bernstein et al., 
2007); and that other differences in legal regimes - e.g. regarding remuneration rights that EU right 
holders are not able to claim in the United States - are what really dictates the better position of the 
latter’s music industry (van Eechoud et al., 2009). 
Therefore, from the analysis and data available, the term extension does not seem to have reduced 
any disadvantages of EU producers and performers vis-à-vis third countries, nor does it seem to have 
increased their competitiveness. It can also be argued that the EU term extension will benefit foreign 
right holders (thus comparably not putting EU right holders at an advantage). Even though Art. 7(2) 
of the Term of Protection Directive imposes a comparison of terms, the provision also states that it is 
only to be applied if it does not contradict Member States’ international obligations (which is also 
underlined by Recital 23 of the Directive). All Member States except for Malta are party to the Rome 
Convention. Considering that the Rome Convention does not allow for a comparison of terms, if the 
third country is also party to the Rome Convention a broad principle of national treatment applies 
and that country will be able to benefit from the extended EU term of protection. If the third country 
is not party to the Rome Convention, the right holder in question can, in certain cases, still benefit 
from the extended term if the phonogram was published in a Rome Contracting State within thirty 
days of its publication in a non-Contracting State (Art. 5(1)(c) and 5(2) of the Rome Convention).78 
                                                 
75 321,445,173.963 in 2012; 658,772,433.044 in 2014; 466,556,8838.054 in 2015. Data available at  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.GSR.ROYL.CD?end=2015&locations=IN&start=2011 (last accessed 28 November 2017). 
76 Data and report available at http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/India.pdf and http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2017_ExecutiveSummary.pdf (last accessed 28 November 2011). 
77 This is not confirmed by Spotify, Deezer or other users, since, as mentioned before, no reply has been received from these companies. 
78 Note however that a Contracting State may deviate from this possibility if it declares, under Art. 5(3) of the Rome Convention, that it will 
not apply the criterion of publication, or if it declares, under Art. 17 of the Rome Convention, that it applies the criterion of fixation alone. 
According to van Eechoud et al, 2009, the following EU Member States come under one of the two situations: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia and Spain. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The expert reports from selected Member States and the questionnaires completed by stakeholders 
generally state that it is too early to draw definitive conclusions on the effectiveness of the Directive. 
No case law interpreting the Directive’s provisions exists, and its application in practice is still in its 
infancy. It should be recalled that only four years have passed since the Directive entered into force. 
At the time of writing this report, none of the pan-European users of music repertoires contacted by 
the authors of this study (Spotify and Deezer) had sent back the questionnaire,79 and therefore no 
data is available on the impact of the Directive on their business models.   
Nevertheless the analysis of the Directive’s provisions and of the expert reports and questionnaires 
highlights some points of attention. The fact that performers only enjoy the accompanying 
measures during the extension period is a modest achievement of the objective of enhancing the 
welfare of performers. Performers have a weak contractual position vis-à-vis producers throughout 
the entire period of protection. In this context, Arts. 14 to 16 of the Proposal for a DSM Directive 
provide additional safeguards. The provisions would oblige Member States to introduce a much 
clearer and stronger right to request an adjustment of their remuneration in cases where the 
remuneration originally agreed is disproportionately low compared to the subsequent relevant 
revenues derived from the exploitation of the performance. As a consequence, the (optional) right of 
performers to ask for the modification of their contract (Art. 10a (2) of the Directive) might become 
superfluous. Only one of the Member States (France) has introduced this right in national law and, in 
any case, its regulation is not satisfactory since many questions in relation to its exercise remain 
unanswered.  
The identification of the performers entitled to the rights provided for in the Directive –the “use it 
or lose” it clause, the annual supplementary remuneration and the “clean slate” right – stands out as 
the main problem regarding the effectiveness of the Directive. The fact that these rights are enjoyed 
over performances that were recorded 50 years ago makes this not an easy task. The role played by 
CMOs to inform performers about their new rights varies from one Member State to another. The 
Directive does not establish an obligation for CMOs to inform performers, but Art. 13(3) of the CMO 
Directive does provide a general obligation to adopt the necessary measures to identify and locate 
right holders who are entitled to remuneration. Member States should ensure that such obligation 
also refers to the necessary information to facilitate the exercise of the rights provided for in this 
Directive. 
Producers also play an essential role in identifying entitled performers, since they hold the necessary 
information about the performances that are entering the extension period, the performers who 
participated in their fixation, and the terms of their participation. Good internal organisation of CMOs, 
the use of advanced and up-to-date electronic databases of their members, good communication 
schemes with CMOs representing producers or directly with producers seem essential to guarantee 
the effectiveness of the Directive.  
The Directive establishes an obligation for producers to provide information on very limited terms: a) 
information necessary to secure the payment of the annual supplementary remuneration (but not 
covering any other aspect necessary for the exercise of other rights provided for in the Directive); b) 
information only provided upon request. None of the Member States surveyed have expanded the 
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scope of this obligation in national law. The expert reports or questionnaires do not mention 
examples of producers who have incorporated clauses in their model contracts reflecting the rights 
provided to performers in the Directive. While producers are not obliged to do so, the incorporation 
of these clauses in their model contracts would have shown that the provisions in the Directive are 
established practices in the music sector. So far, this doesn’t seem to be the case, and more should be 
done by Member States to achieve it. For this reason, the obligation of producers to provide 
information should be reinforced. The general obligation established in the CMO Directive for users 
(Art. 17) does not apply to producers. However, if adopted, Art. 14 of the Proposal for a DSM Directive 
will help to reinforce the obligation of producers to provide information to performers. According to 
this provision, Member States shall ensure that performers receive on a regular basis timely, adequate 
and sufficient information on the exploitation of their performances from those to whom they have 
licensed or transferred their rights. It is assumed that such an obligation would have a retroactive 
character so that producers are obliged to inform performers bound by contracts concluded 
previously to the entering into force of the Directive. Information on contracts concluded 50 years 
might not be readily available, and paragraph 2 of Art. 14 states that Member States may adjust this 
obligation in accordance to the administrative burden it implies and the revenues generated by the 
exploitation of the performance. However, the provision also makes clear that the obligation must 
remain effective and ensure an appropriate level of transparency. 
The lawful publication or lawful communication to the public of the performance are taken into 
account for two different purposes in the Directive. First, to calculate the term of protection. Second, 
to calculate the beginning of the extension period where performers start to enjoy the rights 
provided for them in the Directive. Except for the calculation of the term of protection of performers’ 
rights, the lawful publication prevails over the lawful communication. Only Portugal out of the 
Member States surveyed has deviated from the wording of the Directive on this issue. The Directive’s 
rule is cause for a number of concerns. It opens the door to abusive practices by producers, as they 
can make new releases available on the Internet and delay the publication of records to a date where 
the 50-year period from the performance is about to expire (which would mean that the term of 
protection could expand to almost 120 years). Moreover, there is no justification to apply a different 
term of protection to performers’ rights (lawful publication or lawful communication of the 
performance, whichever is first) and to producers’ rights (lawful publication or, if this does not 
happen, lawful communication). If producers put in practice the abusive practice mentioned above, 
during the “new” term of protection they would also benefit from the fact that performers’ rights 
would have expired. In addition, an interpretation of “lawful publication” as the offering of “fixed 
copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects” in the sense of Art. 2(e) and the Agreed 
Statement in WPPT is not adapted to actual practices in the music sector, where the making available 
of performances on the Internet is increasingly gaining more relevance.  
These concerns could be adequately addressed by interpreting the term “lawful publication” as 
including the making available of a performance on the Internet. This position is supported by 
legal doctrine that understands that the interpretation of “publication” in the WPPT should be 
assimilated to that in Art. 3(3) of the Berne Convention (Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2006; Evangelio Llorca, 
2013). The interpretation is compatible with the WPPT due to its “de minimis” character (Ficsor, 2002): 
nothing prevents the CJEU from interpreting that “lawful publication” for the purpose of the Term of 
Protection Directive 2011 covers the offering of tangible copies of the performance but also its 
making available on the Internet. Following the example of CDPA in the UK, such interpretation from 
the CJEU should also make clear that “lawful publication” and “lawful communication to the public” 
imply the consent of the right holder.  
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Another relevant issue concerning the term extension refers to the exclusion of audio-visual 
performers and producers from the scope of application of the Directive. None of the Member 
States surveyed have applied the term extension to this category of performers and producers. 
Despite the differences between the film industry and the music sector, this does not seem justified, 
not least because it creates difficulties where the same performance is recorded both on a 
phonogram and an audio-visual media. A deeper analysis of a possible legislative intervention on this 
matter is needed.  
In relation to the “use it or lose it” clause, the expression “offering for sale in sufficient 
quantity” raises interpretation problems that have only been partially addressed in some of the 
Member States surveyed (UK and Spain). It should be considered that “offering for sale in sufficient 
quantity” exists where the performance is made available on the Internet in a manner that satisfies 
the reasonable needs of the public, taking into account the nature and aim of the phonogram. The 
fulfilment of this requirement would need to be established on a case by case basis, although it can 
be safely assumed that making a new record available on popular streaming services such as Spotify 
or Deezer, where it can be easily located by the general public, should be enough to comply with the 
threshold of “sufficient quantity”. Likewise, uploading a new recording of a piano concerto on a 
website specialised in piano music would also meet the requirement; while uploading a pop record 
exclusively on the website of an independent record company that does not make any promotion on 
third party’s websites or social networks would probably not amount to offering for sale sufficient 
quantities of said record.  
This interpretation entails that, contrary to what is explicitly or implicitly established in the laws of the 
Member States surveyed, producers do not need to release the record in tangible copies and make it 
available on the Internet to make sure that the “use it or lose it” clause is not triggered. The opposite 
interpretation (where both acts of exploitation are needed) would be more beneficial to performers; 
however, it would also be unrealistic having in mind actual practices in the music sector.  
Considering that music performances with a plurality of performers is the general rule in many 
music genres, a deeper analysis of the exercise of the “use it or lose it” clause in these cases seems 
necessary. Very different solutions exist in the Member State surveyed. These divergences may create 
obstacles to the functioning of the internal market. In certain Member States, the solution provided 
by law is so complex that the effectiveness of the measure is at risk. Because of that, a simple rule 
should be proposed according to which a majority of performers shall agree to terminate the 
contract, and they should select one representative to exercise the right. Such rule may grant more 
weigh to the vote of featured artists as a recognition for the essential role they play on the 
conception of the performance.  
Only the implementing measures in UK and Portugal make clear that the clause can be exercised 
against producers or against third parties (exclusive licensees) to whom the economic rights over 
the performance may have been transferred. This interpretation should be adopted in other Member 
States (either through legislative amendments or through case law), but it should be clarified that it 
only applies in the case of exclusive licenses.  
In relation to the annual supplementary remuneration, the expert reports point out that obtaining 
accurate information is essential. Divergences exist in the Member States surveyed regarding the 
person entitled to request that information to the producer. It should be interpreted that such 
request can be made either by the CMO administering the right, or by the performer himself/herself. 
In addition, the regulation of the obligation of the producer to provide information should be 
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reinforced and thus further developed. The obligation should be mandatory and it should be made 
clear that producers should provide such information free of charge. Following the example of the 
UK, if a producer does not provide the required information within a reasonable time or provides 
incomplete information, the performer or the CMO should be entitled to bring the producer to court. 
However, the producer should be allowed to deny the provision of the information in justified cases 
(e.g., if the collection of the information is excessively burdensome) 
The expert reports also show that clarification is needed in relation to certain aspects of the 
functioning of the annual supplementary remuneration. This may be easily accomplished by 
competent authorities in the Member States through the publication of guidelines. Such document 
should identify the information producers are obliged to provide. The broader the interpretation of 
the terms of the Directive – “any information which may be necessary in order to secure payment” – 
the more it facilitates the accomplishment of the Directive’s objective of increasing the protection of 
performers. However, some limits should be established so that producers are not unfairly affected: 
the amount of information requested should not make its provision excessively burdensome for 
producers; the obligation should not extend to information that can be considered trade secrets, or 
personal data of third parties. The guidelines should also provide clear information for the calculation 
of the 20% fund. This would be beneficial for performers, since they would be able to know how the 
annual supplementary remuneration is calculated, and it would provide guidance to producers on 
how to adequately comply with their obligation. Finally, it should be made clear that the 
remuneration should be paid by the exclusive licensee in those cases where the producer has 
transferred the rights over the performance.  
In relation to the “clean slate” provision, while the Directive explicitly states the mandatory nature 
of the “use it or lose it” clause, nothing is said with respect to this provision. As a consequence, 
Sweden has established that the “clean slate” provision can be derogated by contract. This diminishes 
the effectiveness of the Directive. Taking into account the objective of the provision, the “clean slate” 
clause must be understood as an overriding mandatory rule in the sense of Art. 9 of the Regulation 
593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I): such a clause cannot be 
derogated by contract and it is applicable even if the parties have chosen the law of a non-EU 
country. This should have been clearly established in the Directive to avoid other Member States 
following Sweden’s stance.  
Expert reports have also pointed out the problems that exist in interpreting the terms “advance 
payments” and “contractually defined deductions”. The abovementioned guidelines could be used to 
shed some light on these concepts.  
Finally, with regard to the potential long term effects of the Directive, it is also too early to draw 
solid conclusions. No data exists in relation to the impact on other EU policies and sectors. It is 
foreseeable that the term extension’s impact on performers and producers, while marginal in the first 
years, might grow steadily, but no evidence is available to support this forecast. The impact of the 
Directive on consumer protection policies is also not known: due to the absence of data, it could not 
be established whether consumers have to bear any extra costs derived from an extended period of 
protection, or whether the quality and breadth of consumer choices have increased. Some data 
mentioned by a Portuguese collecting society show an increase in record releases in Portugal, but a 
correlation between such increase and the Directive could not be proven. Likewise, no proof of 
distortion of competition could be found, even though in one Member State (Spain) the Competition 
Authority was extremely critical of the term extension. In relation to cultural diversity, one national 
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expert (UK) has stated that increased marketing spend on back catalogue items is likely to have 
happened, but again no data was provided to sustain this. 
Regarding the competitiveness of the European music industry vis-à-vis foreign trading 
partners, the research shows that from a legal point of view the “comparison of terms” argument 
used by the Commission to justify the term extension is unfounded. Such argument was based on the 
premise that non-EU countries were allowed to not grant longer protection to EU right holders as 
they granted their nationals, thus putting EU performers and producers at a disadvantage. Due to the 
obligations assumed in the Rome Convention, EU trading partners cannot apply a rule on comparison 
of terms. The only exceptions are the United States and India, which are not parties to the Rome 
Convention. However, in the case of the United States, its national legislation does not apply a 
comparison of terms, with the consequence that its term of protection applies equally to national and 
foreign sound recordings (provided of course that such sound recordings are protectable under US 
law). In the case of India, any negative impact on the EU’s exports to India would likely derive from 
the latter’s weak enforcement and pervasive piracy rather than on the rule on comparison of terms. 
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ANNEX 1 – NATIONAL REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE DIRECTIVE 
COUNTRY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Term of musical 
composition with words 
(art 1(7) 
Term 
extension 
(art 3(1) and 
3(2)) 
Use it or lose 
it clause 
(art 3(2)a) 
20% fund 
(art 3(2)b 
and c) 
Clean slate 
(art 3(2)e) 
AUSTRIA 
§ 60(2) Gesamte 
Rechtsvorschrift für 
Urheberrechtsgesetz, 
Fassung vom 11.02.2016 
§ 68(3) & § 
76(6) § 76(7) § 76(8) § 76(9) 
BELGIUM 
ART XI.166 §2, 3rd par, Boek 
XI “Intellectuele 
eigendom” Wetboek van 
economisch recht – Code 
for economic rights 
ART XI.208 
ART XI.209 §1, 
6th 
ART XI.210 §1 ART XI.210 
§2 & §3 
ART XI.210 
§5 
BULGARIA 
ART. 27 (3) of the 
Copyright and Related 
Rights Act 
ART. 82 (1-4) 
and ART. 89 
(1-4) of the 
ART. 77 (3) ART. 77a (1-
4) ART. 77 (2) 
CROATIA 
ART. 100a of the Copyright 
and Related Rights Act 
ART. 131 (2-3) 
and ART. 137 
(1-2) 
ART. 137a(1-
5) 
ART. 137b 
(1-5) 
ART. 137c 
(1-4) 
CYPRUS 
ART 5(1) – table - (i) of the 
Copyright and Related 
Rights Act 
ART. 5(1) – 
table - (iii) and 
(vii) 
ART. 12(8a)(i) ART. 12 (8b)-
(8e) 
ART. 12 (8f) 
t 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
Section 27 (6) of the 
Copyright Act 
Section 73 
and Section 
77 
Section 72a 
(1)-(2) and 
Section 77a 
Section 
71(4) and 
Section 76(a) 
Section 
72b 
DENMARK 
ART. 63(2) of the 
Consolidated Act on 
Copyright 2014 
ART. 65 (3-4) 
and ART. 66 
(1) 
ART. 66a (1-
3) 
ART. 66b (1-
5) ART. 66c 
ESTONIA § 39 of the Copyright Act § 74(1-2) § 68 (5-8) § 67
1 (1-3 
and 5) 
§ 671 (3 and 
4) 
FINLAND 
Section 43(2) of the 
Copyright Act 
Section 45 (4-
5) and Section 
46(2) 
Section 46b 
(1-4) 
Section 
46c(1-2) 
Section 46c 
(3) 
FRANCE 
Art. L-123-2 Code de la 
propriete intellectuelle 
Art. L-211-4 
Art. L-212-3-1 
and 2 
Art. L-212-3-
3 
Art. L-212-
3-4 
GERMANY 
§ 65 (3) Gesetz über 
Urheberrecht und 
verwandte Schutzrechte 
(Urheberrechtsgesetz, 
§§ 82 and 85 § 79 (3) § 79a § 79a (5) 
Implementation of the Directive 2011/77/EU: copyright term of protection 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 55 
COUNTRY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Term of musical 
composition with words 
(art 1(7) 
Term 
extension 
(art 3(1) and 
3(2)) 
Use it or lose 
it clause 
(art 3(2)a) 
20% fund 
(art 3(2)b 
and c) 
Clean slate 
(art 3(2)e) 
geändert durch Gesetzes 
vom 4. April 2016) 
GREECE ART. 30 of Law 2121/1993 ART. 52(c) and 
52(d) 
ART. 
52(d)(aa) o 
ART. 
52(d)(bb)-
(ee) and (gg) 
o 
ART. 
52(d)(ff) 
and (gg) 
HUNGARY 
ART. 31 (2) of the 
Copyright Act 
ART. 84(1)(a)-
(c) and (d) 
ART. 55 (2)-
(4) 
ART. 74/A 
(1)-(2) 
ART. 74/A 
(3) 
IRELAND 
Section 24(1A) of the 
Copyright and Related 
Rights Act 2000 
Section 26 (C) 
and Section 
291 (2A-B) 
Section 299A 
(1-5) 
Section 299B 
(1-7) 
Section 
299C 
ITALY 
ART. 26 – Law n. 633 of 
April 22, 1941 
ART. 75 and 
ART. 85 ART. 84ter ART. 84bis ART. 84bis 
LATVIA 
Section 37 (3) of the 
Copyright Law 
Section 55(1) 
and (21) 
Section 48 
(9)-(11) 
Section 48 
(12)-(14) 
Section 48 
(15) 
LITHUANIA 
ART 35(8), Law No. VIII-
1185 of May 18, 1999, on 
Copyright and Related 
Rights (as amended up to 
Law No. XII-1183 of 
October 7, 2014) 
ART 59 (1) and 
(2) ART 591 ART 592 ART 592 
LUXEMBOURG 
ART 9(2), Loi du 18 avril 
2001 sur les droits 
d'auteur, les droits voisins 
et les bases de données 
ART 45(1)-(2) ART 45 (2bis) ART 45 (2ter 
– quarter) 
ART 45 
(2sexies) 
MALTA 
ART. 4 of the Extension to 
Term of Protection 
(Neighbouring Rights) 
ART. 5 (2-3) 
and ART. 6(2) ART. 7(1-4) ART. 8 (1-5) ART. 8(6) 
NETHERLANDS 
ART 1 Jo Art 10(1)5° & ART 
37 Aw 
ART 12(1)-(4) 
WNR 
ART 9A WNR 
Jo ART 25e(3) 
Aw 
ART 9B, 15C, 
15G WNR 
ART 9B, 
15C, 15G 
WNR 
POLAND 
ART. 36 (5) of the 
Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights Act 
ART. 89, 891 
and 95 (1)-(3) ART. 952 Art. 953 of Art. 954 
PORTUGAL Art. 32 (1) Código do Art. 183 and Art. 183a (1) Art. 183a (4) Art. 183a 
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COUNTRY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Term of musical 
composition with words 
(art 1(7) 
Term 
extension 
(art 3(1) and 
3(2)) 
Use it or lose 
it clause 
(art 3(2)a) 
20% fund 
(art 3(2)b 
and c) 
Clean slate 
(art 3(2)e) 
Direito de Autor e dos 
Direitos Conexos 
(conforme alterado de 
acordo com DL n.º 
100/2017, de 23/08) 
102 (1) (b) to (3) to (7) (5) in fine 
ROMANIA 
Art. 102^d1 para. (4) LEGE 
nr. 53 din 24 martie 2015 
pentru modificarea şi 
completarea Legii nr. 
8/1996 privind dreptul de 
autor şi drepturile conexe 
Art. 102 para. 
(1) letter b) 
and art. 106 
para. (1) 
Art. 102^1 
para. (1) - (4) 
Art. 102^1 
para. (5) - (9) 
Art. 102^1 
para. (10) 
SLOVAKIA 
Section 32 (5) of the Act 
on Copyright and Related 
Rights 
Section 102(2) 
and Section 
111(1) 
Section 105 
Section 100 
and Section 
112 
Section 101 
SLOVENIA 
ART. 60 (2) of the 
Copyright and Related 
Rights Act 
Art. 127 and 
ART. 132 
ART.83 and 
ART. 122 ART. 122.b ART. 122.c 
SPAIN 
Art. 28.1 Texto refundido 
de la Ley de Propiedad 
Intelectual, regularizando, 
aclarando y armonizando 
las Disposiciones Legales 
Vigentes sobre la Materia 
(aprobado por el Real 
Decreto legislativo Nº 
1/1996 de 12 de abril, y 
modificado hasta la Ley N° 
12/2017, de 3 de julio de 
2017) 
Arts. 112 and 
119 Copyright 
Act 
Arts. 110 
bis.1 
Copyright 
Act 
Art. 110 bis.2 
Copyright 
Act 
Art. 110 
bis.3 
Copyright 
Act 
SWEDEN 
§ 43 (1) Lag (1960:729) om 
upphovsrätt till litterära 
och konstnärliga verk 
§§ 45 and 46 § 45d § 45a to 45d § 45c 
UNITED KINGDOM Section 12 (8) Copyright, 
Design and Patent Act 
1988 
Section 191 
(2) 
Section 
191HA 
Section 
191HB 
Section 
191HB (9) 
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Austria: 
Bundesgesetz über das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und der Kunst und über verwandte 
Schutzrechte – Copyright and Related Rights Act 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/de/at/at122de.pdf 
1. Term of musical composition with words: implemented completely, paraphrased 
- No mention of co-authorship is included, making the requirement implicitly unrequired 
2. Term extension: Implemented with different wording, but effect remains the same 
3. Use it or lose it clause: Implemented with different wording, and 
- The right to dissolve the contract is to be used by a “common representative” 
4. 20% fund: Implemented with different wording 
5. Clean slate: Implemented with different wording, but 
- “Advance payments” are not included in the article, but this can perhaps be included in 
the “contractually defined deductions” 
Belgium: 
Boek XI “Intellectuele eigendom” Wetboek van economisch recht – Code for economic rights 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/fr/be/be166fr.pdf 
1. Term of musical composition with words: 
2. Term extension: Implemented quasi-verbatim, and; 
- A standard provision is included assigning the rights to the successor in title after the 
passing of the performer 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented quasi-verbatim, but; 
- The term “contract on transfer or assignment” was replaced with only “contract on 
assignment”. This is in standing with art. XI.167 and XI.203. The term “assignment” is receives 
a broad enough interpretation at Belgian law to adhere to the Directive. 
4. 20% fund: Implemented verbatim 
5. Clean slate: Implemented verbatim 
Bulgaria: 
Amendment to the Copyright and Related Rights Act, published on 8 March 2014 in State Gazette 
issue 21/2014, available at http://dv.parliament.bg/DVWeb/showMaterialDV.jsp?idMat=83222 
1. Term of musical composition with words: implemented verbatim. 
2. Term extension: implemented completely, with the remark that the rights of the phonogram 
producer cease to exist if the performer has exercised his right of termination of the transfer or 
assignment of his exclusive rights in the phonogram. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented verbatim. 
4. 20% fund: implemented verbatim. 
5. Clean slate: implemented verbatim. 
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Croatia: 
NN 141/13, in force from 5 December 2013, which amended the Copyright and Related Rights Act, 
available at http://www.dziv.hr/files/File/eng/zakon_autor_ENG.pdf 
1. Term of musical composition with words: implemented completely, with the remark that, if the 
musical composition and the words were not created specifically to be used together, the general 
rule applies. No mention was made to the situation in which the authors were not designated as co-
authors. 
2. Term extension: implemented completely, with two remarks: a) the term of protection for the 
phonogram producer was also extended to 70 years from the fixation (before any publication or 
communication to the public); and b) the term extension does not apply to the rights of the 
phonogram producer if there is a termination of the contract between him and the performer. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely, with the addition that, if more than one performer 
participated in the performance fixed in a phonogram, the termination can be exercised by the 
representative of the artistic ensemble, according to art. 123 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act. 
4. 20% fund: implemented completely. 
5. Clean slate: implemented completely, with the addition that, if the performer and the phonogram 
producer fail to achieve an agreement concerning an equitable rebalance of the contract, the rights 
of the phonogram producer are deemed to have expired 50 years after the publication of the 
phonogram or its communication to the public. 
Cyprus: 
2014 Amendment to the Copyright and Related Rights Act, available at 
http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop/non-ind/1976_1_59/index.html 
1. Term of musical composition with words: implemented verbatim. 
2. Term extension: implemented verbatim. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely, with the addition that, when a phonogram 
contains more than one performance, the performers can terminate the transfer or assignment 
according to Contract Law. 
4. 20% fund: implemented verbatim. From the language of the provision, it seems that the annual 
supplementary remuneration will be always based on the “revenue earned by the record producer 
during the year prior to the 50th year after the record was lawfully published” or lawfully 
communicated to the public, and not calculated each year based on the previous’ year revenue. 
5. Clean slate: implemented verbatim. 
Czech Republic: 
Copyright Act, available at https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2000-121 
1. Term of musical composition with words: implemented completely. 
2. Term extension: implemented verbatim. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely, with the addition that, when the phonogram 
contains the record of performances of more than one performer, paragraph 68 (which refers to the 
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joint representative of performers) shall apply mutatis mutandis to their termination of the 
assignment or transfer contract. 
4. 20% fund: implemented completely, with the addition that the producer shall pay the annual 
supplementary remuneration to the competent collective administrator who pays the annual 
supplementary remuneration to the performers no later than 31 March of the calendar year following 
the year for which such remuneration is due. Moreover, revenues from payments made to a collective 
society which fails to make a reasonable effort within 3 years of their receipt expire and go to the 
State Cultural Fund of the Czech Republic. 
5. Clean slate: implemented completely. 
Denmark: 
Consolidated Act on Copyright (2014), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/dk/dk091en.pdf 
1. Term of musical composition with words: implemented, but no mention was made to the situation 
in which the authors were not designated as co-authors. 
2. Term extension: implemented completely with regard to the performers. The term extension of the 
rights of the phonogram producers, however, was not implemented. They still enjoy 50 years of 
protection from the fixation and, then, 50 years from the publication or communication to the public. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely. 
4. 20% fund: implemented completely, with the addition that the supplementary remuneration must 
be paid and managed by a management organization approved by the Danish Minister for Culture. 
5. Clean slate: implemented verbatim. 
Estonia: 
Copyright Act (Consolidated Text of January 1, 2017),  
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ee/ee184en.pdf 
1. Term of musical composition with words: not explicitly implemented, but Section 39, which may 
apply, affirms that in the case of joint or co-authorship, the term of protection is the life of the last 
surviving author and seventy years after his or her death. 
2. Term extension: implemented completely concerning the rights of the performers. However, with 
respect to the phonogram producers, the term was extended only if there is a publication. If there is a 
communication to the public less than fifty years from the fixation, the work is protected for fifty years 
(and not for seventy years) from the communication to the public. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely, with the addition that, if there are several 
performers in a fixed performance, each one may terminate a separately concluded agreement for 
assignment or transfer, and a jointly concluded agreement for assignment or transfer can be 
cancelled by the leader of an ensemble (or another person authorized by the group to do so). Also, 
the termination cannot occur if, within less than one year from the notice of the intention to 
terminate, the phonogram producer either offers the phonogram for sale or make it available to the 
public (according to the language of the Directive, both of those acts should be done in order to 
prevent the termination). 
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4. 20% fund: implemented completely, with the remark that this annual additional remuneration does 
not apply to a business whose turnover for reproduction, distribution and making available of such 
phonograms which were lawfully published, or if no such publication occurred, then lawfully 
communicated to the public fifty years ago, was less than 100 euros in the year preceding the year of 
payment of the remuneration. 
5. Clean slate: implemented completely. 
Finland: 
Copyright Act (404/1961, amended by Act n. 2015/608 of May 22, 2015), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/fi/fi115en.pdf 
1. Term of musical composition with words: implemented verbatim. 
2. Term extension: implemented completely, but it specifies that the fixation of a performance will be 
protected after the publication or communication to the public of the phonogram or the video 
recording (whereas the directive refers more generically to “fixation of the performance otherwise 
than in a phonogram”). Moreover, it adds that, if there is a termination, this term extension does not 
apply to the phonogram producer. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely, with the addition that, if the phonogram contains 
a performance by multiple artists, they all must file the notification to the phonogram producer with 
their intention to terminate their contracts and, after a year, the notice of termination. 
4. 20% fund: implemented completely. 
5. Clean slate: implemented completely. 
France:  
Loi du 20 février 2015 portant diverses dispositions d’adaptation au droit de l'Union européenne dans 
les domaines de la propriété littéraire et artistique et du patrimoine culturel, (JO 22 février 2015, p. 
3294) https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2015/2/20/MCCB1421649L/jo/texte 
The implementing measures are discussed in chapter 3.  
Germany: 
Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz, geändert durch 
Gesetzes vom 4. April 2016) http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/es/details.jsp?id=16047  
The implementing measures are discussed in chapter 3.  
Greece: 
Law 4212/2013, which amended the Copyright, Related Rights and Other Cultural Issues Act (Law 
2121/1993), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=430896 
1. Term of musical composition: implemented, but no mention was made to the situation in which 
the authors were not designated as co-authors. 
2. Term extension: implemented verbatim. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely, with the addition that, if the rights assigned by the 
performer to the phonogram producer were transferred to a third party, the written notification of 
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the intention to terminate the contract will be exercised against the producer. Moreover, when a 
phonogram contains a fixation of the performances of a plurality of performers, they may terminate 
the contract according to paragraph 4, article 46 (representative). If no representative is determined, 
the provisions of the community of right shall be applied. 
4. 20% fund: implemented completely, with the addition that the payment of the annual 
supplementary remuneration must be made within six months from the end of each financial year. 
Moreover, for the purposes of this remuneration, as well as the clean slate, a phonogram producer is 
considered to be the primary beneficiary or the successor in title or any third party that the relevant 
rights have been transferred to. 
5. Clean slate: implemented completely. 
Hungary: 
Act LXXVI of 1999 on Copyright, consolidated text (15.03.2014-28.10.2014), available at 
http://www.hipo.gov.hu/en/English/jogforras/hungarian_copyright_act.pdf 
1. Term of musical composition: not expressly implemented, but art. 31(2), which refers to cases of 
joint authorship, may apply. 
2. Term extension: implemented, but with slightly different concepts. With respect to performers, the 
extension occurs when the phonogram or other media in which it was fixed is put into circulation or, 
if not put into circulation, when the fixation occurred (whereas in the Directive the extension occurs 
with the publication or the communication to the public of the fixation of the performance). With 
respect to phonograms, they are protected for 50 years from the fixation and, if they are put into 
circulation during that time, for 70 years from the putting into circulation. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented verbatim. 
4. 20% Fund: implemented completely. 
5. Clean slate: implemented in regard to the 20% fund. 
Ireland: 
S.I. No. 411/2013 – European Union (Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related 
Rights)(Directive 2011/77/EU) Regulations 2013 (available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2013/si/411/made/en/print), which amended the Copyright and 
Related Rights Act 2000. 
1. Term of musical composition with words: implemented, but no mention was made to the situation 
in which the authors were not designated as co-authors. 
2. Term extension: fully implemented. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: completely implemented, with the addition that, if the performance of more 
than one performer is captured in a phonogram and more than one assignment agreement has been 
made, the expiry of the producer’s rights will not take effect until the last of the existing assignment 
agreements has been terminated. The termination may occur if, not later than one year from the date 
of notification, the producer has not offered copies of the sound recording or made it available to the 
public (whereas, from the language of the Directive, both acts should take place). 
4. 20% fund: fully implemented, with the following additions: a) the producer shall pay the annual 
supplementary remuneration to a collecting society within one month of its having been set aside; b) 
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the collecting society shall then distribute the annual supplementary remuneration to the performer; 
c) any information required by the performer in order to secure the payment of that remuneration 
must be given by the producer in writing as soon as may be, and in any event not more than 40 days 
after receipt of the said request; d) if the producer fails to supply the information within this period, 
the performer may seek an injunction from the High Court requiring the producer to provide the 
information. 
5. Clean slate: implemented verbatim. 
Italy: 
Decree-Law n. 22 of February 21, 2014, which modified Law n. 633 of April 22, 1941, available at 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2014/03/11/14G00034/sg 
1. Term of musical composition with words: no implementation was required, since article 26 
provides for protection for 70 years after the death of the last of the authors to die, in cases of joint 
authorship (http://documenti.camera.it/Leg17/Dossier/pdf/CU0081A.pdf p. 1). 
2. Term extension: implemented verbatim. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely, with the following additions: a) if the phonogram 
contains the fixation of the performances of a plurality of performers, they may terminate their 
contracts on transfer or assignment when there is a consensus, according to article 10; and b) if there 
is an unjustified refusal of one or more performers to agree with the termination, the judiciary 
authority shall ensure the termination rights.   
4. 20% fund: implemented completely. 
5. Clean Slate: implemented verbatim. 
Latvia: 
Copyright Law, as amended up to December 31, 2014), available at 
 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=417220 
1. Term of musical composition: not implemented expressly, but the provision on co-authorship, 
according to which copyright is granted for 70 years after the death of the last surviving author, may 
apply. 
2. Term extension: implemented completely. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely, with the addition that, if the performances of a 
plurality of performers are fixed in a phonogram, they may terminate the transfer or assignment 
contract if they do it jointly, including with the intermediation of a joint representative. None of them 
may refuse, without sufficient justification, other performers from exercising that right. 
4. 20% Fund: implemented completely. 
5. Clean slate: implemented completely. 
Lithuania: 
Law available at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/lt/lt081en.pdf 
1. Term of musical composition with words: implemented verbatim 
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2. Term extension: implemented verbatim 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely with the following additions: 
- Also applicable if the successor in title of producer hasn’t commercialised the record 
- Where a phonogram contains the fixation of the performances of a plurality of performers: 
the right to terminate its contract on transfer or assignment of the rights shall be 
implemented by a representative authorised by the group, and in the absence of 
authorisation to terminate the contract on transfer or assignment of the rights, by the leader 
of the group. 
4. 20% fund: implemented with the following additions: 
- The successor in title of the producer is also liable for the payment 
- Calculation and payment of the annual supplementary remuneration shall not be affected by 
any advance payments or deductions defined by a phonogram producer or his successor in 
title in the contract of the performer and the phonogram producer or his successor in title 
regarding the use of a fixation of the performance in a phonogram. 
- remuneration payable by producer (or his successor in title) once a year, following the end of 
the year in which the relevant fixations were used 
5. Clean slate: implemented in regard to the 20% fund (see above) 
Luxemburg: 
Loi du 18 avril 2001 sur les droits d'auteur, les droits voisins et les bases de données 
http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2001/04/18/n2/jo 
Note: Implementation comes from « Loi du 10 février 2015 portant transposition de la directive 2011/77/UE 
» changes may not be reflected in copyright act 
1. Term of musical composition with words: Implemented verbatim 
2. Term extension: Implemented verbatim 
3. Use it or lose it clause: Implemented verbatim 
4. 20% fund: Implemented verbatim 
5. Clean slate: Implemented verbatim 
Malta: 
Subsidiary Legislation n. 415.04 (Legal Notice 81 of 2014) – Extension to Term of Protection 
(Neighbouring Rights) Regulations, available at 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=12164&l=1 
1. Term of musical composition with words: implemented verbatim. 
2. Term extension: implemented verbatim. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented verbatim. 
4. 20% fund: implemented verbatim. 
5. Clean slate: implemented verbatim. 
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The Netherlands: 
Auteurswet (Aw) – Copyright Act http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/nl/nl/nl099nl.pdf   
Wet op de Naburige Rechten (WNR) – Neighboring Rights Act 
 http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/nl/nl079en.pdf   
1. Term of musical composition with words: No implementation was required. Copyright extends to 
musical works, which are given protection for 70 years from the time of death of the author 
2. Term extension: implemented completely 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented, however 
- No provisions are given in the event of a plurality of performers but explanatory 
memorandum clarifies that this is catered for 
- Economic feasibility for economic exploitation is a prerequisite 
- Definition of “does not offer … for sale” is replaced with “is not or no longer exploited” to tie 
up with existing jurisprudence (see Hof Amsterdam 23 december 2008, AMI 2009, 2 Intersong 
Basart/Hans van Hemert) 
4. 20% fund: Implemented completely, with addition of: 
- A criminal penalty is imposed in the event information on revenue is withheld after a 
request therefore is made (max 3 years and/or €8,200 fine) 
5. Clean slate: implemented in regard to the 20% fund (see above) 
Poland: 
Act of February 4, 1994, on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (as amended up to May 20, 2016), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=408585 
1. Term of musical composition: implemented, but no mention was made to the situation in which 
the authors were not designated as co-authors. 
2. Term extension: implemented completely. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented, with the addition that, if a phonogram contains the fixation of 
the performances of several performers, the right to terminate is available to any of them and, in case 
of an effective termination of the contracts concluded for all performances fixed in a phonogram, the 
phonogram producer’s right expires. The termination cannot take place if, within a year from the 
notification, the producer start using the phonogram in any of the possible ways (whereas, from the 
language of the Directive, both acts should be taken). 
4. 20% Fund: implemented completely, with the addition that the payment of the supplementary 
annual remuneration shall be made through organizations for collective management of rights 
related to performances scheduled for a period of no more than five years by the minister responsible 
for culture and national heritage protection after a competition, whose requirements are set forth in 
the provision. The minister shall specify by regulation how the annual supplementary remuneration 
will be paid, bearing in mind the need to ensure that the collection and payment of remuneration 
were carried out in an efficient and transparent way, and that deductions are justified and 
documented. 
5. Clean slate: implemented completely. 
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Portugal: 
Código do Direito de Autor e dos Direitos Conexos (conforme alterado de acordo com DL n.º 
100/2017, de 23/08) available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/es/details.jsp?id=17387  
The implementing measures are discussed in chapter 3.  
Romania: 
LEGE nr. 53 din 24 martie 2015 pentru modificarea şi completarea Legii nr. 8/1996 privind dreptul de 
autor şi drepturile conexe, available at http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/lege-nr-53-din-24-martie-
2015-pentru-modificarea-i-completarea-legii-nr-8-1996-privind-dreptul-de-autor-i-drepturile-conexe-
emitent-166598.html  
The implementing measures are discussed in chapter 3.  
Slovakia: 
Act n. 185/2015 Coll. on Copyright and Related Rights (as amended by Act n. 125/2016 Coll), available 
at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=451098 
1. Term of musical composition: implemented, but no mention was made to the situation in which 
the authors were not designated as co-authors. 
2. Term extension: implemented completely, but it specifies that the fixation of a performance will be 
protected after the publication or communication to the public of a phonogram or an audio-visual 
recording (whereas the directive refers more generically to “any form of recording other than 
phonogram”). 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely. 
4. 20% Fund: implemented completely. 
5. Clean slate: implemented completely. 
Slovenia: 
Copyright and Related Rights Act (as amended up to October 22, 2016), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=422515 
1. Term of musical composition: implemented verbatim. 
2. Term extension: implemented completely. 
3. Use it or lose it clause: implemented completely. 
4. 20% Fund: implemented completely. 
5. Clean slate: implemented completely. 
Spain: 
Ley 21/2014, de 4 de noviembre, por la que se modifica el texto refundido de la Ley de Propiedad 
Intelectual, aprobado por Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1996, de 12 de abril, y la Ley 1/2000, de 7 de 
enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil, available at https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2014-
11404  
The implementing measures are discussed in chapter 3.  
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 66 
Sweden: 
SFS 2013:691 amending the Copyright Act (“SFS 1960:729”). A consolidated text of the Copyright Act 
is available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/es/details.jsp?id=16268  
The implementing measures are discussed in chapter 3. 
United Kingdom: 
The Copyright and Duration of Rights in Performances Regulations 2013 amending the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 are available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1782/pdfs/uksi_20131782_en.pdf 
 
The implementing measures are discussed in chapter 3.  
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ANNEX 2 – LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS CONTACTED DIRECTLY BY THE 
AUTHORS 
(Please note that the stakeholders contacted by national experts are listed in the national reports 
included in Annex 3)  
Type of stakeholder Name of stakeholder Member State Contact 
Users Younion / Sektion Musik Austria 
(through FIM – 
International Federation 
of Musicians) 
Mag. Thomas Dürrer 
Users Spotify  
At the time of closing the 
research, we have not 
received an answer 
Users Deezer  
At the time of closing the 
research, we have not 
received an answer 
CMO (performers and 
producers) 
Gesellschaft zur 
Verwertung von 
Leistungsschutzrechten 
mbH (GVL) 
Germany 
(through FIM) 
Tilo Gerlach 
Performers Musicians’ Union UK (through FIM) 
Performers AEPO-ARTIS  Nicole Schulze 
Producers IFPI  Kristina Janusauskaite 
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ANNEX 3 – NATIONAL REPORTS 
 
FRANCE 
National expert: Oleksandr Bulayenko80 
 
 
1. National implementation of the Directive  
 
a) Through which legislation was the Directive implemented in national law? Please provide a 
short history of the implementation, highlighting any legal or practical difficulties in implementing 
the Directive (for example, strong opposition from any interest groups, or difficulties in 
implementing the clauses of the Directive given national legal constraints – for instance, from 
contract law - or established practices) 
 
The Directive was implemented in national law through adoption of the law of 20 February 2015 
containing various provisions amending national law according to the law of the European Union in 
the domains of copyright and of cultural heritage (Loi du 20 février 2015 portant diverses dispositions 
d’adaptation au droit de l'Union européenne dans les domaines de la propriété littéraire et artistique 
et du patrimoine culturel, JO 22 février 2015, p. 3294). This law modified the French Intellectual 
Property Code (Code de la propriété intellectuelle) (CPI), notably by amending Article L211-4 and by 
creating Articles L212-3-1 to L212-3-4.  
 
Normative implementation of Articles L212-3-1 and L212-3-3 of the CPI was completed by the 
adoption by the Decree of the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat) 7 May 2015 (Décret n° 2015-506 du 6 
mai 2015 pris pour l’application des articles L. 135-7, L. 212-3-1 et L. 212-3-3 du code de la propriété 
intellectuelle, JORF n°0106 du 7 mai 2015 page 7848, texte n° 28) and of the Order of the Ministry of 
Culture and Communication (Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication) of 27 September 2016 
(Arrêté du 27 septembre 2016 portant agrément de la société des artistes-interprètes en vue de la 
gestion de la rémunération annuelle supplémentaire due aux artistes-interprètes, JORF n°0234 du 7 
octobre 2016, texte n° 38).  
  
2. Term extension (Art. 1.7, 3.1 and 2).  
 
*a) Have the provisions concerning the term extension been adequately implemented into 
national law?  
 
With regard to the duration of rights to phonograms the Directive was adequately implemented by 
Article L211-4 of the CPI.  
 
With regard to the duration of rights to works, respective provisions of the Directive were already a 
part of the French law before its adoption (Articles L123-1and L123-2 of the CPI).  
                                                 
80 Researcher at the Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI), University of Strasbourg, France; Coordinator of WIPO/CEIPI 
IP capacity building trainings (2012-14); Coordinator of CEIPI IP diploma programme in Skopje, FYROM (2013-17); Member of the 
Administrative Board of CEIPI and of the Academic Board of the Joint European Doctorate EIPIN – Innovation Society (Horizon 2020 - Marie 
Skłodowska-Curie Action - ITN-EJD 2016-2019) 
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b) Having in mind the “de minimis” character of the Directive, does national law provide for the 
application of the term extension when the performance is fixed in a media different from a 
phonogram?  
 
French law does not provide for the term extension when the performance is fixed in a media 
different from a phonogram (Article L211-4 of the CPI).  
 
c) Is the term extension also applicable to performers and producers in the audio-visual sector?  
According to Article L211-4 of the CPI the term extension was not applied to performers and 
producers in the audio-visual sector.  
 
*d) General assessment of the term extension/other remarks 
 
Recital 12 of the Directive provides that “national rules on non-distributable revenue may be applied” 
to the distribution of the annual supplementary remuneration. No special rule was adopted with 
regard to the non-distributed sums collected for the annual supplementary remuneration in France. 
Hence the general regime for non-distributed revenues of CMOs of Article L321-9 of the CPI is 
applicable. The general assembly of the CMO may decide on the use of the sums five years after their 
allocation for distribution. One of conditions for the CMO to be appointed by the Ministry of Culture 
for managing the rights to the annual supplementary remuneration is the provision by the former of 
the necessary information regarding identification and location of performers for the purpose of 
distribution of collected sums (Article R328-1, 5° of the CPI).  
 
3. The “use it or lose it” clause (Art. 3.2a): how does it work in practice?  
 
*a) How shall the term “in sufficient quantity” be interpreted?  
No answer 
 
b) Does the offering of copies or the making available of the work need to be done by the producer 
himself or does the provision also apply when these acts are carried out by third parties?  
No answer 
 
c) Are there any mechanisms in place to inform performers of this clause (having in mind that this 
right can only be exercised 50 years after the fixation or publication of the performance)?  
No answer 
 
d) What is the procedure in cases where a phonogram contains the fixation of the performances 
from a plurality of performers?  
 
With regard to the exercise of this right in case when a phonogram contains the fixation of the 
performances of a plurality of performers the French law requires a common agreement of those 
performers. In case of disagreement, it is for the courts of civil jurisdiction to rule. (Article L212-3-2 of 
the CPI). If there is a common agreement on the intention to terminate the contract, the performers 
need to undertake together the same sequence of acts as individual performers (R212-8, III of the CPI). 
For the description of the sequence of acts, see response to the question “g” below.  
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e) To your knowledge, have performers already made use of this clause vis-à-vis phonogram 
producers?  
No answer 
 
f) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this mandatory clause?  
No answer 
 
*g) General assessment of the “use it or lose it” clause/other remarks 
 
The right of a performer to terminate the contract, its exercise and its unwaivable character (as 
provided by Recital 2a of the Directive) were transposed into the French law by Articles L211-4, II and 
L212-3-1 of the CPI. The performer can notify phonogram producer of his intention to terminate the 
contract if the latter does not offer copies of the phonogram for sale in sufficient quantity or does not 
make it available in such a way that members of the public may access them at their own initiative. 
The notification has to be made by sending a registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt 
(Article R212-8, I of the CPI). The performer can exercise his unwaivable rights to terminate the 
contract one year after the aforementioned notification (counting from the postmark date) by 
notifying the producer of his decision to terminate the contract in the same manner in which he notified 
him of his intention to do this (i.e., by sending a registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt). 
The termination becomes effective the day after the postmark date (Article R212-8, II of the CPI).  
 
4. The annual supplementary remuneration (the “20% fund”): how does it work in practice? (art. 
3.2b – 2d)  
 
a) What kind of measures have been adopted to ensure that performers are informed of this 
annual supplementary remuneration?  
No answer 
 
b) Are phonogram producers obliged by national law to inform performers of this right?  
 
No 
 
c) How has the Member State implemented in national law the obligation of phonogram producers 
to provide performers, upon request, “any information which may be necessary in order to secure 
payment of that remuneration”?  
 
The obligation of phonogram producers under the second paragraph of Article 3(2c) of the Directive 
to provide performers with any information which may be necessary in order to secure payment of 
the supplementary remuneration was transposed into the French law by Article L212-3-3, III of the 
CPI. This article obliges phonogram producers to provide on the request of performers or of collective 
management organisations exercising their rights statement of revenue relevant for the calculation 
of the supplementary remuneration as well as all the justifications for establishing the accuracy of the 
statement.  
 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to inform them of this right?  
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No answer 
 
e) Have collecting societies in the Member State adopted any measure to inform performers of this 
right?  
 
It can be affirmed that the two CMOs having performers as their members informed them about this 
rights at least indirectly, through the annual report (in case of ADAMI81) and through their websites 
(ADAMI82 and SPEDIDAM83).  
f) Which collecting society is responsible for administering the “20 % fund”? How has this 
collecting society organized the administration and distribution of the annual supplementary 
remuneration? 
 
The Order of the Ministry of Culture and Communication (Ministère de la Culture et de la 
Communication) of 27 September 2016 (Arrêté du 27 septembre 2016 portant agrément de la société des 
artistes-interprètes en vue de la gestion de la rémunération annuelle supplémentaire due aux artistes-
interprètes, JORF n°0234 du 7 octobre 2016, texte n° 38) authorised SAI (Société des artistes-interprètes) to 
manage the annual supplementary remuneration.  
 
SAI was created in 2004 by the two CMOs representing performers, ADAMI (Société pour 
l’administration des droits des artistes et musiciens-interprètes) and SPEDIDAM (Société de perception et 
de distribution des droits des artistes-interprètes),84 which are its only shareholders today.85 According to 
the annual report of the Permanent Commission for the Control of CMOs, a joint work plan of ADAMI 
and SPEDIDAM foreseeing, among other things, use of SAI for the management of the annual 
supplementary remuneration, was signed 17 October 2016.86 
 
g) How many performers represented by collecting societies have benefited so far from this right in 
each of the fiscal years following the deadline for transposition of the Directive (1 November 
2013)?  
 
Publicly available reports of the CMOs representing performers do not specifically mention the sums 
collected through the right to the annual supplementary remuneration, while they do this with 
regard to other rights.   
 
h) How much have collecting societies collected each year as a consequence of the 20%-fund 
provision?  
                                                 
81 ADAMI, Rapport d’activité 2016, pp. 28-29, available at:  
https://www.adami.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf___docs/05_Connaitre/Bilan/2017/ADAMI_RAPPORT_ACTIVITE_2016_BD.pdf (last visited 
10 October 2017). 
82  Accord Adami-Spedidam : Un accord majeur pour les artistes-interprètes: https://www.adami.fr/connaitre-ladami/accord-adami-
spedidam.html  (last visited 10 October 2017). 
83 Accord avec l’ADAMI : Accord entre l’Adami et la Spedidam, réactivation de la Société des artistes-interprètes Paris (this news was 
published 17 October 2016, Essentiel n° 78628): https://spedidam.fr/actualites/accord-entre-la-spedidam-et-ladami/ (last visited 10 October 
2017). 
84 Commission permanente de contrôle des sociétés de perception et de répartition des droits, Treizième rapport annuel 2016, April 2016, 
pp. 53-54.  
85 Commission permanente de contrôle des sociétés de perception et de répartition des droits, Quatorzième rapport annuel 2017, April 
2017, p. 207.  
86 Commission permanente de contrôle des sociétés de perception et de répartition des droits, Quatorzième rapport annuel 2017, April 2017, p. 206. 
ADAMI, Rapport d’activité 2016, pp. 28-29, available at: 
https://www.adami.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf___docs/05_Connaitre/Bilan/2017/ADAMI_RAPPORT_ACTIVITE_2016_BD.pdf (last accessed 10 
October 2017).  
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Publicly available reports of the CMOs representing performers do not specifically mention the sums 
collected through the right to the annual supplementary remuneration, while they do this with 
regard to other rights.   
 
i) Following Recital 12 of the Term Extension Directive, has national law exempted micro-
enterprises from the obligation to contribute? If so, under which circumstances?  
 
Micro-enterprises of phonogram producers are exempted from the obligation to pay to performers 
the annual supplementary remuneration in cases when the costs of operations of calculation and 
control would be out of proportion with the amounts of remuneration to be transferred (Article L212-
3-3, I of the CPI). The same article defines micro-enterprises of phonogram producers as those that 
employ fewer than 10 persons and whose annual revenue or the annual balance sheet total does not 
exceed 2 million euros.  
 
*j) General assessment of the 20% fund/other remarks 
 
Article L212-3-3 of the CPI transposed the right of performer to an annual supplementary 
remuneration in case of the contract foreseeing a non-recurring remuneration.  
 
According to Article L212-3-3, II of the CPI, the annual supplementary remuneration of 20% should be 
calculated from the totality of revenues of the preceding year collected by producers of phonograms 
from reproduction, communication to the public and making available of phonograms,  but 
excluding the remuneration collected from certain types of communication to the public of 
commercial phonograms (provided by Article L214-1 of the CPI) and from private copying (provided 
by Article L311-1 of the CPI). This Article trasposes Recital 13 of the Directive.  
 
Recital 11 of the Directive states that the phonogram producers should be obliged to set aside “at 
least once a year […] 20% of the revenue […] before deducting costs”. Article L212-3-3 opt for the 
minimum of compliance with the Directive and renders the payment annual (i.e., once a year). The 
implementing law does not contain a specific indication that the revenue taken into consideration for 
the purpose of calculating the 20% remuneration to authors should be the revenue before deducting 
costs.   
 
Article 3(2d) of the Directive, providing for the mandatory collective management of the rights to 
supplementary remuneration, was transposed by Article L212-3-3, III of the CPI. As it is the case with 
the mandatory collective management of rights in other domains in France, the collective 
management organisation(s) (CMO) managing rights to the annual supplementary remuneration 
have to be approved by the Minister of Culture (Article R328-3 of the CPI). The requirements to CMOs 
and the procedure for obtaining, renewing and withdrawing of the authorisation are established by 
Articles R328-1 to R328-6 of the CPI. The authorisation is issued for the period of five years, renewable 
for the same duration and under the same condition as the initial authorisation (Article R328-4 of the 
CPI).  
 
5. The “clear state” provision (Art. 3.2e): how does it work in practice 
 
a) Can the clean slate rule be waived by contract?  
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Given that the purpose of the legislative provision is to limit contracts, the answer to this question 
shall be negative.  
 
b) What are the mechanisms Member States have established to enforce this measure in national 
law?  
 
It seems that there are no special measures in national law to enforce this measure.  
 
c) Is there an obligation to inform performers of this measure?  
 
There is no legal obligation to inform performers of this measure.  
 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to reflect this mandatory clause?  
 
No answer 
 
*e) General assessment of the “clean slate” provision/other remarks 
 
Article 3(2e) and Recital 14 of the Directive was transposed by Article L212-3-4 of the CPI. The national 
law unambiguously states that when performers under their contracts with producers of 
phonograms are entitled to recurring payments, no advances or any contractually defined 
deductions can be applied to the payments due to the artists during the term of protection after the 
first 50 years.  
 
6. Transitional provisions (Art. 10.5 and 6, art. 10a)  
 
*a) Have the transitional measures of arts. 10.5, 10.6 and 10a been adequately implemented into 
national law?  
 
Article 2 of the Term Extension Directive of 2011 obliged member states to implement the Directive 
by 1 November 2013. The French law transposing the Directive was adopted with a delay 20 February 
2015. The transitional provisions of the law retroactively apply to the events from 1 November 2013 
(Article 8, I of the law).   
 
Article 10(5) of the Directive provides that its Articles 3(1) (on the term extension) and 3(2e) 
(containing the “clean slate” provision) should apply to fixations of performances and phonograms 
the duration of protection of which did not expire as of 1 November 2013. Article 8, I of the 
transposition law states that the law does not revive the rights to fixations of performances and 
phonograms which expired before 1 November 2013, thus having a retroactive effect and 
“resurrecting” rights that expired between 1 November and the entry into force of the law of 20 
February 2015. At the same time, Article 8, IV of the transposition law stipulates that only 
infringements of related rights occurring after the publication of the law (20 February 2015) can lead 
to criminal prosecution.  
 
Article 10a(1) of the Directive, providing that in the absence of clear contractual indications to the 
contrary, a contract on transfer or assignment concluded before 1 November 2013 shall be deemed 
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to continue to produce its effects beyond the former 50 years term of protection, was accurately 
transposed by Article 8, II of the transposition law.  
 
b) Does national legislation allow performers to modify their contracts on transfer or assignment 
after the 50-year period has expired (see Art. 10a.2)?  
 
Article 10a(2) of the Directive, providing for the possibility to renegotiate contracts on transfer or 
assignment of related rights which entitle a performer to recurring payments and which were 
concluded before 1 November 2013, was transposed by Article 8, III of the transposition law. The 
French law specifies that the contracts can be renegotiated for the benefit of performers. 
 
c) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this? 
 
No answer 
 
7. General assessment of the Directive  
 
*a) Are performers aware of the benefits brought about by the Directive? Do they effectively 
reclaim them? How long on average does it take for performers to receive the benefits they are 
entitled to?  
 
No answer 
 
*b) What are roughly the estimated yearly benefits for (1) record producers and (2) performers, 
taking into consideration the musical repertoire affected by the term extension? In the case of 
record producers, is there any data on how these benefits have been used?  
 
No answer 
 
*c) Has the Directive had a negative impact on other stakeholders, such as users (e.g., higher prices 
in cultural goods, or lower production volume)?  
 
No answer 
 
d) How much money (estimate) would users of music repertoires have saved each fiscal year since 1 
November 2013 if the Directive had not been adopted?  
 
No answer 
 
e) Have the effects of the Directive been watered down due to contractual practices? Please 
describe such practices if applicable.  
 
No answer 
 
*f) In your opinion, have the cultural and creative sectors benefited from the term extension (e.g., 
have marketing opportunities in third countries increased? Are there more revenue streams? Have 
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producers been marketing back catalogue items, and if so how is that received by users)? Please 
give reasons.  
No answer 
 
g) Have users of music repertoires become less competitive vis-à-vis companies in third countries 
due to the amount of royalties they will have to pay to performers and phonogram producers as a 
consequence of the term extension? In your opinion, can this be an obstacle for off-line / on-line 
music business models to flourish in Europe?  
 
No answer 
 
h) Other remarks 
 
No answer 
 
Stakeholders effectively contacted: 
 
Type of stakeholder Name of 
stakeholder 
Contact 
Academic centre CEIPI 
Oleksandr Bulayenko with Prof Christophe Geiger, Director 
General of CEIPI. 
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GERMANY 
National expert: Ana María Pacón87 
 
 
1. National implementation of the Directive 
 
a) Through which legislation was the Directive implemented in national law? Please provide a 
short history of the implementation, highlighting any legal or practical difficulties in implementing 
the Directive (for example, strong opposition from any interest groups, or difficulties in 
implementing the clauses of the Directive given national legal constraints – for instance, from 
contract law - or established practices) 
 
By law of July 2, 2013 (Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) I, p. 1940) §§ 82 and 85 of the German 
Copyright Law (Urheberechtsgesetz, UrhG) regarding the duration of performer’s and producer’s rights 
was amended (9. Urheberänderungsgesetz, UrhÄndG of July 2, 2013). The law was published on July 5, 
2013 and it took place on July 6, 2013. 
The adoption of the Directive was highly criticized by the German academy (see, for example, 
Hilty/Kur/Klass/Geiger/Peukert/Drexl/Katzenberger, Stellungnahme des Max-Planck-Instituts für 
Geistiges Eigentum, Wettbewerbs- und Steuerrecht zum Vorschlag der Kommission für eine Richtlinie 
zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2006/116 EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über die 
Schutzdauer des Urheberrechts und bestimmter verwandter Schutzrechte, GRUR Int.  2008, p. 907; 
GRUR, Stellungnahme zum Vorschlag der Kommision für eine Richtlinie zur Änderung der Richtlinie 
2006/116 EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über die Schutzdauer des Urheberrechts 
und bestimmter verwandter Schutzrechte, 2008; Dietz, Zusammenhänge zwischen Vertragsdauer 
und Schutzdauer (insbesondere am Beispiel der jüngsten Schutzdauerverländerung bei ausübenden 
Künstlern), GRUR Int. 2015, p. 635).  
 
2. Term extension (Art. 1.7, 3.1 and 2). 
 
*a) Have the provisions concerning the term extension been adequately implemented into 
national law? 
 
If the performance is recorded on a phonogram, then a 70-year protection period for the rights 
arising from §§ 77 and 78 UrhG (recording, reproduction and public broadcasting rights) shall apply 
in accordance with § 82 paragraph I 1 UrhG. Relevant calculation time is either the appearance of the 
phonogram or its first permitted use for public reproduction, should this have been done earlier. For 
performances that have not been recorded on phonograms, the 50-year term of protection (§ 82 
paragraph (1) UrhG) remains the same. If the recording of a performance has not been published 
within 50 years, nor has it been permitted to use it publicly, the rights of the performer will continue 
to expire after 50 years (§ 82 paragraph (2) and (3) UrhG). 
 
Section 82 
Duration of exploitation rights 
                                                 
87 Ph.D. (Dr.iur) and Master in Law (LL.M.) (University of Augsburg, Germany), Guest Researcher at the Max-Planck-Institut for Innovation and 
Competition Law (Munich, Germany), Fellow Researcher at the Max-Planck-Institut (1991-1998), Lecturer at different European and Latin 
American Universities (since 2001), Co-Director of online courses on Patent - and Trademark Law at the International University Menendez 
Pelayo (Spain, since 2013); Partner at Pacon & Schiantarelli (since 2013). 
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(1) Where a performance has been recorded on an audio medium, the rights of the performer referred to in 
sections 77 and 78 shall expire 70 years after the release of the audio recording, or, if its first legal use for 
communication to the public took place earlier, 70 years after the latter. Where the performance was not 
recorded on an audio medium, the rights of the performer referred to in sections 77 and 78 shall expire 50 
years after the release of the recording or, if its first legal use for communication to the public occurred 
earlier, 50 years thereafter. However, the rights of the performer shall already expire 50 years after the 
performance if a recording has not been released or not legally used for communication to the public 
within that period of time. 
The phonogram producers also receive a 20-year extension. The duration of the exploitation rights of 
the phonogram producer shall be extended by 20 years for recorded or non-published phonograms 
which have been published within 50 years after the production, but which may be used for public 
reproduction. This is done by simply changing the "50" to "70" in § 85 paragraph (3) UrhG. For neither 
published, nor for the public reproduction used sound carriers it remains with the 50-year protection 
period.  
 
Section 85 
Exploitation rights 
 
(3) The right shall expire 70 years after release of the audio recording. If the audio recording was not 
released within 70 years of production, but was used legally for communication to the public, the right 
shall expire 50 years after the latter. If the audio recording has not been released or legally used for 
communication to the public during that period, the right shall expire 50 years after production of the 
audio recording. The period shall be calculated in accordance with section 69. The right shall expire 70 
years after release of the audio recording. If the audio recording was not released within 70 years of 
production, but was used legally for communication to the public, the right shall expire 50 years after the 
latter. If the audio recording has not been released or legally used for communication to the public during 
that period, the right shall expire 50 years after production of the audio recording. The period shall be 
calculated in accordance with section 69. 
 
The transitional provision of § 137m paragraph (1) UrhG applies to the provisions concerning the 
term of protection in accordance with §§ 82 and 85 UrhG:  
 
Section 137m 
Transitional provision occasioned by implementation of Directive 2011/77/EU 
 
(1) The provisions concerning the term of protection in accordance with sections 82 and 85 (3) and 
concerning the rights and claims of the performer in accordance with section 79 (3) and section 79a shall 
apply to recordings of performances and audio media whose term of protection for the performer and 
producer of the audio medium had not yet expired on 1 November 2013 in accordance with the provisions 
of this Act as amended on 6 July 2013, and to recordings of performances and audio media created after 1 
November 2013. 
 
b) Having in mind the “de minimis” character of the Directive, does national law provide for the 
application of the term extension when the performance is fixed in a media different from a 
phonogram? 
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No, in accordance to § 82 paragraph (1) UrhG the term extension only applies when the performance 
is fixed in a phonogram. For performances that have not been fixed in a phonogram the term 
extension does not apply.  
 
c) Is the term extension also applicable to performers and producers in the audio-visual sector? 
 
The performance on an audiovisual medium is not covered (see, for example, only Pakuscher, Der 
Richtlinienvorschlag der EU-Kommission zur Schutzfristenverlängerung für ausübende Künstler und 
Tonträgerhersteller,  ZUM 2009, 89, 90). 
 
*d) General assessment of the term extension/other remarks 
 
The German Association for Intellectual Property Protection and Copyright (GRUR) proposed a 
number of amendments which had partly been adopted in the now adopted law. The legal 
amendment contains two parts. On the one hand, the harmonization of the duration of protection for 
musical compositions is implemented with text; on the other hand, the prolongation of the term of 
protection of rights of performers and phonogram producers is extended from 50 to 70 years. This is 
supplemented by the introduction of accompanying rights. The performer shall be given a new right 
to dismiss, as well as a right to remuneration and disclosure. 
It is also argued in the scientific literature that, in order to strengthen the position of performers, the 
appropriate and appropriate instrument should be chosen: at the European level, harmonization of 
copyright law should also be used, in particular the "buy- Contracts "which dominated in this market 
Segment. 
This proposal for a regulation raises questions not only from a dogmatic but also from a practical 
point of view, For example, in the event that a performance has been recorded both on phonograms 
and on audiovisual media. 
 
3. The “use it or lose it” clause (Art. 3.2a): how does it work in practice? 
 
The right to terminate is regulated in a new third paragraph of § 79 UrhG. The performing artist now 
has an indispensable option in the event that the phonogram producer, with whom he has 
concluded a transfer agreement with regard to the rights in his recorded performance fails to offer 
phonograms for sale in sufficient quantity or to make the phonograms publicly accessible (§ 79 
paragraph (3) UrhG).  
The termination is only possible 50 years after the event relevant for the duration of the protection 
(appearance of the phonogram or first permitted use of the phonogram for public reproduction, if 
this has not been published) (§ 79 paragraph (3) 2. UrhG). On the other hand, the phonogram 
producer can dispense with the admissibility of the termination of the transfer contract by notifying 
the performer of the transfer agreement within a period of one year after the performer has informed 
him that he wishes to terminate the transfer contract terminate the contract and extinguish the rights 
of the phonogram producer to the phonogram (§ 79 paragraph (3) UrhG).  
For the right to cancel is according to § 137m paragraph (1) UrhG November 1, 2013 the relevant 
deadline. The recording of the performance must be protected by then or be created thereafter. 
 
*a) How shall the term “in sufficient quantity” be interpreted? 
Implementation of the Directive 2011/77/EU: copyright term of protection 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 79 
In order to ensure that performers who have transferred or assigned their exclusive rights to the 
phonogram producer actually benefit from the extension of the period of protection, performing 
artists are given the opportunity to terminate the agreement with the phonogram producer where 
the latter fails to offer copies of the phonogram in a sufficient quantity for the sale or to make the 
phonograms publicly available (§ 79 paragraph (3) UrhG). 
The term “in sufficient quantity” (in ausreichender Menge) shall be interpreted according to § 17 
paragraph (1) UrhG (see, for example Dreier/Schulze, Urheberrechtsgesetz, 5th. Edition, 2015, §79). So 
the distribution of the phonogram must only take place in public (BGH GRUR 1991, 316, 317 - 
individual offer). This is also the case when phonograms are sent to the general public of interested 
parties, such as broadcasters. It is not necessary for the phonograms to be directly acquired by the 
public (cf. BGH GRUR 1981, 360, 361 - publication of phonograms). 
 
b) Does the offering of copies or the making available of the work need to be done by the producer 
himself or does the provision also apply when these acts are carried out by third parties? 
 
The law is not explicit at this point. 
 
c) Are there any mechanisms in place to inform performers of this clause (having in mind that this 
right can only be exercised 50 years after the fixation or publication of the performance)? 
In accordance to § 79 (4) UrhG the producer of the audio medium shall be obliged, upon request, to 
provide the performer with information concerning the income generated and other information 
required to quantify the entitlement to remuneration in accordance with subsection (1). 
 
d) What is the procedure in cases where a phonogram contains the fixation of the performances 
from a plurality of performers? 
 
If a work is performed by several performers, the exercise of the right of termination pursuant to § 80 
paragraph (2) UrhG is determined by reference to § 74 paragraph (2) 2. and 3. UrhG.  
Therefore if the group of artists has an elected representative acting as a board, the latter shall be the 
sole representative in respect of third parties and is authorized to exercise the right of termination 
with effect for all group members.  
If a group does not have a representative, the right to terminate can only be exercised by the group 
leader or, in the absence of one, only by a representative to be elected by the group. 
 
e) To your knowledge, have performers already made use of this clause vis-à-vis phonogram 
producers? 
No one of the performers I interviewed has made used of this right. The phonogram producers 
interviewed also have no knowledge that any performer has made use of this right. 
 
f) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
 
No one of the phonogram producers I interviewed has modified its contracts to incorporate this right.  
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I had access to a contract recently signed by one of the big Labels and a clause on the right of 
termination has not been included. 
 
An explanation of the above could be that because they are mandatory legal provisions, there is no 
need to modify contracts. 
 
*g) General assessment of the “use it or lose it” clause/other remarks 
 
4. The annual supplementary remuneration (the “20% fund”): how does it work in practice? (art. 
3.2b – 2d) 
 
a) What kind of measures have been adopted to ensure that performers are informed of this 
annual supplementary remuneration? 
 
So far, no action has been taken. 
 
b) Are phonogram producers obliged by national law to inform performers of this right? 
 
In accordance to § 79a paragraph (4) 1. UrhG the phonogram producers are obliged, upon request, to 
provide the performer with information concerning the income generated and other information 
required to quantify the entitlement to the annual supplementary remuneration. This provision 
seems to be in discrepancy with § 79a paragraph (3) UrhG, since the claim for compensation can only 
be asserted by a collecting society and not by the performing artist. But only this can demand 
information from the phonogram producer.  
 
c) How has the Member State implemented in national law the obligation of phonogram producers 
to provide performers, upon request, “any information which may be necessary in order to secure 
payment of that remuneration”? 
 
In order to quantify the amount of its claim and to verify its proper calculation, § 79a paragraph (4) 
UrhG sets out the legal obligation of the phonogram producer to provide the performer with 
information on the revenues generated and other information required for that purpose. However, 
the performer must request the information. The claim of the performing artist, however, relates only 
to revenue, since the 20% amount of the remuneration is calculated before deduction of expenditure, 
but not the latter. On the other hand, the performer does not have a claim to insight into the books of 
the sound carrier. If there is any doubt about the correctness of the information, only the submission 
of an affidavit (§ 260 Abs. 2 BGB) will help. Irrespective of any band-transfer agreements, the right to 
information only applies to the phonogram producer and not to its licensees, even if they generate 
the actual revenue (see, for example, Dreier/Schulze/Dreier, Urheberrechtsgesetz, 5th. Edition, 2015, 
§79a Rn. 11-12). 
 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to inform them of this right? 
 
No one of the phonogram producers I interviewed has modified its contracts to incorporate this right.  
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An explanation of the above could be that because they are mandatory legal provisions, there is no 
need to modify contracts. 
 
e) Have collecting societies in the Member State adopted any measure to inform performers of this 
right? 
 
No, they have not. 
 
f) Which collecting society is responsible for administering the “20 % fund”? How has this 
collecting society organized the administration and distribution of the annual supplementary 
remuneration? 
 
Gesellschaft zur Verwertug von Leistugsschutzrechten (GVL). 
Until now it has done nothing for the administration and distribution of the annual supplementary 
remuneration. 
For the GVL the implementation of the Directive 2011/77/EU is not a priority at the moment. Shortly 
after the implementation of the Directive in Germany (July 2013), the EU Directive on Collective 
Societies was adopted. Therefore the GVL  has been involved I an internal restructuring process. 
Along with this, the GVL decided two years ago to modify its payment structure. This has generated 
that in the last two years there has been no payment to its members. For this reason, the GVL is 
currently under a lot of pressure to conclude this restructuring process and to start making regular 
payments. There is no time to implement the annual supplementary remuneration. 
g) How many performers represented by collecting societies have benefited so far from this right in 
each of the fiscal years following the deadline for transposition of the Directive (1 November 
2013)? 
 
No performers so far have benefited from this right. 
 
h) How much have collecting societies collected each year as a consequence of the 20%-fund 
provision? 
 
 Nothing so far. 
 
i) Following Recital 12 of the Term Extension Directive, has national law exempted micro-
enterprises from the obligation to contribute? If so, under which circumstances? 
 
No, micro-enterprises are not exempted from the obligation to contribute. 
 
*j) General assessment of the 20% fund/other remarks 
 
Regarding the right of information of the performer of the 20% supplementary remuneration, § 79a 
UrhG has splitting the two closely related claims. This is not appropriate. The collecting society cannot 
be granted a separate claim for information based on the clear legal wording of § 79a paragraph (4) 
UrhG. But since only they the compensation claim according to § 79a (paragraph 3) 2. UrhG can assert 
that the collecting society receives the right to obtain information on the basis of explicit or implied 
assignment by the performing artist. 
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5. The “clean slate” provision (Art. 3.2e): how does it work in practice? 
 
a) Can the clean slate rule be waived by contract? 
 
No, the “clean slate” rule cannot be waived by contract. 
 
b) What are the mechanisms Member States have established to enforce this measure in national 
law? 
 
§79a paragraph (5) UrhG regulates the case when the performer has granted or transferred to a 
phonogram producer rights to its performance against recurring remuneration (in particular the 
percentage or number of royalties of the performing artist on the revenues). Since this agreeing in 
accordance to § 137m paragraph (3) UrhG also extends to the extension period from 50 to 70 years, 
unless there are clear contractual indications to the contrary, the performer is therefore also involved 
in the exploitation on the basis of the contract in the extension period on the basis of the contract. 
There is therefore a need for protection only in so far as the phonogram producer could be tempted 
to make any advances or other contractually agreed deductions for the extension period.  
In order to protect the performing artist in this respect, the phonogram producer is prohibited under  
§ 79a paragraph (5) UrhG, after 50 years after the release of the phonogram or in case of non-
appearance after the 50th year after the first permitted public reproduction, to withdraw advances or 
other contractually agreed deductions from the remuneration.  
Advances are to be understood as future cash receivable but non-repayable advance payments to the 
performer (see, for exemple, Loewenheim, Handbuch des Urheberrechts, 2nd. Edition, 2010, § 69 Rn 
37) and under contractually specified deductions real deductible costs to charge from the costs of the 
phonogram producer (see Dreier/Schulze, Urheberrechtsgesetz, 5th. Edition, 2015, §79a). 
 
c) Is there an obligation to inform performers of this measure? 
 
No, the law has not provided an obligation to inform performers of this provision. 
 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
 
No one of the phonogram producers I interviewed has modified its contracts to incorporate this 
provision.  
 
An explanation of the above could be that because they are mandatory legal provisions, there is no 
need to modify contracts. 
 
*e) General assessment of the “clean slate” provision/other remarks 
 
6. Transitional provisions (Art. 10.5 and 6, art. 10a) 
 
*a) Have the transitional measures of arts. 10.5, 10.6 and 10a been adequately implemented into 
national law? 
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The transitional provisions of the Directive are adequately implemented in § 137m paragraph (1) and 
(2) UrhG. 
Section 137m 
Transitional provision occasioned by implementation of Directive 2011/77/EU 
(1) The provisions concerning the term of protection in accordance with sections 82 and 85 (3) and 
concerning the rights and claims of the performer in accordance with section 79 (3) and section 79a 
shall apply to recordings of performances and audio media whose term of protection for the 
performer and producer of the audio medium had not yet expired on 1 November 2013 in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act as amended on 6 July 2013, and to recordings of 
performances and audio media created after 1 November 2013. 
(2) Section 65 (3) shall apply to musical compositions with text whose musical composition or text 
was protected in at least one Member State of the European Union on 1 November 2013 and for 
musical compositions with text created after that date. Where the protection of the musical 
composition or of the text is revived in accordance with the first sentence, the revived rights are 
accorded the author. However, any act of use commencing before 1 November 2013 may be 
continued in the context provided for. Appropriate remuneration shall be paid for any use after 
1 November 2013. 
A substantive transitional arrangement for the interim period, from the day the Directive was 
adopted until the end of the transitional period, is available in the Directive only to performers and 
phonogram producers. For musical compositions with text such a transitional arrangement was 
missing. This can lead to problems, for example, with works composers, where the text is in the public 
domain but the music composition was still protected until 2013. The German legislator did not want 
to regulate this period. This is unsatisfactory, because as of 1.11.2013 at least a retroactivity of the 
copyright protection of public domain contributions of the genre »music composition with text« is 
given. Only use acts remained untouched in this case. 
 
b) Does national legislation allow performers to modify their contracts on transfer or assignment 
after the 50-year period has expired (see Art. 10a.2)? 
 
In accordance to § 137m paragraph (3) UrhG where a transfer agreement was concluded between a 
performer and a producer of an audio medium before 1 November 2013, in the case of the extension 
of the term of protection the transfer shall extend to this period unless there are clear, contractual 
indications to the contrary. 
c) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this? 
 
No one of the phonogram producers I interviewed has modified its contracts to incorporate this 
provision.  
 
7. General assessment of the Directive 
 
*a) Are performers aware of the benefits brought about by the Directive? Do they effectively 
reclaim them? How long on average does it take for performers to receive the benefits they are 
entitled to? 
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No, they are not aware of the benefits. 
 
*b) What are roughly the estimated yearly benefits for (1) record producers and (2) performers, 
taking into consideration the musical repertoire affected by the term extension? In the case of 
record producers, is there any data on how these benefits have been used? 
No information was obtained on this point. 
 
*c) Has the Directive had a negative impact on other stakeholders, such as users (e.g., higher prices 
in cultural goods, or lower production volume)? 
 
No negative impacts can be seen so far. 
 
d) How much money (estimate) would users of music repertoires have saved each fiscal year since 1 
November 2013 if the Directive had not been adopted? 
 
No information was obtained on this point. 
 
e) Have the effects of the Directive been watered down due to contractual practices? Please 
describe such practices if applicable.  
 
As far as I can get information, not until now. 
 
*f) In your opinion, have the cultural and creative sectors benefited from the term extension (e.g., 
have marketing opportunities in third countries increased? Are there more revenue streams? Have 
producers been marketing back catalogue items, and if so how is that received by users)? Please 
give reasons. 
 
It has not been possible to contact the big Labels, the real beneficiaries of the extension. For the 
independent producers the extension has not brought them so far benefits. 
 
g) Have users of music repertoires become less competitive vis-à-vis companies in third countries 
due to the amount of royalties they will have to pay to performers and phonogram producers as a 
consequence of the term extension? In your opinion, can this be an obstacle for off-line / on-line 
music business models to flourish in Europe?  
 
No information was obtained on this point. 
 
h) Other remarks 
 
The implementation of Directive 2011/77/EU into national law has been generally successful. The 
German legislator inserts the new regulations meaningfully into the copyright law.  
However, great benefits for performers and small phonogram producers cannot yet be observed. It 
seems that  performers are not be involved until now  from additional revenues the phonogram 
producers generate due to the extended term of protection. There is no association in Germany - as 
there is in the United States or in the United Kingdom - that groups and cares for artists. They have 
therefore not been aware in many cases of the benefits that the Directive has brought to them. 
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The rights of performing artists are strengthened in the long term, in particular by the accompanying 
termination option with which they can force the phonogram producer to optimally use the 
recording. However, the impact on the system of copyright itself should not be underestimated. 
Prolonged periods of protection mean that the protected recordings will become public domain later 
and can be used by anyone. It may therefore be necessary to think about a more creative 
interpretation of the boundaries in order to take the interests of the general public into account. 
Stakeholders effectively contacted: 
Type of stakeholder Name of stakeholder Contact 
CMO 
Gesellschaft zur Verwertug von 
Leistungsschutzrechten mbH (GVL) 
Dr. Tilo Gerlach  
gerlach@gvl.de 
CMO VG Bild-Kuns 
Dr. Anke Schierholz  
schierholz@bildkunst.de 
Association of 
independent 
phonogram producers 
Verband der unabhängigen Musikunternehmen 
VUT e.V. 
Reinher Karl karl@vut.de 
Phonogram producer enja & yellowbird records 
Werner Aldinger 
enja@jazzrecords.com 
Music Publisher  
Kompetenzzentrum für Kultur- und reativwirtschaft, 
City of Munich 
Jürgen Enninger 
kreativ@muenchen.de 
Performer Luis Borda luis@luisborda.de 
Phonogram producer 
and performer 
Robert Popp rpopp@munichre.com 
Performer 
Violinist at the Munich Philarmonic and at the 
Orchestra of the Bayreuth Festival 
Bernhard Metz 
berni.metz@gmx.de 
Performer  Roman Bunka r@romanbunka.de 
Performer  Weigold & Böhm International Artists & Tours GmbH 
Teresa Brunnmüller 
teresa@weigold-
boehm.de 
Academic and 
representative of a 
copyright association 
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition 
ALAI Germany 
 
Dr. Silke von Lewinski 
svl@ip.mpg.de 
Academic 
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition 
Dr. Adolf Dietz 
a.dietz@ip.mpg.de 
Academic 
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition 
Prof. Dr. Annette Kur 
Annete.kur@ip.mpg.de 
Academic Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU) 
Dr. Agnès Lucas-
Schloetter Agnes.Lucas-
Schloetter@jura.uni-
muenchen.de 
Academic Zentrum für Angewandte Rechtswissenschaft (ZAR) 
Prof. Dr. Thomas Dreier 
MCJ dreier@kit.edu 
Copyright lawyer 
Dr. Roth & Kollegen 
Dr. Nikolaus Reber (Partner) 
reber@copyroth.de 
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PORTUGAL 
National expert: Teresa Nobre88 
 
 
 
1. National implementation of the Directive 
a) Through which legislation was the Directive implemented in national law? Please provide a 
short history of the implementation, highlighting any legal or practical difficulties in implementing 
the Directive (for example, strong opposition from any interest groups, or difficulties in 
implementing the clauses of the Directive given national legal constraints – for instance, from 
contract law - or established practices)  
 
The Directive was implemented through Law no. 82/2013 of 6 December 2013. This law amended art. 
183.º (term of protection of related rights) of the Portuguese Code of Author’s Rights and Related 
Rights (“CDADC”), and introduced a new article – art. 183.º-A (making available phonograms by 
producers). The legal provision concerning the term extension (art. 183.º CDADC) was amended two 
years later by Law no. 32/2015 of 24 April 2015. 
 
The Directive was implemented into national law following a legislative initiative by the Portuguese 
Government. The legislative proposal presented by the Government was not subject to opposition 
from any interest group. There was a general agreement from the political parties represented in the 
Portuguese Parliament that the term of protection of the rights of performers should be extended, 
and that the accompanying measures should be approved. The extension of the term of protection of 
the producers’ rights was less consensual, with two political parties showing some opposition to it. 
The political debate was, nevertheless, brief, and only a few stakeholders took part in the public 
consultation. No users’ rights organization contributed to the debate. The main amendments to the 
legislative proposal originated from the collecting societies that represent the performers and the 
producers in Portugal. All the documentation related to this legislative initiative is available here. 
 
Perhaps due to the low level of involvement of the political parties and stakeholders in the 
discussions surrounding the national implementation of the Directive, the resulting law is tainted by 
several flaws: the provision regarding the term of protection in respect of musical compositions with 
words was not implemented; the provision regarding the term of protection of the producers’ rights 
was revoked; the provisions regarding the extension of the term of protection of the rights of 
producers were inadequately implemented; the provisions regarding the extension of the term of 
protection of the rights of performers were only partially implemented; the “clean slate” provision 
was not implemented; and only one transitional measure has been adequately implemented. 
 
2. Term extension (Art. 1.7, 3.1 and 2). 
 
*a) Have the provisions concerning the term extension been adequately implemented into 
national law?  
                                                 
88 Attorney-at-law (since 2005) based in Lisbon, Portugal; University Degree in Law (University of Lisbon Faculty of Law, 2003); LL.M. in 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Munich Intellectual Property Law Center, 2009); Legal Expert on Copyright at Communia 
International Association on the Digital Public Domain; Creative Commons Portugal Legal Lead. 
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Art. 1.7 of the Directive, concerning the harmonization of the term of protection in respect of co-
written musical compositions, has not to this date been implemented into national law. The 
Portuguese Government did not include in its proposal the implementation of this provision, and no 
other political party or stakeholder suggested it either. During the public consultation, the 
Portuguese collecting society that represents authors in Portugal (SPA – Sociedade Portuguesa de 
Autores) presented a short opinion, praising the legislative initiative, and did not make any comments 
with regards to this provision.  
 
Under the Portuguese law, works of joint authorship are given a single term of protection (see art. 
32.º n.º 1 CDADC) calculated from the death of the last surviving author. However, a musical 
composition with words is not necessarily a work of joint authorship. Therefore, one cannot consider 
that the Portuguese law has any rule similar to the new rule introduced by art. 1.7 of the Directive. 
 
Art. 3.1. of the Directive, concerning the extension of the term of protection of the performers’ rights, 
was only partially implemented into national law: 
- the first subparagraph of the second sentence of art. 3.1. of the Directive was not 
implemented: the national law does not foresee the situation where the fixation of the 
performance is made otherwise than in a phonogram; 
- the second subparagraph of the second sentence of art. 3.1. of the Directive was not 
adequately implemented by Law no. 82/2013 of 6 December 2013 (see art. 183.º, n.º 3 CDADC 
as amended by such law). Indeed, in this first implementation attempt, the national lawmaker 
did not state that the phonogram had to be lawfully published or lawfully communicated to 
the public within the 50-year period following the date of the performance. This error was 
corrected by the lawmaker through the Law no. 32/2015 of 24 April 2015 (see current version 
of art. 183.º, n.º 3 CDADC). 
 
Art. 3.2 of the Directive, concerning the extension of the term of protection of the producers’ rights, 
was inadequately implemented into national law: 
- first and most importantly, the lawmaker revoked, through Law no. 82/2013 of 6 December 
2013, the CDADC rule that stated that the rights of producers shall expire 50 years after the 
fixation is made (see art. 183.º, n.º 1 b) CDADC as amended by Law no. 82/2013 of 6 December 
2913, which has not been amendment since then, as shown in the current version of art. 
183.º, n.º 1 b) CDADC); 
- second, the lawmaker mixed the second and third sentences of art. 3.2 of the Directive and 
ended up saying that the rights of producers shall expire 70 years from the date of the first 
lawful communication to the public if no lawful publication or communication to the public 
has taken place within the period mentioned in art. 183.º n.º 1 CDADC (we assume that the 
lawmaker intended to refer to the 50-years period following the fixation, but as mentioned 
above he lawmaker also revoked that rule, so we are not sure) (see art. 183.º, n.º 4 CDADC as 
amended by Law no. 82/2013 of 6 December 2913); 
- third, the national lawmaker tried to correct the errors regarding the national implementation 
of art. 3.2 of the Directive, and simply revoked art. 183.º, n.º 4 of the CDADC through Law no. 
32/2015 of 24 April 2015.  
 
It is extremely difficult to interpret the national framework with regards to the term of protection of 
the producers’ rights after these amendments. Following the revocation of art. 183.º, n.º 4 of the 
CDADC, one could ask if the lawmaker intended to apply art. 183.º, n.º 3 CDADC to the producer’s 
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rights, since this legal provision reads as follows: “If the fixation of the performance of a performer in a 
phonogram is lawfully published or lawfully communicated to the public, within the period mentioned in 
the no. 1, the term of protection of the right is 70 years following the date of the first publication or the first 
communication to the public, whichever is the earlier”.  
 
The law only refers to the “right” without mentioning performers and/or phonogram producers, so 
one could attempt to make a broad interpretation in order to apply this rule to the producers’ rights. 
Such interpretation would not be, however, without inconsistencies, because the only relevant period 
that is mentioned in the current version of art. 183.º, n.º 1 CDADC is the 50-year period following the 
date of the performance (see art. 183.º, n.º 1 a) CDADC). As mentioned above, the 50-years period 
following the fixation was revoked. This means that, if art. 183.º, n.º 3 CDADC was to apply to the 
producers rights, one would end up with the following rule: if the fixation of the performance of a 
performer in a phonogram is lawfully published or lawfully communicated to the public, within the 
50-year period following the date of the performance, the rights of producers shall expire 70 years 
following the date of (such) first publication or (such) first communication to the public. 
Such difference with regards to the periods within which the phonogram would have to be published 
or communicated to the public in order to enjoy of the term extension, is somewhat insignificant 
when compared to the revocation of the main rule on the term of the producer’s rights. Under the 
current version of the Portuguese law, producers’ rights will simply not expire if the phonogram is not 
lawfully published or communicated to the public within a certain period of time! 
 
We asked GDA – the collecting society that represents artists, musicians and dancers in Portugal – 
and AUDIOGEST – the collecting society that represents record producers in Portugal – if they 
considered that the provisions concerning the term extension had been adequately implemented 
into national law, and their answers were positive. The only remark made by AUDIOGEST was that 
only the current versions of the term extension provisions are adequately implemented in the 
Portuguese law (that is, the text versions introduced by Law no. 32/2015 of 24 April 2015). 
 
b) Having in mind the “de minimis” character of the Directive, does national law provide for the 
application of the term extension when the performance is fixed in a media different from a 
phonogram?  
 
No. 
 
c) Is the term extension also applicable to performers and producers in the audio-visual sector? 
 
No. During the public consultations, GDA proposed an amendment to the legislative proposal 
presented by the Government, in order to apply the term extension to performers and producers in 
the audio-visual sector, but no political party subscribed such an amendment. 
 
*d) General assessment of the term extension/other remarks 
 
On GDA’s view, Directive 2011/77/EU is extremely important for artists and producers, and also for 
consumers. This collecting society considers that the term extension is important for artists since it 
represents an approximation of the EU laws with the laws of the USA, which is the biggest music 
market in the world. It also represents a step forward in the direction of approximation of the EU laws 
with the laws of Brazil and other significant music markets for Portugal, where the term of protection 
is equal to or greater than 70 years post mortem. GDA believes that the Directive has significantly 
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reduced the number of performances that will enter into the public domain during the life of their 
performing artists. However, GDA cannot quantity such performances. GDA takes the view that these 
new rules are intrinsically righteous, regardless of their economic impact.  
 
D3 Direitos Digitais – a Portuguese non-profit association that advocates for user rights – considers 
that the existence of neighbouring rights makes the access to culture more expensive, due to the 
increase of the amount of rights that have to be paid by users. The term extension only exacerbates 
this problem. This non-profit takes the view that term extensions are, therefore, not appropriate.  
 
3. The “use it or lose it” clause (Art. 3.2a): how does it work in practice? 
 
*a) How shall the term “in sufficient quantity” be interpreted?  
 
On GDA’s view, this expression should be interpreted as meaning “in sufficient quantity to be acquired 
in normal market conditions (in the market at stake), that is with a balanced distribution in the territory at 
stake”. However, this collecting society adds, “considering that the physical recorded music market is 
tending to disappear (…), we should also address (the offer of copies of records through) online 
distribution”, namely through streaming platforms. GDA recalls that, if one looks only to the physical 
recorded music market, the offer of copies of phonograms for sale may not be “in sufficient quantity”. 
This collecting society believes that, in order for the offer to be considered “in sufficient quantity” in 
the market for recorded music in digital formats, the records should be available not only in one 
online platform, but in a significant part of the platforms that are active in the market. 
 
On AUDIOGEST’s view, the requirement to offer for sale “in sufficient quantity” is not relevant in the 
market for recorded music in digital formats. This collecting society underlines that, for the purposes 
of the “use it or lose it” clause, producers may make the phonogram available to the public through a 
digital platform (for download or interactive streaming), and, in such cases, one does not need to 
assess if the offering is “in sufficient quantity”. This requirement will only be pertinent if the producer 
decides to exclusively market physical copies of the record (which is a scenario that is more and more 
rare). According to AUDIOGEST, in such scenario, the term “in sufficient quantity” should be 
interpreted as meaning a quantity that is sufficient in order to ensure the effective market demand. 
When doing such an assessment, one should take into account the stocks policies of the distributors 
of physical records, which the producers do not control.  
 
b) Does the offering of copies or the making available of the work need to be done by the producer 
himself or does the provision also apply when these acts are carried out by third parties?  
 
The provision also applies when the acts carried about by the producer’s assignees. 
 
c) Are there any mechanisms in place to inform performers of this clause (having in mind that this 
right can only be exercised 50 years after the fixation or publication of the performance)? 
 
GDA is unaware of any mechanisms in place to inform performers of this clause. Nevertheless, this 
collecting society informed its members of the national implementation of the Directive, through its 
usual channels of communication.   
 
AUDIOGEST does not know if the collecting society that represents the performing artists has in place 
any mechanisms to inform them of this clause, but recalls that this right is not administered by 
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collecting societies. AUDIOGEST also does not know of any specific case of producers informing the 
performers of this clause.  
 
d) What is the procedure in cases where a phonogram contains the fixation of the performances 
from a plurality of performers? 
 
According to art. 183º-A no. 3 CDADC, where a phonogram contains the fixation of the performances 
of a plurality of performers, they may terminate their contracts on transfer or assignment, provided 
that the rules contained in art. 17.º (rules regarding works of joint authorship) are respected.  
 
It is not entirely clear what is the intention of the lawmaker when referring to a legal provision that 
deals with joint ownership of works of joint authorship. One could ask if the lawmaker aim was to 
apply such rules mutatis mutandis to performances. If that is the case, where a phonogram contains 
the fixation of the performances from a plurality of performers, performers could terminate their 
contracts on transfer or assignment of their rights in the fixation of the performance, provided that 
they are in agreement. 
 
e) To your knowledge, have performers already made use of this clause vis-à-vis phonogram 
producers? 
 
GDA is not aware of any cases where performers have already made use of the “use it or lose it” clause 
vis-à-vis phonogram producers. 
 
The music performers André Simão, João Barbosa and André Molarinho were not aware of any cases 
where performers have made use of this clause vis-à-vis phonogram producers. 
 
AUDIOGEST is also unaware of any such cases. AUDIOGEST underlines that it sent this questionnaire 
to all of its members. 17 record producers answered to the questionnaire. From those, only 4 record 
producers have in their catalogue phonograms that are subject to this clause. None of those 
producers have reported any cases where performers have already made use of this clause vis-à-vis 
producers.  
 
f) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
 
GDA is unaware of any cases in which phonogram producers have amended the model contracts 
they use with performers to reflect the “use it or lose it” clause. 
 
AUDIOGEST is also unaware of any such cases. Again, AUDIOGEST sent this questionnaire to all of its 
members. 17 record producers answered to the questionnaire. From those, only 4 record producers 
have a repertoire of phonograms that is subject to this clause. None of those producers have reported 
any amendments.  
 
*g) General assessment of the “use it or lose it” clause/other remarks 
 
None of the interviewees made a general assessment or gave any other remarks regarding the “use it 
or lose it” clause. 
Implementation of the Directive 2011/77/EU: copyright term of protection 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 91 
4. The annual supplementary remuneration (the “20% fund”): how does it work in practice? (art. 
3.2b – 2d) 
 
a) What kind of measures have been adopted to ensure that performers are informed of this 
annual supplementary remuneration?  
 
To date, no measures have been adopted to ensure that performers are informed of this annual 
supplementary remuneration. GDA is planning to inform its members and those whose rights are 
collected by this society on the date of the first payment of this remuneration. So far, no payments 
have been made because the amounts collected from the main record producers total less than € 
3,000.00 (three thousand euros). This collecting society foresees to start paying this supplementary 
remuneration once it has collected 2 or 3 years of payments. GDA expects to make the first round of 
payments this year (2017).  
 
b) Are phonogram producers obliged by national law to inform performers of this right?  
 
No. 
 
c) How has the Member State implemented in national law the obligation of phonogram producers 
to provide performers, upon request, “any information which may be necessary in order to secure 
payment of that remuneration”? 
 
The national lawmaker only introduced a legal provision (Art. 183.º-A no. 6 of the CDADC) according 
to which phonogram producers and collecting societies are required on request to provide to 
performers who are entitled to the annual supplementary remuneration any information that may be 
necessary in order to secure payment of that remuneration. 
 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to inform them of this right? 
 
GDA is unaware of any cases in which phonogram producers have amended the model contracts 
they use with performers to inform them of this right. 
 
AUDIOGEST is also unaware of any such cases, and underlines that phonogram producers are not 
obliged to inform performers of this right. On AUDIOGEST’s view, the performers should be informed 
by their collecting society, which is the entity that is responsible for administering such right. 
e) Have collecting societies in the Member State adopted any measure to inform performers of this 
right? 
 
Please see answer to question a) regarding the collecting society that represents performers in 
Portugal (GDA).   
 
AUDIOGEST has not adopted any measure to inform performers, since they only represent record 
producers and therefore do not take responsibility for providing such information to performers. 
f) Which collecting society is responsible for administering the “20 % fund”? How has this 
collecting society organized the administration and distribution of the annual supplementary 
remuneration? 
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GDA is the only collecting society representing performers in Portugal, therefore GDA considers that 
the “20% fund” should be administered by them. GDA has informed us that, so far, no record 
producers have contested GDA’s legitimacy to administer the fund. 
 
GDA has not yet organized the administration and distribution of the annual supplementary 
remuneration. GDA has already initiated the process of collection of information from the record 
producers that operate in Portugal, and intends to continue such process in the short run. According 
to this collecting society, in order to organize the administration and distribution of the annual 
supplementary remuneration, the collecting society must first have an idea of the amount of 
revenues that it has to collect and distribute.  
 
GDA considers that the administration of this remuneration has specific characteristics, mainly 
because the information-gathering process depends on the reports provided by the producers. 
Typically, for the other remuneration rights that are administered by GDA, the information is provided 
by the users. GDA believes that, for this right, it is advisable to monitor the records that are marketed 
in Portugal, in order to double-check the information collected from the producers. 
 
Concerning the distribution of this remuneration, GDA does not foresee any problems, since it will 
use the producer’s sales list, which contain the number of records sold and also, when available, a 
technical sheet. GDA will gather information from other sources, namely from the Internet, when the 
phonogram’s technical sheet is not available.  
 
GDA stated that it will take into consideration the above-mentioned specificities when organizing the 
administration and distribution of the annual supplementary remuneration. 
 
g) How many performers represented by collecting societies have benefited so far from this right in 
each of the fiscal years following the deadline for transposition of the Directive (1 November 
2013)? 
 
As explained above, to this date, no performers have benefited from this remuneration right. 
According to GDA, the precise number of performers that will benefit from the monies that have 
been collected so far will only be determined on the moment of the payment of such amounts. 
 
h) How much have collecting societies collected each year as a consequence of the 20%-fund 
provision? 
 
According to GDA, no amounts have been collected yet, because the amounts available are small. 
Nevertheless, this collecting society already knows how much it will collect with regards to years of 
2014 and 2015:  
 
2014: € 801.45 
2015: € 2,371.79 
i) Following Recital 12 of the Term Extension Directive, has national law exempted micro-
enterprises from the obligation to contribute? If so, under which circumstances? 
No. 
*j) General assessment of the 20% fund/other remarks 
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GDA believes that, despite the fact that the initial amounts available for collection are modest, they 
will tend to increase over the years, since each year new phonograms will be added to the group of 
phonograms that is subject to the “20% fund”. According to this collecting society, between 2014 to 
2016, there was already an enlargement of the set of phonograms that is subject to the fund. In other 
words, there are more phonograms in 1965 than in 1964, and less in 1963 than in 1964. Furthermore, 
GDA considers that in such a small music market, like the Portuguese market, it is enough to have a 
strong marketing campaign for a specific phonogram or artist (e.g. a marketing campaign that 
includes TV advertisements of records or sound tracks of movies) to have a significant increase of the 
amount of revenues available for collection and distribution. GDA considers, however, that it is early 
to draw any conclusions on the financial aspects of the 20% fund. 
 
AUDIOGEST stated that the record producers that are members of this collecting society, which have 
replied to this questionnaire and which have in their catalogue phonograms that are subject to the 
“20% fund”, are reporting to GDA the information that is needed for the collection of revenues by 
such collecting society.  
 
5. The “clean slate” provision (Art. 3.2e): how does it work in practice? 
 
a) Can the clean slate rule be waived by contract?  
 
Not applicable. 
 
b) What are the mechanisms Member States have established to enforce this measure in national 
law?  
 
Not applicable. 
 
c) Is there an obligation to inform performers of this measure? 
 
Not applicable. 
 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
 
Not applicable. 
 
*e) General assessment of the “clean slate” provision/other remarks 
 
The “clean slate” provision has not been implemented in Portugal. None of the stakeholders that we 
interviewed were able to explain the reason behind the lack of implementation of this clause. 
Apparently, the Portuguese lawmaker misinterpreted art. 3.2-E of the Directive. Indeed, the national 
lawmaker introduced a similar rule but for the annual supplementary remuneration (see art. 183.º-A 
no.5 “in fine” of the CDADC). According to this rule, the overall amount that the producer should set 
aside for performers who receive non-recurring payments shall be unencumbered by advance 
payments or contractually defined deductions. 
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 94 
GDA considers that the non-implementation of the “clean slate” provision was unintentional. On 
GDA’s view, the European Commission should intervene with the Portuguese Government to 
implement the “clean slate” provision in Portugal.  
 
6. Transitional provisions (Art. 10.5 and 6, art. 10a) 
 
*a) Have the transitional measures of arts. 10.5, 10.6 and 10a been adequately implemented into 
national law? 
Art. 10.5 has been implemented into national law through art. 4.º no. 1 of Law no. 82/2013 of 6 
December 2013. The national transitional measure states that every provision of Law no. 82/2013 of 6 
December 2013 (and not only to the term extension provisions embodied in art. 3.1 and 2-E of the 
Directive) shall apply to fixations of performances and phonograms in regard to which the performer 
and the phonogram producer are still protected as at 1 November 2013 and to fixations of 
performances and phonograms which come into being after that date. Despite the excessive zeal of 
the Portuguese lawmaker, we consider that art. 10.5 has been adequately implemented into national 
law. Indeed, the remaining provisions of the national law – the “use it or lose it” clause and the annual 
supplementary remuneration – are conditional to the term-extension. 
 
Art. 10.6 has not been implemented into national law. As mentioned before, art. 1.7 of the Directive, 
concerning the harmonization of the term of protection in respect of co-written musical 
compositions, has not to this date been implemented into national law. So, naturally, art. 10.6 has also 
not been implemented. 
 
Art.10a has also not been implemented into national law. Instead, the Portuguese lawmaker created a 
specific transitional measure, which is embodied in art. 4.º no. 2 of Law no. 82/2013 of 6 December 
2013, and reads as follows: “The provisions of the preceding paragraph [art. 4.º n.º 1] shall be without 
prejudice to any contracts and acts of exploitation performed before the entry into force of the national 
law, and acquired rights of third parties”. There are several problems with this transitional measure: 
- first, it limits the scope of application of the transitional measure embodied in art. 10.5 of the 
Directive, which is implemented in art. 4.º, no. 2 of Law no. 82/2013; 
- second, this transitional measure does not foresee that a contractual transfer or assignment of 
rights in the fixation of the performance shall continue to produce its effects for the extended 
term in the absence of clear contractual indications to the contrary; 
- finally, the reference date used therein is 7 December 2013 (the date of the “entry into force of 
the national law”), and not 1 November 2013. 
 
We asked GDA and AUDIOGEST if they considered that the transitional measures had been 
adequately implemented into national law, and their answers were positive. GDA further added that 
it did not have any problems with the producers that have already contacted and, on the other hand 
no situation has been identified that would suggest that the measures had not been correctly 
implemented. 
 
It should be, however, underlined that, when such collecting societies contributed their written 
comments and amendments to the public consultation, they were apparently given a version of the 
legislative proposal, which was not the proposal that ended up being discussed by the Parliament. It 
is not possible for us to assess why did these stakeholders provided comments on a version of the 
legislative proposal that was not the one made publicly available. It is clear, however, in what respects 
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the transitional measures, that the collecting societies could not have identified some of the errors 
that ended up in the law that implemented the Directive into national law. In fact, the version of the 
legislative proposal commented by such entities contained not only a provision that adequately 
implemented art. 10a.1 of the Directive, but also contained a provision that implemented art. 10a.2. 
 
b) Does national legislation allow performers to modify their contracts on transfer or assignment 
after the 50-year period has expired (see Art. 10a.2)? 
 
No. As stated above, a version of the legislative proposal which circulated through at least some 
stakeholders contained a provision that implemented art. 10a.2. For reasons unknown to us, that text 
did not made into the final version of the legislative proposal that was made available to the general 
public and that was debated by the Parliament. 
 
c) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this? 
GDA is unaware of any cases in which phonogram producers have amended the model contracts 
they use with performers to reflect the transitional provisions. 
 
AUDIOGEST is also unaware of any such cases. Again, AUDIOGEST sent this questionnaire to all of its 
members. 17 record producers answered to the questionnaire. From those, only 4 record producers 
have a repertoire of phonograms that is subject to this clause. None of those producers have reported 
any amendments.  
 
7. General assessment of the Directive  
 
*a) Are performers aware of the benefits brought about by the Directive? Do they effectively 
reclaim them? How long on average does it take for performers to receive the benefits they are 
entitled to? 
 
The music performers André Simão, João Barbosa and André Molarinho were not aware of any of the 
benefits brought about by the Directive.  
 
GDA does not know if the performers are aware of these benefits. This collecting society informed its 
members of the national implementation of the Directive, through its usual channels of 
communication, but does not have any other mechanisms in place to inform performers of these 
benefits. Regarding the benefits that are administered by GDA, this entity has not yet organized the 
administration and distribution of the same, so one does not know how long on average does it take 
for performers to receive these benefits.  
 
AUDIOGEST does not have the necessary information to answer to any of these questions. According 
to AUDIOGEST, the performers that enjoy recurring payments are paid within the contractually 
agreed time limits (typically, on a quarterly or annual basis), whilst the performers that get a one-off 
payment should get the benefits on an annual basis, since the producers have to report those 
benefits once a year. AUDIOGEST considers that the speed at which the performers get the annual 
supplementary remuneration depends on how fast the collecting society that represents the 
performers collects and distributes the revenues.  
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*b) What are roughly the estimated yearly benefits for (1) record producers and (2) performers, 
taking into consideration the musical repertoire affected by the term extension? In the case of 
record producers, is there any data on how these benefits have been used? 
 
GDA is not able to provide any estimate as to the yearly benefits for performers. GDA will only be able 
to provide such estimate once it has collected monies during a period of 3-5 years.  
 
AUDIOGEST does not have the necessary information to estimate the yearly benefits for record 
producers. This collecting society recalls that the term extension allows producers who have a 
musical repertoire with more than 50 and less than 70 years old to obtain gains that otherwise would 
not be possible, because the phonograms would have entered into the public domain. Nevertheless, 
the data usually collected by AUDIOGEST does not allow them to draw any conclusions on the basis 
of the “age” of the repertoire. This collecting society adds that some of the producers who answered 
to this questionnaire were able to identify some of the revenues obtained. This sample is not, 
however, enough to draw conclusions with the regards to yearly benefits for record producers.   
 
*c) Has the Directive had a negative impact on other stakeholders, such as users (e.g., higher prices 
in cultural goods, or lower production volume)? 
 
GDA believes that the Directive has not had any negative impact on other stakeholders. On the 
contrary, in what concerns the so-called “historical” editions offered for sale or made available online, 
GDA says that the copies produced using non-original masters have been forced out of the market as 
a result of the implementation of this Directive. There was no investment on remastering these 
editions, and therefore they deceived the consumer (for instance, a while ago it was released in the 
market a CD edition of phonograms of the artist Amália Rodrigues that did not use the original 
master, but a reproduction of a vinyl record, which resulted in a record with very poor sound quality). 
 
AUDIOGEST stated that it did not observe an increase in the prices of cultural goods, by the contrary. 
On the other hand, this collecting society says that it has data that point to an increase of phonogram 
releases in Portugal. They cannot, however, establish a correlation between that rise on the new 
releases and the Directive. 
 
D3 Direitos Digitais – a Portuguese non-profit association that advocates for user rights – considers 
that the existence of neighbouring rights makes the access to culture more expensive, due to the 
increase of the amount of rights that have to be paid by users. The term extension only exacerbates 
this problem. 
 
DECO Associação Portuguesa para a Defesa do Consumidor – the Portuguese consumers rights 
organization – does not have any data that would allow them to assess if the Directive had a negative 
impact on the users.  
 
d) How much money (estimate) would users of music repertoires have saved each fiscal year since 1 
November 2013 if the Directive had not been adopted? 
Neither GDA nor AUDIOGEST were able to answer to this question. 
 
According to GDA, one would need to know the precise amount of money paid by Spotify to record 
producers, and no one has that information. This collecting society considers that the European 
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institutions should act urgently, in order to make sure that the accounts of platforms and record 
producers are transparent. 
 
e) Have the effects of the Directive been watered down due to contractual practices? Please 
describe such practices if applicable. 
 
Neither GDA nor AUDIOGEST are aware of such practices.  
 
*f) In your opinion, have the cultural and creative sectors benefited from the term extension (e.g., 
have marketing opportunities in third countries increased? Are there more revenue streams? Have 
producers been marketing back catalogue items, and if so how is that received by users)? Please 
give reasons. 
 
GDA considers that there are already some visible benefits and they anticipate more in the future, but 
they underline that it is still too early to draw any conclusions. 
 
AUDIOGEST takes the view that the term extension and, consequently, the potential increase of 
revenues are an incentive to investment. On the other hand, the “newness” and the frequency of new 
releases are essential for the music market. Therefore, this collecting society considers that it is not 
expectable to see in the music market the negative effects that one could see in other markets – the 
disinvestment in new products (in this case, cultural goods). AUDIOGEST underlines, again, that there 
has been an increase of new releases in Portugal, mainly new releases by new artists. We should note, 
however, that AUDIOGEST stated that they could not establish a correlation between that rise on the 
new releases and the Directive. 
 
g) Have users of music repertoires become less competitive vis-à-vis companies in third countries 
due to the amount of royalties they will have to pay to performers and phonogram producers as a 
consequence of the term extension? In your opinion, can this be an obstacle for off-line / on-line 
music business models to flourish in Europe?     
 
On GDA and AUDIOGEST’ views, users such as Spotify have not become less competitive vis-à-vis 
companies in third countries, and the extension of the term is not in any way an obstacle for such 
companies to flourish in Europe.  
GDA recalls that the USA and Brazil have longer terms of protection, and nevertheless such platforms 
have decided to enter into those markets. Moreover, such companies have never publicly stated that 
they intended to leave those markets due to their existing terms of protection. Therefore, according 
to GDA, it is inconceivable that such scenario could happen in the European Union. 
 
AUDIOGEST considers that the “value gap” is the biggest obstacle to the development of such 
services.  
 
h) Other remarks 
 
GDA represents musicians, actors and dancers, therefore it has always argued that the Directive 
should apply to the audio-visual sector. This collecting society is waiting since 01.01.2012 for the 
European Commission to release a strategy with regards to the audio-visual sector. 
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Stakeholders effectively contacted: 
 
Type of stakeholder Name of stakeholder Contact 
Performer Manuel Molarinho manuelmolarinho@gmail.com 
Performer André Simão https://www.facebook.com/andre.simao?ref=br_rs 
Performer/Record 
Producer 
João Barbosa (aka 
Branko) /Enchufada 
liljohn@enchufada.com 
Performers CMO GDA 
Eduardo Simões (Legal Department Director): 
eduardo.simoes@gda.pt 
Record Producers 
CMO 
Audiogest 
Miguel Carretas (General Director): 
miguel.carretas@audiogest.pt 
Consumers Rights 
Organization (Users) 
DECO – Associação 
Portuguesa para a 
Defesa do Consumidor 
Luís Pisco (Legal Adviser, Legal and Economic Department): 
lpisco@deco.pt 
Non-profit 
organization (Users) 
Associação D3 Direitos 
Digitais 
direccao@direitosdigitais.pt 
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ROMANIA 
National experts: Ana-Maria Baciu89 / Flavia Stefura90 
 
 
1. National implementation of the Directive 
a) Through which legislation was the Directive implemented in national law? Please provide a 
short history of the implementation, highlighting any legal or practical difficulties in implementing 
the Directive (for example, strong opposition from any interest groups, or difficulties in 
implementing the clauses of the Directive given national legal constraints – for instance, from 
contract law - or established practices) 
Directive 2011/77/EU amending Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and 
certain related rights (“Directive”) was transposed in national Romanian law through Law no. 53/2015 
on the amendment and supplementing of Law no. 8/1996 regarding copyright and related rights, 
published in the Official Gazette no. 198 dated 25 March 2015, and entered into force three days from 
publication (“Law no. 53/2015”). The Directive should have been transposed in 2013, however 
Romania did not meet that deadline, and as a consequence the European Commission began the 
infringement procedure against the Romanian State (procedure no. 2014/0189, opened on 10 July 
2014).  
On 6 October 2014, the first steps are being taken to implement the Directive regarding the term of 
protection of copyright. On that day a bill amending the law on copyright and related rights, Law no. 
8/1996, was registered with the Senate for debate. The bill was further presented in the Permanent 
Bureau of the Senate in 18 November 2014. On 15 December 2014 it was adopted by the Senate with 
115 votes in favour, 0 against and 3 abstentions. The Chamber of Deputies adopted the bill on 25 
February 2015 with 331 votes in favour, 0 against and 4 abstentions. 
The bill became Law no. 53/2015 on 24 March 2015. 
It should be noted that the Directive, and respectively, of the law implementing the Directive in 
Romanian legislation would currently only affect one producer, which was the sole phonogram 
producer during the communist regime, and which could not be contacted. 
2. Term extension (Art. 1.7, 3.1 and 2)  
*a) Have the provisions concerning the term extension been adequately implemented into 
national law?  
The provisions transposed in the national Romanian law through Law no. 53/2015 mirror the 
provisions of the Directive very closely, as the provisions of Law no. 53/2015 are merely a translation 
of the provisions of the Directive. 
                                                 
89 Partner, Nestor Nestor Diculescu Kingston Petersen. A licensed European trademark and design attorney, Ana-Maria is a member of the 
Romanian National Chamber of Industrial Property Attorneys and of the Bucharest Bar. Her professional affiliations include INTA, ECTA, 
AIPPI and MARQUES. 
90 Associate, Nestor Nestor Diculescu Kingston Petersen 
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However, the transitional measures have not been transposed in Romanian law, and neither has been 
article 1 paragraph (3) of the Directive. 
Having in mind that the Law no. 53/2015 entered into force at the end of March 2015, in Romania 
there is a gap of protection from 1 November 2013 to 29 March 2015, stemming from the fact that 
Article 1 paragraph (3) of the Directive provides that Article 3(1) to (2e) of the Directive 2006/116/EC 
in the version thereof in force on 31 October 2011 shall apply to fixations of performances and 
phonograms in regard to which the performer and the phonogram producer are still protected, by 
virtue of those provisions in the version thereof in force on 30 October 2011, as at 1 November 2013 
and to fixations of performances and phonograms which come into being after that date. So, if under 
Romanian law the protection of a performer or of a phonogram producer expired in the period 
between 1 November 2013 and the date of entry into force of Law no. 53/2015, such performer and 
phonogram producer seems not to benefit from the provisions of Article 3(1) to (2e) of the Directive 
2006/116/EC. 
Moreover, musical compositions with words whose protection ended at 1 November 2013 (and in the 
period between 1 November 2013 and the entry into force of Law no. 53/2015) do not benefit from 
the provisions of Article 10 para. (6) of Directive 2006/116/EC, introduced by article 1 paragraph (3) of 
the Directive, if they are not protected in Member States other than Romania. 
The provisions of the national legislation regarding contracts were not harmonized with the existing 
legislation regarding succession of laws and contracts. Not having established transitory provisions, 
the Law no. 53/2015 will apply only to rights which were still protected at the moment of its entry 
into force. It may also be interpreted that the Law no. 53/2015 only applies to assignment contracts 
which were concluded after its entry into force. 
b) Having in mind the “de minimis” character of the Directive, does national law provide for the 
application of the term extension when the performance is fixed in a media different from a 
phonogram? 
The national law did not implement any additional provisions to the ones included in the Directive. 
Moreover, Romanian legislation (Law no. 8/1996 on copyright and related rights) distinguishes 
between phonograms, which are sound recordings, and videograms or audiovisual works, which are 
mainly image recordings, with or without sound. The term extension was only provided in the 
national law for phonograms. So the answer to the question is that national law does not provide for 
the term extension when the performance is fixed in a media different from a phonogram. 
c) Is the term extension also applicable to performers and producers in the audio-visual sector? 
Given the fact that Romanian legislation provides a distinction between phonograms, on the one 
hand, and videograms/audiovisual works, on the other hand, regulating them in separate chapters of 
the Law no. 8/1996 on copyright and related rights, and given the fact that only the term of 
protection of performances fixed on a phonogram and of producers of phonograms was extended 
through Law no. 53/2015, the answer is that the term extension is not applicable to performers and 
producers in the audio-visual sector. 
*d) General assessment of the term extension/other remarks 
Implementation of the Directive 2011/77/EU: copyright term of protection 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 101 
No answer 
3. The “use it or lose it” clause (Art. 3.2a): how does it work in practice? 
*a) How shall the term “in sufficient quantity” be interpreted? 
It will most probably be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
b) Does the offering of copies or the making available of the work need to be done by the producer 
himself or does the provision also apply when these acts are carried out by third parties? 
Law no. 53/2015 specifies that if the producer of a phonogram does not provide sufficient copies of 
said phonogram, the artist may rescind the assignment contract. However, these provisions of the 
legislation should be read in conjunction with general copyright law legislation, which allows for 
assignment of rights, and also with general civil legislation, which allows legal acts to be carried out 
by a person through its representatives. 
The obligation of making available the work belongs mainly to the producer. However, in our view, if 
the producer assigns his contract with the performer (which can be done with the consent of the 
performer, by virtue of article 1315 of the Romanian Civil Code), then the rights, as well as the 
obligations deriving from that contract, pass onto the third party. It is also possible for the producer 
to mandate third parties to act on his behalf with respect to the distribution of the copies. 
c) Are there any mechanisms in place to inform performers of this clause (having in mind that this 
right can only be exercised 50 years after the fixation or publication of the performance)? 
Performers may find out about the provisions of the copyright and related rights legislation from 
official sources, such as the website of the Senate (https://www.senat.ro/#) and the Chambers of 
Deputies (http://www.cdep.ro/), where the projects of laws are published before being passed as laws 
(together with the legislative process). However, the main source of information for changes in 
legislation is the Official Gazette of Romania, where normative acts are published before entering into 
force. 
According to the information we received from CREDIDAM, they have also informed their members of 
the provisions of the law through announcements on their website. 
d) What is the procedure in cases where a phonogram contains the fixation of the performances 
from a plurality of performers? 
Romanian legislation did not implement a special procedure for when a phonogram contains the 
fixation of the performances from a plurality of performers. The sentence “Where a phonogram 
contains the fixation of the performance of a plurality of performers, they may terminate their 
contracts on transfer or assignment in accordance with applicable law” from Article 1 (2) (c) of the 
Directive was translated almost word by word into Romanian and transposed in the legislation.  
Although the national legislation does not provide a special procedure for the case when a 
phonogram contains the fixation of the performances from a plurality of performers, it does provide 
that the interpretation of a work is collective when the individual performances form a whole, 
without it being possible to grant a distinct right to one artist over the ensemble of the performance. 
In such cases, the group’s rights are exercised by a representative chosen from the members of the 
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group by the majority of that group. In our view, in such cases the representative is the person who 
will terminate the assignment agreement with the phonogram producer, if that is the case. 
As to multiple performers who have distinct rights over a performance, the effects of termination of 
contracts will be regulated on a case by case basis, either by agreement of the parties, or in court. 
e) To your knowledge, have performers already made use of this clause vis-à-vis phonogram 
producers? 
The information we received from respondents with respect to this matter indicates that the 
performers have not yet made use of hits clause vis-à-vis phonogram producers. And when they have 
tried to bring the subject up with producers, the producers were reluctant to enter into a 
conversation on this topic. 
f) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this mandatory clause?  
The information we received from respondents with respect to this matter indicates that record 
companies have not amended the model contracts they use with performers to reflect this 
mandatory clause.  
*g) General assessment of the “use it or lose it” clause/other remarks 
No answer 
4. The annual supplementary remuneration (the “20% fund”): how does it work in practice? (art. 
3.2b – 2d) 
a) What kind of measures have been adopted to ensure that performers are informed of this 
annual supplementary remuneration? 
Performers may find out about the provisions of the copyright and related rights legislation from 
official sources, such as the website of the Senate (https://www.senat.ro/# ) and the Chambers of 
Deputies (http://www.cdep.ro/), where the projects of laws are published before being passed as laws 
(together with the legislative process). However, the main source of information for changes in 
legislation is the Official Gazette of Romania, where normative acts are published before entering into 
force. 
Other than that, according to the information we received from CREDIDAM, they have also informed 
their members of the provisions of the law through announcements on their website. 
b) Are phonogram producers obliged by national law to inform performers of this right?  
National Romanian law does not oblige producers to inform performers of this right. 
c) How has the Member State implemented in national law the obligation of phonogram producers 
to provide performers, upon request, “any information which may be necessary in order to secure 
payment of that remuneration”? 
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Romania has implemented the obligation of phonogram producers to provide performers, upon 
request, “any information which may be necessary in order to secure payment of that remuneration” 
by making it a paragraph in the Law no. 8/1996 on copyright and related rights, introduced therein by 
Law no. 53/2015 implementing the Directive. 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to inform them of this right? 
The information we received from respondents with respect to this matter indicates that record 
companies have not amended the model contracts they use with performers to reflect this 
mandatory clause. 
e) Have collecting societies in the Member State adopted any measure to inform performers of 
this right? 
According to the information we received from CREDIDAM, they have informed their members of the 
new legislative provisions. However, they have expressed the view that performers will need help in 
making use of their rights in practice. 
f) Which collecting society is responsible for administering the “20 % fund”? How has this 
collecting society organized the administration and distribution of the annual supplementary 
remuneration? 
In Romania there are three collecting societies representing artists. Currently the issue of the 
administration of the 20% fund has not been formally discussed, and none of the collecting societies 
has been designated to administer the 20% fund. 
g) How many performers represented by collecting societies have benefited so far from this right in 
each of the fiscal years following the deadline for transposition of the Directive (1 November 
2013)?  
According to the information we have received, so far none of the performers represented by 
collecting societies has benefited from this right. 
h) How much have collecting societies collected each year as a consequence of the 20%-fund 
provision? 
According to the information we received, so far no funds have been collected as a consequence of 
the 20% fund provision. 
i) Following Recital 12 of the Term Extension Directive, has national law exempted micro-
enterprises from the obligation to contribute? If so, under which circumstances? 
No, national legislation did not exempt micro-enterprises from the obligation to contribute. 
*j) General assessment of the 20% fund/other remarks 
No answer 
5. The “clean slate” provision (Art. 3.2e): how does it work in practice?  
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a) Can the clean slate rule be waived by contract? 
Art. 3.2.e of the Directive was implemented into national Romanian law through art. 1021 paragraph 
(10) of the Law no. 8/1996 on copyright and related rights, article which was introduced by Law no. 
53/2015. The wording of art. 1021 paragraph (10) is the Romanian equivalent of art, 3.2e of the 
Directive. In our view, even though the Law no. 8/1996 does not provide that the “clean slate” 
principle cannot be waived by contract, allowing clauses that would circumvent this principle would 
undermine the whole purpose for which it was introduced in the legislation in the first place. 
Therefore, in our view the clean slate rule cannot be waived by contract. 
On the other hand, waiving by the performer of other rights introduced by Law no. 53/2015, i.e. the 
right to terminate the assignment agreement and the right to the annual supplementary 
remuneration, is expressly forbidden by the law. One may therefore argue that, given the fact that 
there is no express rule forbidding the clean slate rule to be waived by contract, this is possible under 
Law no. 53/2015. 
Having said that, the matter will most probably left to be decided by the courts, or by further 
clarification in the legislation. 
b) What are the mechanisms Member States have established to enforce this measure in national 
law? 
Aside from the transposition of the relevant Directive provisions into Romanian legislation, we are not 
aware of any specific measures of enforcement of this measure in national law. 
c) Is there an obligation to inform performers of this measure? 
No, there is no express legal obligation to inform performers of this measure. 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
The information we received indicates that phonogram producers have not amended their model 
clauses they use with performers to reflect the clean slate rule. 
*e) General assessment of the “clean slate” provision/other remarks 
No answer 
 
6. Transitional provisions (Art. 10.5 and 6, art. 10a) 
*a) Have the transitional measures of arts. 10.5, 10.6 and 10a been adequately implemented into 
national law?  
No, the transitional measures of arts. 10.5, 10.6 and 10a have not been transposed into national law in 
Romania. 
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b) Does national legislation allow performers to modify their contracts on transfer or assignment 
after the 50-year period has expired (see Art. 10a.2)? 
As the Romanian legislator did not transpose the transitional measures of the Directive, neither was 
art. 10a.2 transposed. Therefore, the Romanian legislator did not provide for the possibility for 
performers to modify their contracts on transfer or assignment after the 50-year period has expired. 
Moreover, a change in a contract under Romanian law cannot be done unilaterally by one party, 
without the consent of the other party, unless such possibility is provided in law. 
Therefore, performers who are entitled to recurring payments according to contracts concluded 
before March 2015 cannot unilaterally alter them following the 50th year after the phonogram was 
lawfully published or, failing such publication, the 50th year after it was lawfully communicated to the 
public. 
c) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this? 
The information we have received in this regard indicates that the record companies did not yet 
amend the contracts they use with performers to reflect the transitional measures of the Directive. 
7. General assessment of the Directive 
*a) Are performers aware of the benefits brought about by the Directive? Do they effectively 
reclaim them? How long on average does it take for performers to receive the benefits they are 
entitled to?  
(this answer is based on the response from CREDIDAM): Artists and performers were made aware of 
the provisions of the Directive and of the Law no. 153/2015. However, they are not prepared to put 
them in practice. They will need further assistance in this respect from collection societies. Presently, 
no initiative was undertaken by either performers, collecting societies or the regulators with respect 
to the benefits performers are entitled to. 
*b) What are roughly the estimated yearly benefits for (1) record producers and (2) performers, 
taking into consideration the musical repertoire affected by the term extension? In the case of 
record producers, is there any data on how these benefits have been used?  
(this answer is based on the response from CREDIDAM): Currently we have no data on the yearly 
benefits for (1) record producers and (2) performers, taking into consideration the musical repertoire 
affected by the term extension. 
*c) Has the Directive had a negative impact on other stakeholders, such as users (e.g., higher prices 
in cultural goods, or lower production volume)? 
Currently we have no data on the impact of the Directive on other stakeholders. 
d) How much money (estimate) would users of music repertoires have saved each fiscal year since 1 
November 2013 if the Directive had not been adopted? 
Currently we have no data on how much money (estimate) would users of music repertoires have 
saved each fiscal year since 1 November 2013 if the Directive had not been adopted. 
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e) Have the effects of the Directive been watered down due to contractual practices? Please 
describe such practices if applicable.  
The information we received indicates that the record companies have not amended their model 
contracts to reflect the changes brought by the Directive. Therefore, it cannot be said that the effects 
of the Directive have been watered down due to contractual practices. 
*f) In your opinion, have the cultural and creative sectors benefited from the term extension (e.g., 
have marketing opportunities in third countries increased? Are there more revenue streams? Have 
producers been marketing back catalogue items, and if so how is that received by users)? Please 
give reasons.  
In our view (NNDKP), the changes brought by the Directive will be seen in time. So far, the legislative 
provisions are very fresh, and have not yet had time to penetrate the practice of the actors on the 
market. 
*g) Have users of music repertoires become less competitive vis-à-vis companies in third 
countries due to the amount of royalties they will have to pay to performers and phonogram 
producers as a consequence of the term extension? In your opinion, can this be an obstacle for 
companies such as Spotify to flourish in Europe?  
It is too early to tell if users such as Spotify shall become less competitive vis-à-vis companies in third 
countries due to the amount of royalties they will have to pay to performers and phonogram 
producers as a consequence of the term extension. 
h) Other remarks 
No answer 
 
Stakeholders effectively contacted: 
 
Type of stakeholder91 
Name of stakeholder  
(Institution and contact person) 
Contact 
(min e-mail) 
Collecting society Centrul Român pentru Administrarea 
Drepturilor Artiștilor Interpreți 
(CREDIDAM) – contact person: Alina 
Iordache 
alina.iordache@credidam.ro 
 
                                                 
91 Note that in the respondents category we noted a single contact person, who is from CREDIDAM, the most important collecting society 
representing performers, having the largest number of members in Romania (http://credidam.ro/wp/). This is because they are the only 
ones who answered our questions in writing. Other persons we have contacted have either declined to answer (such is the case of the 
authority in matters of copyright, ORDA), said that they were not competent to answer (such is the case of UPFR, a collecting society that 
represents producers of phonograms), or they simply did not answer at all (other collecting societies and various studios). The answers from 
ORDA and UPFR were given on the phone. 
We note especially the reason for not providing answers given by ORDA, who said that the issues raised by the questionnaire are sensitive 
matters, because of the potential conflict of interests between artists and phonogram producers. 
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SPAIN 
National expert: Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella92 
 
 
The questionnaire includes the answers received from AISGE (Audiovisual Artists’ Collecting Society) and 
AIE (Music Performers’ Collecting Society). AGEDI (Phonogram producers’ Collecting Society) was also 
contacted but they refused to answer the questionnaire because they understood they were not involved in 
the putting into practice of the Directive. 
1. National implementation of the Directive 
a) Through which legislation was the Directive implemented in national law? Please provide a 
short history of the implementation, highlighting any legal or practical difficulties in implementing 
the Directive (for example, strong opposition from any interest groups, or difficulties in 
implementing the clauses of the Directive given national legal constraints – for instance, from 
contract law - or established practices)  
Directive 2011/77 was implemented in the Spanish legal order though Law 21/2014 of 4 November 
2014 (BOE 5 November 2014) and entered into force on 1 January 2015. Art. 1 of that Law amended 
several provisions in the Spanish Copyright Act (arts. 28.1, art. 112 and 119) and introduced a new Art. 
110 bis.  
Implementation of Directive 2011/77 was not the exclusive purpose of Law 21/2014. In fact, this Law 
included several important amendments to the Spanish Copyright Act (hereinafter SCA) including: a) 
the implementation of Directive 2012/28 on orphan works; b) the modification of the copyright 
exception for use of the work for research and educational purposes; c) a new unwaivable ancillary 
right for publishers consisting of an equitable remuneration to be paid by news aggregators; d) a 
reform of the private copy exception to reflect the existing CJUE case law; e) regulation of the 
competences of a new administrative body (Sección 2a Comisión de Propiedad Intelectual) whose 
main function is to administer a fast-track procedure for web site blocking injunctions; f) the 
introduction of new provisions aimed at subjecting the activities of collecting societies to further 
controls to improve their transparency and efficiency; g) the reform also introduced a centralised 
payment system (one-stop shop) to collect and redistribute the income by collecting societies 
amongst right holders. 
Having in mind the controversial nature of other of the questions of the Law, the implementation of 
Directive 2011/77 did not raise much concerns. However, as it will be explained, some of the advisory 
bodies that were consulted during the legislative process mentioned some issues that could have 
been taken into account.  
AISGE: Not. The implementation of these specific provisions was not controversial, mainly because 
they were introduced in our legislation together with other measures having a much greater impact 
on Copyright and its collective management. Indeed, the national Law that incorporated the 
Directive 2011/77 into the Spanish legislation was the Law 21/2014, of November 4th, amending the 
Spanish Intellectual Property Law in areas such as the private copying compensation scheme and 
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collective management, the fair remuneration for press publishers for the making available of their 
works by content aggregators, etc. All these measures were so controversial that other aspects of the 
new regulation (including the term extension for sound recordings, or the orphan works regulation) 
were not even noticed by the general public. 
AIE. We consider that, in general terms, the Spanish Law No. 21/2014, of 4 November, amending the 
consolidated text of the Law on Intellectual Property, has adopted legal provisions included in the 
Directive 2011/77/EC in an appropriate manner.  
Furthermore, in some cases the Spanish legislation goes further than the provisions set out in the 
Directive. By way of example, Spanish legislation specifically foresees that the supplementary 
remuneration, which shall not be waived by the performer, shall be effective through the performers’ 
CMO, and establishes that phonogram producers or exclusive assignees shall provide to such CMO all 
information that may be needed to ensure the payment of such supplementary remuneration.  
Although the Directive has not included a specific definition of producer, the Spanish legislation has 
adopted a legal provision about the debtor of this supplementary remuneration which foresees that 
it shall be the phonogram producer or the exclusive assignee, as the case may be.  
2. Term extension (Art. 1.7, 3.1 and 2). 
*a) Have the provisions concerning the term extension been adequately implemented into 
national law? 
New Art. 1.7 D. 2006/116 was implemented in the Spanish Copyright Act by introducing a new 
Paragraph 2, in Art 28.1.  
Spain was one of the Member State that at the time of the adoption of the Directive already 
established that the term of protection of musical compositions with lyrics and music from different 
authors starts counting after the death of the last of these persons. While no amendment was 
needed, the legislator opted for introducing a new paragraph in Art. 28.1 SCA. The wording of such 
new paragraph is almost identical to that of Art. 1.7, so it can be affirmed that it was adequately 
implemented. 
To implement Art. 3.1 and 2 D. 2011/77, amendments in Paragraph 2, art. 112 (performers’ rights) and 
Paragraph 2, art. 119 (phonogram producers’ rights) were introduced. The wordings of such 
paragraphs are almost identical to that of Art. 3.1 and 2, so it can be affirmed that it was adequately 
implemented. 
In relation to Art. 119 SCA, academics has raised the question on whether the making available of a 
phonogram in the Internet should be considered as “lawfully published” or as “lawfully 
communicated to the public”. The question is relevant since “lawfully published” prevails. So, what 
happens if the phonogram is first made available in the Internet and later on it is released as a record? 
Will the release be taken into account for the term extension? Or should it be considered that the 
making available in the Internet counts as a “lawful publication”?  
The doubt is also relevant for the interpretation of Art. 3.2 D. 2006/116. In particular, this is so because 
the music business is focusing on Internet downloading or streaming, and not in distribution of 
tangible copies of the works. 
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Scholars understand that the making available in the Internet should be considered as “lawfully 
published” for the purpose of art. 119 SCA. This is more in line with the existing practices in the music 
business (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2015)93.  
b) Having in mind the “de minimis” character of the Directive, does national law provide for the 
application of the term extension when the performance is fixed in a media different from a 
phonogram?  
No. this has been criticised by some scholars because it creates an unjustified discrimination between 
phonograph performers and the rest. That is performances fixed in a phonogram enjoy 70 years of 
protection; those fixed in a different audio-visual format, 50.  
Furthermore, it might create problems where the same performance is exploited in different media, 
since different terms of protection may apply (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2015). depending on the media in 
which the performance is fixed. 
AISGE. On the other hand, and for us, the controversy on this particular topic (term extension) was 
raised in Brussels during the debates in 2009. As soon as the Commission made it clear that the 
proposed Directive (subject of this work) would only benefit performances in sound recordings we, 
together with the Association of European Performers Organizations (AEPO-ARTIS) and the 
International Federation of Actors (FIA), organized a series of meetings with members of both the 
Commission and the Parliament, pointing out the discrimination against the performers whose 
performances are fixed in an audiovisual recording. Thanks to such effort, the Parliament finally 
introduced in the Directive the obligation of the Commission to carry out a study on the situation of 
the audiovisual sector, which should have already determined the need to extend the term of 
protection equally to the actors and other audiovisual artists. This obligation is long due; however, we 
do not currently have information about the Commission’s undertakings about this matter. Because 
of that, certain MEPs have already asked questions to the Commission, and are even asking whether 
the current process for reviewing the Copyright legislation in the EU would be suitable for analysing 
the need of AV performers to have an extended term of protection. 
c) Is the term extension also applicable to performers and producers in the audio-visual sector? 
No. This creates an unjustified discrimination between phonograph performers and audiovisual 
performers (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2015). 
*d) General assessment of the term extension/other remarks 
No answer 
3. The “use it or lose it” clause (Art. 3.2a): how does it work in practice? 
*a) How shall the term “in sufficient quantity” be interpreted?  
Art. 3.2a has been implemented in Art. 110 bis.1 SCA. The problem to interpret “sufficient quantity” 
was raised during the legislative process in the Dictamen del Consejo de Estado sobre el Anteproyecto 
de Ley de modificación de la LPI (p. 89). According to this Report: “… la suficiencia del número de 
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copias dependerá del tipo de obra producida – calidad del product, calidad del artista, Mercado 
objetivo… - “. El criterio de la previsible demanda por el público “no añade seguridad adicional para 
las partes, la idea de la suficiencia remite a una determinación que puede realizarse, por ejemplo, en 
el propio contrato de cession, sin que la idea de la previsibilidad del comportamiento del Mercado de 
fonogramas, con los márgenes temporales que maneja este concepto, parezca aportar un elemento 
sobre el que hacer descansar el derecho del artista a la resolución del contrato”. 
The provision finally adopted refers to “a sufficient quantity of copies so as to satisfy the reasonable 
needs of the public having regards to the nature and aim of the phonogram” . The definition derives 
from Art. 3(3) Berne Convention. As explained by legal doctrine (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2017), the 
definition requires an analysis of the particular circumstances of the phonogram in question (its 
content, the featured artist, the producer, its aim, the market and the targeted audience) to 
determine whether the offer of copies is sufficient or not.  
The concept should be the object of an autonomous interpretation. In this sense, Recital 8 of the 
Directive states: “The rights in the fixation of the performance should revert to the performer if a 
phonogram producer refrains from offering for sale in sufficient quantity, within the meaning of the 
International Convention on the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organisations, copies of a phonogram”.  
It should be understood that the offering for sale should take place in the territory of the European 
Union. 
Is it enough for the performer to make use of this right if the producer has not offered for sale or 
made it available? 
The Staff Working Document accompanying the Proposal for a Directive (Doc. COM(2008) 464 FINAL, 
p. 26) give an affirmative answer: if one of these means of exploitation is missing, the performer can 
claim his right.  
This means that producers are obliged to offer for sale and make available if they do not want 
problems.  
This is contrary to the existing practices in the music industry: it is more and more common that 
music work are just make available in the internet. Distribution of tangible copies is not the general 
rule anymore. An interpretation according to the present practice is needed. If not, perfomers may 
make an abusive use of this clause.  
For AIE, Spanish legislation contains some ambiguous concepts such as “sufficient” or “reasonably” 
refered to the number of copies that the phonogram producer shall offer for sale, which make 
difficult its practical application, since there is no objective way to establish a number of copies under 
these parameters. 
b) Does the offering of copies or the making available of the work need to be done by the producer 
himself or does the provision also apply when these acts are carried out by third parties?  
At this point, Spanish rule differs from the Directive. While the second explicitly refers to the 
producers, the Spanish legislator purposefully avoided any reference to the person that has to 
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distribute or make available the phonogram. So the offering of copies can be made by the producer 
or a third party (assignee). In any case, the consent of the producer is needed.  
The text of the directive should be interpreted to include those cases where the distribution or the 
making available of the phonogram is made by a third party with the consent of the producer. 
This is also important to determine the person that must be notified of the intention of the performer 
of terminating the contract. 
c) Are there any mechanisms in place to inform performers of this clause (having in mind that this 
right can only be exercised 50 years after the fixation or publication of the performance)? 
No answer 
 
d) What is the procedure in cases where a phonogram contains the fixation of the performances 
from a plurality of performers? 
 
For the solution of these situations, Art. 110 bis.1 make a reference to art. 111. According to this 
provision, all the performers involved shall choose a representative among themselves by majority of 
votes. The agreement shall designate the person and his/her powers. This means that he/she would 
only be able to terminate the contract if the majority has agreed that he/she has powers for doing so.  
As an exemption, Art. 111 states that orchestra directors and soloists can decide autonomously.  
This regulation may create problems in cases where the soloist or the orchestra directors choose to 
terminate the contract, but the rest of the performers not. In this case, the first would not be able to 
use the phonogram that combines the contributions of all the parties concern.  
As a consequence, while the directive impedes producers to block the exploitation of performances 
by performers, the way Spain has implemented this provision opens the door to other situations 
where obstacles may appear for the exploitation of performances. 
This solution differs from the one chosen by the Commission in the Proposal for a Directive: all the 
performers need to agree in the termination of the contract. Unfortunately, it was not finally adopted.  
e) To your knowledge, have performers already made use of this clause vis-à-vis phonogram 
producers? 
 
Stakeholders questioned did not know of any example 
 
f) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
 
No answer 
 
*g) General assessment of the “use it or lose it” clause/other remarks 
 
Spanish legislator has specified that the notification by the performer has to be reliable (“fehaciente”). 
This is important because the 1-year period starts counting from that date. The performer must 
clearly identify the performance.  
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According to legal doctrine, performers can exercise this right after 12 months from the notification. 
For that, the performer must communicate the producers the termination of the contract (Gonzalez 
Gozalo, 2017). 
 
4. The annual supplementary remuneration (the “20% fund”): how does it work in practice? 
(art. 3.2b – 2d) 
 
a) What kind of measures have been adopted to ensure that performers are informed of this 
annual supplementary remuneration?  
 
Art. 110.bis.2 SCA is almost identical to Arts. 3.2 b – d of the Directive. Therefore, the provision does 
not include any measure to inform performers.  
Since “lawfully published” prevails over “lawfully communicated to the public”, a similar 
interpretative question to that in Art. 119 SCA exists: should the making available in the Internet of 
the performance be considered as “lawfully published”? or would a subsequent publication in 
tangible media prevailed? 
Again, this is also relevant for the interpretation of Art. 3.2.b since this right only exists 50 years after 
the “lawfully publication” or, on default, “the communication to the public”, an autonomous 
interpretation of the provision is needed. 
Legal doctrine (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2017) have pointed out the problem that may exist for performers 
to demonstrate that they are entitled to this remuneration. In particular, non-featured performers. In 
Spain, according to the Civil procedural Law (art. 217 LEC), the onus probandi lies in the party claiming 
his rights. It is certainly not easy for performers or their heirs to provide evidence (a contract, a bill, an 
invoice, pictures…) that demonstrate that they participated in the recording of a song or a record 
that took place at least 50 years ago (this period can be even longer if the record was lawfully 
published later). Easier to demonstrate is the fact that the contract does not provide a recurring 
remuneration. If that would be so, documentary evidence would exist. 
In this expert’s opinion, it is possible to interpret that collecting societies may request to producers 
information about the participation of their performers in the performances fixed in a phonogram. 
This should be considered “information which may be necessary in order to secure payment of that 
remuneration” for the purpose of Art. 110.bis.2 SCA and Art. 3.2.c D. 2011/77. 
In the SCA the person in charge of paying the annual remuneration is the phonogram producer or “en 
su caso, su cesionario en exclusiva” (the exclusive licensee or assignee). According to the Memoria de 
análisis de impacto normativo del Anteproyecto de Ley de modificación de la LPI, p. 42, this applies to the 
integral transfer of the rights over the phonogram: an assignment of the phonogram producer’s 
rights. This will not apply to an exclusive license of limited rights over the phonogram or a license limited in 
time (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2015). This might be problematic: how should Art. 3.2.b DIRECTIVE be interpreted in 
cases where the rights over the phonogram are licensed to different parties? Who has to pay the annual 
remuneration? 
b) Are phonogram producers obliged by national law to inform performers of this right?  
 
Not by law, and it seems collecting societies have not adopt any practice in this sense. 
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c) How has the Member State implemented in national law the obligation of phonogram producers 
to provide performers, upon request, “any information which may be necessary in order to secure 
payment of that remuneration”? 
 
This part of the Directive has not been correctly implemented. According to Art. 110.bis.2 producers 
are obliged to provide information to collecting societies, not to performers. Scholars do not consider 
that this is incompatible with the directive because at the end of the day it is for the collecting 
societies to collect the remuneration (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2015). 
As previously explained this obligation needs to be widely interpreted so that producers are obliged 
to provide all information including whether a particular performer participated in the recording of a 
particular phonogram.  
The provision does not provide for any sanction against those producers who do not provide the 
information requested or they provide an incomplete or false information.  
 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to inform them of this right? 
 
No information has been received by stakeholders in this regard 
 
e) Have collecting societies in the Member State adopted any measure to inform performers of this 
right? 
 
AIE. Initially, AIE addressed the main record companies (“majors”), but also AGEDI (the Spanish 
producers ́ collecting society) contacted all its members to inform them about the terms of the new 
regulation. Currently, AIE addresses directly all AGEDI ́s members and requires them annually to 
provide the necessary information to make that annual supplementary remuneration effective, as the 
Directive and the Spanish legislation provided.  
 
f) Which collecting society is responsible for administering the “20 % fund”? How has this 
collecting society organized the administration and distribution of the annual supplementary 
remuneration? 
 
As stated in Art. 3.2.b of the Directive the annual remuneration is equal to the “20 % of the revenue 
which the phonogram producer has derived, during the year preceding that for which the said 
remuneration is paid, from the reproduction, distribution and making available of the phonogram in 
question” 
Art. 110.bis.2 provides further rules: 
a) 20% of the revenue refers to “gross revenue” (before deducting costs) 
b) Art. 110.bis.2 states: “Quedan excluidas del calculo de los ingresos a que se refiere el parrafo 
anterior las cantidades percibidas por el deudor en concepto de compensación equitativa por 
copia privada y alquiler de fonogramas”. This is in line with Recital 13: such gross revenue shall 
not include the amount producers obtain from the  the fair compensation received for private 
copying (Art. 5.2 D. 2001/29, art. 25.2 LPI) and the equitable remuneration for the rental of 
phonograms (art. 5 D. 2006/115, Art. 109.3.2 LPI). The provision does not refer to the single 
equitable remuneration for broadcasting and communication to the public (art. 8.2 D. 
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2006/115, Arts. 108.4 and 116.2 LPI). This is so because no reference was needed since no 
revenue from communication to the public (except for the making available, already 
mentioned in Art. 3.2.b D. 2011/77) is considered as such (Gonzalez Gozalo, 2015). 
c) In cases where there are several performers in one phonogram, the distribution would be 
proportional to the number of performers that participate in it. 
The fact that the gross revenue should include the amount deriving from the “making available of the 
phonogram in question” is a problem in Spanish Law. Under EU Law, this inclusion makes sense 
because, performers do not have a right to obtain from a producer a remuneration for the making 
available of their performances. However, according to art. 108.3 LPI, performers do enjoy this right 
under Spanish Law. Scholars believe this latter right is not compatible with EU Law (Gonzalez Gozalo, 
2015). In any case, it should not be included in the revenue to calculate the annual remuneration 
fund.  
AIE. AIE, as the only CMO which represents music performers in Spain, collects anually from the 
phonogram producers the amounts which correspond to 20% of the remuneration obtained for the 
distribution (physical sales), making available (online sales) and reproduction (synchronisation) of 
phonograms published from 1963.  
AIE distributes anually this supplementary remuneration during the last term of the year among 
performers.  
In addition, a 5 years limitation period is established in the Article 154 section 3 and 4 TRLPI regarding 
amounts for identified and unidentified rightholders. After this period if applicable, the amount shall 
be allocated in accordance with Article 154 section 5 TRLPI.  
 
g) How many performers represented by collecting societies have benefited so far from this right in 
each of the fiscal years following the deadline for transposition of the Directive (1 November 
2013)? 
 
According to AIE data, currently more than 1.000 artists will be paid from the record companies 
through AIE.  
 
h) How much have collecting societies collected each year as a consequence of the 20%-fund 
provision? 
 
AIE. The producers haven ́t provided all the information about the incomes, which should be applied 
to annual supplementary remuneration.  
 
i) Following Recital 12 of the Term Extension Directive, has national law exempted micro-
enterprises from the obligation to contribute? If so, under which circumstances? 
 
No. 
 
*j) General assessment of the 20% fund/other remarks 
 
No answer. 
 
5. The “clean slate” provision (Art. 3.2e): how does it work in practice? 
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a) Can the clean slate rule be waived by contract? 
  
The “clean slate” provision has been implemented in Art. 110.bis.3. 
Nothing is mentioned in this regard. Having in mind the nature of the provision and the fact that the 
measure applies automatically (contrary to the “use-it-or-lose-it” provision, there is no need for the 
performer to request it), it shall be interpreted that it’s an unwaivable right. 
Even if the measure is mandatory, there might be problems to establish which contractual measures are to 
be considered “advance payments” or “contractually defined deductions” and which not. 
 
b) What are the mechanisms Member States have established to enforce this measure in national 
law?  
Art. 110.bis.3 is a copy of art. 3.2.e D. 2011/77. No further legislative measure has been adopted to 
facilitate the enforcement. 
 
c) Is there an obligation to inform performers of this measure? 
 
No 
 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
 
No information was received in this regard 
 
*e) General assessment of the “clean slate” provision/other remarks 
 
Again, there might be a problem to calculate the 50-year term: should “making available in the 
Internet” be considered as “lawfully published”? 
 
AIE has no information on this matter at present.  
 
6. Transitional provisions (Art. 10.5 and 6, art. 10a) 
 
*a) Have the transitional measures of arts. 10.5, 10.6 and 10a been adequately implemented into 
national law? 
 
Arts. 10.5 and 10.6 have been implemented in DT 21 SCA. However, attention needs to be paid also to 
DT 1, 13 and 19. 
The new term of protection applies to phonograms and performances that are still protected in 1 
November 2013. This means that it applies to phonograms recorded and performances fixed in 
phonograms later than 1 January 1963, or to phonograms or performances previously recorded or 
fixed, but lawfully published or communicated to the public later than 1 January 1963. 
Due to the delay of implementation of the Directive by the Spanish government, there is an 
anomalous situation. Law 21/2014 entered into force in 1 January 2015: therefore, phonograms and 
performances whose protection expired 31 December 2013 were not protected during 2014, and 
following DT 21 SCA their protection was resumed in 2015, and will last until 31 December 2033. This 
creates a lot of uncertainty: on the one side, rightholders cannot claim payment of the acts of 
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exploitation of these performances and phonograms made during 2014; on the other side, users 
cannot keep using these performances and phonograms for free from 2015 onwards (Gonzalez 
Gozalo, 2015).  
b) Does national legislation allow performers to modify their contracts on transfer or assignment 
after the 50-year period has expired (see Art. 10a.2)? 
No, Spain has not implemented this optional measure. This might be detrimental in cases where Art. 
110. bis.2 (art. 3.2 b-c) applies. After 50 years, a performer who has agreed very reduced royalties 
cannot terminate his contract. In contrast, a performer who has not agree a royalty payment will be 
able to ask for the 20% annual remuneration fund.  
 
c) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this? 
 
7. General assessment of the Directive  
 
*a) Are performers aware of the benefits brought about by the Directive? Do they effectively 
reclaim them? How long on average does it take for performers to receive the benefits they are 
entitled to? 
 
No answer. 
 
*b) What are roughly the estimated yearly benefits for (1) record producers and (2) performers, 
taking into consideration the musical repertoire affected by the term extension? In the case of 
record producers, is there any data on how these benefits have been used? 
 
No answer. 
 
*c) Has the Directive had a negative impact on other stakeholders, such as users (e.g., higher prices 
in cultural goods, or lower production volume)? 
 
No answer. 
 
d) How much money (estimate) would users of music repertoires have saved each fiscal year since 1 
November 2013 if the Directive had not been adopted? 
 
No answer. 
 
e) Have the effects of the Directive been watered down due to contractual practices? Please 
describe such practices if applicable. 
 
No answer. 
 
*f) In your opinion, have the cultural and creative sectors benefited from the term extension (e.g., 
have marketing opportunities in third countries increased? Are there more revenue streams? Have 
producers been marketing back catalogue items, and if so how is that received by users)? Please 
give reasons. 
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No answer. 
 
*g) Have users of music repertoires become less competitive vis-à-vis companies in third countries 
due to the amount of royalties they will have to pay to performers and phonogram producers as a 
consequence of the term extension? In your opinion, can this be an obstacle for companies such as 
Spotify to flourish in Europe? 
No answer. 
h) Other remarks 
AIE. In our opinion, the Directive ensures that performers receiving non-recurring remuneration also 
benefit from the term extension. It means that featured and non-featured performers not benefiting 
from royalties on the exploitation of the recordings are granted an unwaivable right to obtain an 
annual supplementary remuneration from the record producer (following the 50th year of the term of 
protection).  
Nevertheless, we are interested in knowing how does the collection of this right operate in practice in 
other countries, particurarly with regard to mechanisms of verification of the data provided by the 
phonogram producers, and how such CMOs distribute the supplemetary remuneration among 
performers subject to this right. This is because in most of the cases, it is not easy to verify whether 
the assessments actually contain all profits subject to the additional annual remuneration or not, due 
to the age of these data.  
 
AISGE. Our opinion on this topic is limited to the unfair discrimination between performers, on the 
basis of the nature of the fixation in which they incorporate their performances. Please see our 
answer to question 2 above.  
 
 
Stakeholders effectively contacted: 
 
Type of stakeholder Name of stakeholder Contact 
CMO AIE 
Alvaro Hernandez-Pinzon 
alvaro.hpinzon@aie.es  
CMO AISGE 
Jose María Montes 
jmmontes@aisge.es  
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SWEDEN 
National expert: Nedim Malovic94 /  
 
1. National implementation of the Directive 
a) Through which legislation was the Directive implemented in national law? Please provide a 
short history of the implementation, highlighting any legal or practical difficulties in implementing 
the Directive (for example, strong opposition from any interest groups, or difficulties in 
implementing the clauses of the Directive given national legal constraints – for instance, from 
contract law - or established practices)  
N. Malovic: Over time the relevant directives have implemented into Swedish law by amending the 
Copyright Act (SCA) (“SFS 1960:729”). The term of protection was first amended in 1996 in connection 
with the implementation of Directive 93/98/EEC (SFS 1995:1273). Directive 2011/77 was implemented 
by means of SFS 2013:691 (attached). SFS 2013:691 amended §§ 45-46 SCA, and changed the term of 
protection period for sound recordings from 50 to 70 years. 
With regard to Directive 2011/77, at the implementation stage a number of practical issues was raised 
by interest groups.  
The Swedish Television (the Swedish national public TV broadcaster), Sweden’s Radio and Sweden’s 
Education Radio (Sweden’s public broadcasting organisations) submitted that the rules on sound 
recordings should be limited to commercial phonograms. They also submitted that the producer's 
right to compensation due to compulsory licences should remain in force even if an artist has 
exercised his right of withdrawal. 
Other smaller agencies argued that smaller production companies should be excluded from the 
obligation to pay supplementary compensation.  
Other agencies and companies, e.g. KLYS, Copyswede and SAMI, argued that the provisions on 
royalty determination for withdrawals in relation to sound recording older than 50 years should be 
mandatory.  
The Swedish Law Society noted that it should be clarified whether the artists’ right to receive 
supplementary compensation and terminate the transfer agreement is personal, or whether it can be 
instead enforced by the person who acquired the right. According to the Law Society, it was also 
necessary to clarify whether customary limitation rules apply to the performance of performers in 
relation to the organization. 
SAMI: The Directive was implemented in the Swedish Copyright Act 1 November 2013. The 
implementation was preceded by Ministry Publications Series 2014:44 where interested parties were 
able to submit consultation comments and by government bill No. 2012/13:141. 
The extension of the term of protection is the result of many and long discussions and a lot of 
influences from, among others, SAMI. Initially, it was primarily the record companies who wanted an 
extension, something which the performers came to support. For the performers, the rules of 
                                                 
94 Trainee (Sandart & Partners, Stockholm); IPKat contributor (2018); LLM in Intellectual Property Law (Stockholm University, 2016); LLB 
(Southampton University, 2015). 
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supplementary remuneration became important for them not to end up without compensation. SAMI 
participated in in the effort to coordinate the collection of signatures in the second half of the 2000s 
through which Swedish artists and musicians contributed to making the EU pay attention to the 
fairness of performers getting paid for their recordings during their lifetime. At the same time, the EU 
was made aware of the fact that the term of protection of European recordings is, in many cases, 
shorter than recordings from other key music markets such as the USA (95 years) and, moreover, 
significantly shorter than concerning the authors of musical compositions. Sweden was one of the 
countries that contributed with the most signatures in Europe. Of course, this is because Sweden has 
many active and committed artists and musicians. It should also be seen as a confirmation that 
Swedish music and Swedish artists and musicians have a strong position even internationally and 
constitute an important export industry to Sweden. SAMI is of the opinion that, with an international 
and vigorous repertoire, the extension, as well as increased harmonization of the countries’ term of 
extension, are highly relevant. The Directive (2011/77/EU) on extension of the term of protection for 
performers and phonogram producers from 50 to 70 years was therefore very welcome when 
adopted in September 2011. 
2. Term extension (Art. 1.7, 3.1 and 2). 
a) Have the provisions concerning the term extension been adequately implemented into national 
law? 
N. Malovic. Yes. Generally speaking the Swedish implementation is compliant with what Directive 
2011/77 requires.   
SAMI: Yes 
b) Having in mind the “de minimis” character of the Directive, does national law provide for the 
application of the term extension when the performance is fixed in a media different from a 
phonogram?  
SAMI: No – but this was recommended by SAMI in connection with the referral being circulated for 
consultation. 
c) Is the term extension also applicable to performers and producers in the audio-visual sector? 
N. Malovic: No: see § 46 SCA.  
This is because audio recordings made for use in audiovisual productions are not covered by 
Directive 2011/77. The sound is usually taken in connection with the production of movies and 
television. In addition, the soundtrack in a audiovisual work is a sound recording when used 
separately. However, the extension of the term of protection of performers and producers only covers 
published or published sound recordings. This means that they should have been published or 
published as recordings of sound only.  
 
SAMI: No – but this was recommended by SAMI in connection with the referral being circulated for 
consultation. 
d) General assessment of the term extension/other remarks 
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N. Malovic: Concerns have been raised by various organisations and the government alike.  
The extension of the term protection for sound recordings has meant that anyone who wishes to use 
a sound recording for a further 20-year period will be dependent on permission from the rights 
holder. Such conditions often require that compensation be paid for the utilization. Accordingly, an 
extension of the term of protection entails a cost increase for those who use sound recordings in their 
business activities and, ultimately, also for consumers.  
The term extension has affected all audio recordings and musical works with lyrics for which 
protection has not expired. The number of recordings in question is difficult to estimate, not least 
since the extended term of protection also covers a very high proportion of foreign recordings used 
in Sweden. According to STIM, the Swedish CMO for music creators and publishers, the same 
difficulties also arise for jointly authored musical works where there is often no information about 
whether lyrics and music have been created specifically for the work. The amount of possible cost 
increases can also be governed by the individual agreements and the proportion of older works and 
acquisitions used in the case at issue. Thus, it is not possible to make a general assessment of the cost 
increases that may result from the extended term of protection. 
SAMI argues that it is important that there are clauses that ensure the rights of the performers since 
they often take on a subordinate position towards the producers. Contractual safeguards are rarely 
enough, but rather it is necessary that there are clauses that protect the performers so that they 
receive their rightful compensation. In the present situation, there are problems in this area regarding 
so-called "on-demand services", where SAMI, together with performers all around Europe, is behind a 
campaign for an indispensable right of compensation, see https://www.fair-internet.eu/. 
As far as the extension of the term of protection as such (50 to 70 years), it is fully implemented in 
SAMI's system so that the performers participating in these recordings receive compensation, as far as 
the recordings are used. 
3. The “use it or lose it” clause (Art. 3.2a): how does it work in practice? 
a) How shall the term “in sufficient quantity” be interpreted?  
SAMI: Interpretation of "in sufficient quantity": Government bill No. 2012/13:14 page 67 states that 
the Government does not think it is reasonable for a producer to be required to issue a certain 
number of physical copies of a recording in situations where such publishing never has taken place 
before or been intended in connection with the transfer. The Government believes that the purpose 
of the clause is to ensure that the producer utilizes the rights acquired by him or her as agreed upon 
at the time of the transfer. According to SAMI's assessment, it is important that the producer does not 
attempt to circumvent the clause. Sweden is a frontrunner of digitization and today's sales of physical 
copies are negligible in comparison. 
The assessment of whether the producer offers a fixation for sale in a sufficient number of copies 
must, according to Ministry Publications Series 2014:44, be based on the circumstances of the 
individual case. The decisive factor is whether the demand for the current acquisition is met in a 
reasonable manner by the published copies. This also means that sales must have a certain duration, 
i.e. that the producer will not only sell for a limited period of time. If the producer has undertaken to 
offer a certain number of copies, the producer may provide guidance in the assessment of what is 
considered to be a sufficient quantity. However, in the individual case, what is considered to be a 
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sufficient quantity of copies may be above, as well as below, what the producer has committed to in 
the agreement. 
b) Does the offering of copies or the making available of the work need to be done by the producer 
himself or does the provision also apply when these acts are carried out by third parties?  
SAMI: The Swedish legislature is talking about the producer and the legislative history does not 
indicate whether this may be a third party. 
c) Are there any mechanisms in place to inform performers of this clause (having in mind that this 
right can only be exercised 50 years after the fixation or publication of the performance)?  
SAMI does not know any "external" mechanisms that have informed performers about this, but have 
themselves to some extent informed in news letters to affiliates and members and also on our 
website. 
d) What is the procedure in cases where a phonogram contains the fixation of the performances 
from a plurality of performers? 
N. Malovic: Swedish law requires that, in case of a plurality of performances, the use it or lose it clause 
can be only exercised jointly by the various performers. If only part of the performing artists 
participating in a recording cancels the transfer agreement, the producer retains the rights of the 
other contributors. The fact that the performers can only jointly exercise their right of withdrawal may 
limit the number of cases in which the right of withdrawal can be effectively exercised. In addition, 
the right of cancellation does not subsist after the 50-year period. 
SAMI: All of the performers must stand behind the termination of their contracts. 
e) To your knowledge, have performers already made use of this clause vis-à-vis phonogram 
producers? 
N. Malovic: Not that I know of.  
SAMI: As far as SAMI is aware, this right has not been exercised 
f) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
SAMI: Not that SAMI knows of. 
g) General assessment of the “use it or lose it” clause/other remarks 
SAMI: In general, it is too early to draw any major conclusions. It is of course also a difficulty that all of 
the performers must stand behind the termination of their contracts, even if in some way it is also 
natural. 
4. The annual supplementary remuneration (the “20% fund”): how does it work in practice? 
(art. 3.2b – 2d) 
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a) What kind of measures have been adopted to ensure that performers are informed of this 
annual supplementary remuneration?  
N. Malovic: § 45a SCA regulates the annual supplementary remuneration. The provision stipulates 
that supplementary compensation shall amount to 20% of the revenue obtained by phonographic 
producer as a result of the right to exploit the recording. The 20% fund is applicable to both the 
phonographic producer’s income from his/her own exploitations of the work, and income from the 
rights that have been assigned to someone else.  
The phonographic producer may not make any deductions for any costs incurred. Some of the 
revenue that the phonographic producer has made from the exploitation of the recording is exempt 
and not included in the calculation. This includes part of the income that the artist typically obtains 
from the producer by means of the latter’s dealings with the recording and compensation for the 
producer pursuant to the provisions on private copying compensation (§ 26K SCA) and compulsory 
licenses for public performances and for certain communications to the public (§47 SCA). 
The supplementary remuneration shall be paid to artists jointly if more then one artist has 
contributed to the performance. The supplementary remuneration will therefore be allocated 
between then and they will together be entitled to 20% of the producer’s income. How the 
distribution is to be performed is not regulated by law. Swedish legislature left this to customary 
allocation principles in the industry.  
SAMI is not familiar with any external information channel, but they have on its website and in the 
newsletter informed of this right. 
b) Are phonogram producers obliged by national law to inform performers of this right?  
SAMI: No 
c) How has the Member State implemented in national law the obligation of phonogram producers 
to provide performers, upon request, “any information which may be necessary in order to secure 
payment of that remuneration”? 
SAMI: "At the request of the organization, the producer shall provide the information required for the 
compensation to be calculated." According to SAMI, in addition to reporting gross revenues that the 
producer has had (including type and extent), the organization also needs information about the 
fixation as such (title, main artist, recording/release year, information about participating musician). 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to inform them of this right? 
SAMI: Not that SAMI is aware, but SAMI, together with IFPI, have prepared an information letter on 
what is important to consider and what is intended for the producer (record companies). 
e) Have collecting societies in the Member State adopted any measure to inform performers of this 
right? 
SAMI: Yes, see 4 a). 
Implementation of the Directive 2011/77/EU: copyright term of protection 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 123 
f) Which collecting society is responsible for administering the “20 % fund”? How has this 
collecting society organized the administration and distribution of the annual supplementary 
remuneration? 
N. Malovic: An organization responsible for administering the 20% fund must be authorized to enter 
into a contractual license agreement. Furthermore, the organization is required to represent a 
number of eligible artists in the field. This means that there will be primarily one or more Swedish 
organizations that are entitled to claim the compensation. In Sweden, one of the collecting societies 
responsible for administering the 20% fund is SAMI.  
For the purpose of calculating the compensation due, phonographic producers may at the request of 
the relevant collecting society – as far as they deem necessary – provide information on the 
exploitation of the work in question.  
At the time of enacting the Directive, SAMI and the the Swedish Theatre Association considered that 
phonographic producers should be also required to provide an authorized or approved auditor with 
the necessary accounting documents in order for the documentation to be checked. 
Swedish Government interpreted Directive 2011/77 as entailing an obligation for the phonographic 
producer in question to also report such material as is necessary to make it possible to check the 
compensation. Thus, if an organization so requests, the phonographic producer may be required to 
issue documents that allow such control. 
SAMI: According to Swedish law, "only an organization representing a number of eligible artists may 
require supplementary remuneration under section 45 a.” According to the legislative history, it is not 
excluded that several organizations may claim the remuneration, but it emphasizes that the 
organization in the distribution of remuneration is required to treat third parties’ performing artists in 
the same way as artists represented by the organization. In Sweden, the Swedish Musicians 
Association has declared themselves as being representative, but instructed SAMI to handle the 
collection itself, as well as distribution and payment to companies in other countries through our 
exchange agreements. However, SAMI experiences it as a problem that there is no designated 
organization to handle the collection. There is also ambiguities in the legislation regarding the 
representativeness requirement, whether it should only cover Swedish fixations or how this should 
be interpreted? SAMI has prepared information letters etc. to record companies, reporting forms, etc. 
The system is prepared for us to receive and pay remuneration, but so far, collection and payment 
have not been fully implemented. 
g) How many performers represented by collecting societies have benefited so far from this right in 
each of the fiscal years following the deadline for transposition of the Directive (1 November 
2013)? 
SAMI: Too soon to tell. 
h) How much have collecting societies collected each year as a consequence of the 20%-fund 
provision? 
SAMI: SAMI does not have a figure supporting this, but there is reason to assume that the first few 
years will concern small amounts. It is too early to make an economic evaluation of this. The 
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colleagues (collecting societies in other countries) who have a collection going at this time have 
received very little money. 
i) Following Recital 12 of the Term Extension Directive, has national law exempted micro-
enterprises from the obligation to contribute? If so, under which circumstances? 
SAMI: No – which SAMI thinks is good and has pointed out in their consultation response. 
j) General assessment of the 20% fund/other remarks 
SAMI: In general, it is currently too early to evaluate this compensation. One of the reasons that it has 
been difficult with the practical management is that it is not entirely clear which exploits are covered. 
The government bill states that a condition for supplementary remuneration is that the transfer is to 
be assessed under Swedish law which, in normal circumstances, would mean that remuneration 
should not be paid when a foreign fixation is used in Sweden. There is also difficulty in identifying 
who is responsible for obtaining information about who has participated in the fixations entitled to 
remuneration. SAMI thinks it would be natural for the producers to provide SAMI with that 
information. SAMI thinks the following needs to be clarified: 
- Who is seen as a producer / is liable for payment in case of transfer / license etc? The laws concept of 
what a producer is gives little guidance as it is often someone else apart from the original producer 
who exploits and earns on the exploitation. 
- Which producers are covered by the remuneration right - according to the legislative history it are 
those whose contracts are governed by Swedish law, typically fixations made in Sweden - how does 
the collection work when the exploitation takes place in the EEA (which organization should collect?) 
and in terms of non-EU use? As for foreign fixations used in Sweden, can collection only happen if 
there is a representation agreement that gives SAMI the right to collect on the other country's behalf? 
In fact, is it exploitation on Swedish territory which should be guiding? 
- There have been many, long and complicated discussions about this within the framework of our 
international networks - who will do what to whom?. 
5. The “clean slate” provision (Art. 3.2e): how does it work in practice? 
a) Can the clean slate rule be waived by contract?  
SAMI: The rule is not mandatory, but in Swedish law there is the addition: "Offsetting may be made if 
the artist explicitly approved it.". 
b) What are the mechanisms Member States have established to enforce this measure in national 
law?  
SAMI: Do not know 
c) Is there an obligation to inform performers of this measure? 
N. Malovic: Not that I am aware of.  
SAMI: Not that SAMI is aware of.  
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d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
N. Malovic: No – see answer below.  
SAMI: Do not know. 
e) General assessment of the “clean slate” provision/other remarks 
N. Malovic: The Swedish Government stated in its preparatory works to the Directive (see attached, 
pg. 66) that:  
"The Directive leaves the Member States the power to decide that royalty agreements entered into before 1 
November 2013 may be renegotiated in favor of performers after the expiry of 50 years (Article 1.4). The 
purpose is to counter contractual terms that seem unfair to the performer. In the Swedish context, it can be 
noted that there is an opportunity to correct such conditions. The provisions of the Act (1915: 218) on 
agreements and other legal acts in the field of property law (the contract) are also applicable to this type of 
agreement. These include that contractual terms may be adjusted or left unrelated if the condition is unfair 
in view of the content of the agreement, the circumstances at the time of the agreement, the 
circumstances that have arisen and the circumstances in general. 
However, the parties are free to agree to change the terms of the contract without being governed by law. 
It is therefore difficult to see that such a system would in practice be of significance. There is also no reason 
for a mandatory right to renegotiation. Instead, the same conditions should apply to the assessment of 
remuneration levels and other terms in older transfer agreements as in the copyright area in general. 
Against this background, the Government agrees with the assessment made in the memorandum that 
there is no justification for introducing a statutory possibility of renegotiation of such agreements." 
It would appear that the government abandoned its position in this regard, most likely because the 
Swedish Council on Legislation (Lagrådet) was of another view. This resulted in the adoption of 
provision 45 C. However, I would like to emphasise my reply below to this question which is still of 
relevance to the clean slate provision, namely that the relevant provisions in the Swedish Contracts 
Law Act are of a disposable nature. This means that the parties can, whenever they wish, contract out 
of the provisions in the Act. In addition, despite Art 45 C being adopted - the Contracts Law Act (§ 36) 
sets out that - contractual terms may be adjusted if the condition is unfair in view of the content of 
the agreement, the circumstances of it, and circumstances in general.  
Taking the latter into account, because the provisions of the Directive on the calculation of royalties 
for recordings over the age of 50 are also seen as an advantage for the performers (in addition to the 
extension of the term of protection), 45 C in the Contracts Law Act can in my view, be circumvented 
by § 36 in most situations (as noted by the government in the property works, see above).   
SAMI: As far as we are concerned, advances were not to a large extent common at that time (50 years 
ago). To the extent that it occurred, the amounts were probably very small. Since the 90's, it has 
become much more common and the amounts a lot higher. 
6. Transitional provisions (Art. 10.5 and 6, art. 10a) 
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*a) Have the transitional measures of arts. 10.5, 10.6 and 10a been adequately implemented into 
national law? 
SAMI: Yes 
b) Does national legislation allow performers to modify their contracts on transfer or assignment 
after the 50-year period has expired (see Art. 10a.2)? 
SAMI: No, no statutory possibility of renegotiation has been introduced; instead the legislator refers 
to that a renegotiation based on voluntary action by both parties can be made. 
c) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this? 
SAMI: SAMI does not have a direct picture of this. 
7. General assessment of the Directive  
a) Are performers aware of the benefits brought about by the Directive? Do they effectively reclaim 
them? How long on average does it take for performers to receive the benefits they are entitled to? 
SAMI: Knowledge is likely to be very limited. Possibly it is known that the term of protection as such is 
prolonged, but otherwise the knowledge is probably low. It will probably take time before the 
remuneration reaches high sums. 
b) What are roughly the estimated yearly benefits for (1) record producers and (2) performers, 
taking into consideration the musical repertoire affected by the term extension? In the case of 
record producers, is there any data on how these benefits have been used? 
SAMI: At the moment, it is impossible to answer. 
c) Has the Directive had a negative impact on other stakeholders, such as users (e.g., higher prices 
in cultural goods, or lower production volume)? 
SAMI: Not that SAMI is aware of. SAMI has not made changes in the pricing. 
d) How much money (estimate) would users of music repertoires have saved each fiscal year since 1 
November 2013 if the Directive had not been adopted? 
SAMI: SAMI does not have a direct picture of this 
e) Have the effects of the Directive been watered down due to contractual practices? Please 
describe such practices if applicable. 
N. Malovic: No – but an exception would be the application of The Contracts Law Act (§36) in relation 
to the ‘clean slate’ provision and the possibility of waiver.  
SAMI: SAMI does not have a direct picture of this 
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f) In your opinion, have the cultural and creative sectors benefited from the term extension (e.g., 
have marketing opportunities in third countries increased? Are there more revenue streams? Have 
producers been marketing back catalogue items, and if so how is that received by users)? Please 
give reasons. 
N. Malovic: Not entirely related to term – but nonetheless interesting – is that Sweden has seen a 
6.2% growth in recorded-music revenues in 2016 – with streaming services accounting for 82.3% – 
suggesting that the music market is still expanding at good rate.  
SAMI: SAMI does not know - although in the long run, we believe that the cultural sector can profit 
from this. On behalf of the Swedes, it is conceivable that the term of protection will eventually benefit 
several actors in the cultural sector. For example, ABBA's repertoire is still very popular and new areas 
of exploitation are popping up. 
g) Have users of music repertoires become less competitive vis-à-vis companies in third countries 
due to the amount of royalties they will have to pay to performers and phonogram producers as a 
consequence of the term extension? In your opinion, can this be an obstacle for off-line / on-line 
music business models to flourish in Europe?     
N. Malovic: This is a complex economic assessment that I am not in a position to make. You can 
however find this discussion helpful: http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/legc-study.pdf. 
SAMI: SAMI does not think so. In that case it probably does not have to do with term of protection-
clauses. Perhaps rather the competition with Google, Facebook etc. The Safe harbor rules benefit 
these actors. 
h) Other remarks 
SAMI: For SAMI's part, the extension of the term of protection has of course influenced their daily 
work, insofar as a recording is eligible under section 47 of the Swedish Copyright Act for a longer 
period of time. This is fully implemented in SAMI's operations. They also mean that it is important and 
appropriate to, through legislation, protect the rights of performers who often find it difficult to claim 
this because they are inferior to the record companies. SAMI therefore recommends that even the 
performers on the audiovisual side should be covered. 
Stakeholders effectively contacted: 
 
Type of stakeholder 
Name of 
stakeholder 
Contact 
CMO SAMI,  
Swedish Artists’ and 
Musicians’ Interest 
Organization 
Ulrika.wendt@sami.se 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
National expert: David Stopps95 
 
 
1. National implementation of the Directive 
a) Through which legislation was the Directive implemented in national law? Please provide a 
short history of the implementation, highlighting any legal or practical difficulties in implementing 
the Directive (for example, strong opposition from any interest groups, or difficulties in 
implementing the clauses of the Directive given national legal constraints – for instance, from 
contract law - or established practices)  
 
The UK IPO (United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office) experienced strong lobbying from 
phonogram producer trade bodies BPI and AIM as well as from the Musicians Union, FAC (Featured 
Artist Coalition) and the MMF (Music Managers Forum) and other organisations who had performer 
interests. The industry suggested that instead of the 20% Supplementary Remuneration there should 
be a simpler arrangement where performers who were not receiving recurring payments should 
receive a percentage of the phonogram producer’s equitable remuneration PPL (UK CMO for music 
performers and producers) income identified with the recording in question. This was rejected by UK 
IPO as they did not feel the Directive gave them the flexibility to do that. The performers 
organisations also lobbied hard for the Directive’s renegotiation provision to be included in the UK 
legislation but in the end this was omitted. 
 
The legislation was The Copyright and Duration of Rights in Performances Regulations 2013 amends 
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The Copyright and Duration of Rights in Performances 
Regulations 2013 came in to force on 1st November 2013. You can see the text here: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1782/pdfs/uksi_20131782_en.pdf 
 
2. Term extension (Art. 1.7, 3.1 and 2). 
*a) Have the provisions concerning the term extension been adequately implemented into 
national law? 
  
In a legal sense the answer is probably ‘Yes’ but performers would argue that because the 
renegotiation right was omitted and there is so little guidance on clarity it has not been. It would 
have been helpful if the regulations had given more guidance on how each provision should be 
applied. For example, the UK regulations implementing Term Extension are silent as to whether it is 
possible for a performer and a phonogram producer to agree contractually to override the Clean Slate 
provisions. There is confusion about the definition of ‘deductions’ in the context of Clean Slate. 
 
b) Having in mind the “de minimis” character of the Directive, does national law provide for the 
application of the term extension when the performance is fixed in a media different from a 
phonogram?  
 
                                                 
95 International Music Business Consultant and Music Business Educator ; Author of ‘How to Make a Living from Music’ published by WIPO ; 
Director of PPL ; Managing Director of FML International Artist Management ; Promoter of Friars Aylesbury ; Director of Copyright and 
Related Rights for the Music Managers Forum UK ; Senior Advisor on Copyright and Related Rights for the Featured Artist Coalition. 
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The legislation refers only to ‘sound recordings’ and does not specify or differentiate between 
different media applications. 
 
c) Is the term extension also applicable to performers and producers in the audio-visual sector? 
Where sound recording rights exist, the extension exists no matter what media. PPL have issued a list 
of applicable income streams that should be included in the Supplementary Remuneration as follows: 
 
 
 
*d) General assessment of the term extension/other remarks 
According to the 2017 IFPI Global Report the UK was the third largest music market in the world and 
the largest music market in Europe in 2016. The UK was ranked worldwide as No. 2 in digital sales, 
No.3 in performance rights (PPL), No. 3 in synchronisation of recordings and No. 4 in physical sales. 
The only two music markets for recorded music larger than the UK were USA and Japan. 
In general, the extension of copyright in sound recordings from 50 years to 70 years has been 
valuable to the creative industries in the UK and welcomed by both phonogram producers and 
performers. The extension has meant a further 20 years of exploitation for phonogram producers for 
recordings first published in 1963 and later years. For performers, however, the Directive and the way 
it has been transposed into UK Law has been less beneficial 
Whilst the duration of copyright protection from 50 years to 70 years has been very beneficial for 
phonogram producers, it has not been so beneficial for performers. Some artist managers consulted 
for this report would have preferred the term to have remained at 50 years as they could then have 
released their artist’s recordings in the public domain. Because it would have been the artist 
themselves releasing their own recordings (with their own authentic photographs and sleeve notes) 
the recordings would be regarded as ‘authentic’ by the public thus giving them the edge over any 
other public domain releases of the same recordings. 
3. The “use it or lose it” clause (Art. 3.2a): how does it work in practice? 
*a) How shall the term “in sufficient quantity” be interpreted?  
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The term ‘in sufficient quantities’ is defined as ‘such quantity as to satisfy the reasonable 
requirements of the public for copies of the sound recording’. 
b) Does the offering of copies or the making available of the work need to be done by the producer 
himself or does the provision also apply when these acts are carried out by third parties?  
The offering of copies and the making available of a recording needs to be actioned by the copyright 
owner, or if there is an exclusive licensee, by that exclusive licensee. 
c) Are there any mechanisms in place to inform performers of this clause (having in mind that this 
right can only be exercised 50 years after the fixation or publication of the performance)? 
There is a very clear explanation of the rights granted to performers on the PPL website. 
PPL have very clear ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ for both Performers and for Recording 
Rightsholders here: 
http://www.ppluk.com/Documents/Member%20Services/PPL%20Copyright%20Term%20Extension
%20FAQs%20-RRH%20-%20v1%20July%202014.pdf 
http://www.ppluk.com/Documents/Member%20Services/PPL%20Copyright%20Term%20Extension
%20FAQs%20-%20Performers%202014.pdf 
PPL has also highlighted the performer rights granted in the Extension Period in their Annual Review 
and their Annual Performer Review. 
Almost all UK performers are PPL performer members so PPL would be the first place they would go 
for this information. More could be done by the phonogram producer trade bodies BPI and AIM as 
well as the Music Managers Forum, the FAC and the Musicians Union to inform their members of the 
Term Extension regulations and I will suggest this to them. 
d) What is the procedure in cases where a phonogram contains the fixation of the performances 
from a plurality of performers? 
This is complicated and almost certainly unworkable.  
The UK Government had this to say in their consultation on implementing term extension96: 
39. A sound recording may have several performers, some of whom may each enter into individual 
contracts with the producer assigning various rights in the fixation of their performance and 
others who may enter into a joint contract to do so. Once any individual performer has exercised 
his right to cancel his contract it would still be necessary for him to reach agreement with the other 
performers on the sound recording before he can exploit the sound recording. 
 40. In order to exploit the recording a performer (“P”) would require to “clear” the rights of any 
other performers (“OPs”) who appear on the sound recording whose rights will also have been 
assigned to the producer of the sound recording. Such rights would need to revert to their 
respective owners before they could be re-assigned to P in order to be exploited by P. The Directive 
does not prescribe a mechanism for how the rights of other performers might be “unpicked” in 
                                                 
96 Available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1782/impacts  
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order to arrive at a situation where a performer might exploit the recording. Paragraph 2a of the 
Directive provides that where a sound recording contains the fixation of the performances of a 
plurality of performers, they may terminate their contracts on transfer or assignment “in 
accordance with applicable national law”. This suggests that such matters would be determined 
by the law of contract in each member state rather than our prescribing new measures. 
41. We consider that the way that this will operate if there are multiple performers on a 
sound recording is as follows. If P terminates his contract with the producer, the producer 
would no longer be legally entitled to exploit the recording. Depending on the terms of 
their contracts with the producer this may constitute an event entitling the OPs to 
terminate their contracts with the producer. Alternatively, such OPs may exercise their 
statutory right to terminate under the new provisions. Even if the OPs are legally entitled to 
cancel their contracts in such circumstances, there are then various steps which have to be taken 
before P can exploit the recording, namely that the OPs have to terminate their contracts and then 
have to agree to assign their rights to P (or agree jointly with P to exploit the sound recording). It 
appears therefore in practice, that where there are multiple performers P will need to act 
jointly with the OPs in exercising the right to terminate the contract under the use it or lose 
it provision (in which case each of the performers on any sound recording would issue 
notices to terminate their individual contracts under the Regulations). 
e) To your knowledge, have performers already made use of this clause vis-à-vis phonogram 
producers? 
I have not been able to discover any examples of performers exercising this clause in the time I have 
been working on this report. The UK’s two largest phonogram producers, Universal and Sony, tell me 
that they have not been approached by any performer concerning Use It or Lose It. 
f) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
The phonogram producers that have been consulted for this report have not altered their model 
contracts to reflect the Term Extension provisions. 
*g) General assessment of the “use it or lose it” clause/other remarks 
The way this provision drafted in the Directive was unfortunate. The term ‘sufficient quantities’ is 
subjective and should have been quantified. It is also difficult to understand why the Directive 
stipulates that if any performer exercises their ‘Use It of Lose It’ right the copyright in the recording 
expires. If the copyright in the recording expires performers can no longer enjoy equitable 
remuneration in the Extension Period which in itself is a disincentive for performers to exercise the 
right in the first place. Compare this approach with that in the US where authors and performers can 
exercise a reversion right after 35 years from first publication (17 U.S.C.A.#203(s) 2009). If this right is 
exercised the performers on a recording can affect a transfer of the copyright in the recording from 
the phonogram producer to themselves. 
If the ‘Use it or Lose It’ right is exercised, the performers’ rights will still continue through the 
extension period so in theory the performers on the recording will still have control of the recording 
and can legally stop a third party releasing it without their permission. However, most recordings 
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have a plurality of performers, so all the performers (or their estates) would have to collectively agree 
on any such permissions, which may prove impossible.  
The drafting in the Directive and in the UK’s subsequent Copyright and Duration of Rights in 
Performances Regulations 2013 implies that any one performer on a recording can invoke the Use It 
or Lose It right. If the phonogram producer does not make sufficient quantities of the recording 
available to the public in physical form and/or fails to make the recording available on digital 
platforms in the 12-month period following receipt of the performer’s notice, the copyright in the 
recording will automatically expire and the original contract between the phonogram producer and 
the performer will terminate. The other performers on the recording may not want the copyright in 
the recording to expire, as it means, for example, that they will not then enjoy equitable 
remuneration through the Extension Period. In this way the Use It or Lose It provision could actually 
harm the interests of performers. 
The two biggest phonogram producers in the UK, Universal and Sony, consider that they have not 
been approached by any performer in regard to the right of Use It or Lose It in the four years it has 
existed, which is not surprising. I think it unlikely that this right will ever be exercised in the UK, 
although it may be useful as a threat to encourage a phonogram producer to include the recording 
on digital services and to manufacture perhaps 100 CDs if the recording in question is not currently 
included on those services, and not available physically. 
4. The annual supplementary remuneration (the “20% fund”): how does it work in practice? (art. 
3.2b – 2d) 
a) What kind of measures have been adopted to ensure that performers are informed of this 
annual supplementary remuneration? 
  
The PPL website has clear information and ‘Frequently Asked Questions’. See links above in 3(c). 
b) Are phonogram producers obliged by national law to inform performers of this right? 
  
No. I am not aware of any national law that obliges phonogram producers to inform performers of 
this right. 
c) How has the Member State implemented in national law the obligation of phonogram 
producers to provide performers, upon request, “any information which may be necessary in order 
to secure payment of that remuneration”? 
Yes. The UK government has provided statutory rights for performers as follows: 
If a record company fails to pay on time and/or in full PPL has a specific statutory right to claim the 
money as a debt.  
Any performer who is entitled to supplementary remuneration also has a statutory right to request 
information from the copyright owner (or, if there is one, the exclusive licensee) to enable the 
performer to ascertain the amount of the payment to which they are entitled and/or to secure its 
distribution. This only covers information which is in the possession, or under the control, of the 
recipient of the request. The request must be made by the performer in writing to the copyright 
owner (or exclusive licensee). If the relevant information is not provided within 90 days, the performer 
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has a specific right to apply for a court order requiring the copyright owner/exclusive licensee to 
provide the information. 
Any performer who is entitled to supplementary remuneration also has a statutory right, in the event 
of a dispute regarding the amount which should be remitted to PPL, to apply to the Copyright 
Tribunal to determine the correct amount which should be remitted by the record company to PPL. 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to inform them of this right? 
 
The phonogram producers I have consulted tell me that they have not altered their model contracts 
to reflect the Term Extension provisions. 
e) Have collecting societies in the Member State adopted any measure to inform performers of this 
right? 
 
Yes. PPL have very clear information together with Frequently Asked Questions. See 3(c) above. 
f) Which collecting society is responsible for administering the “20 % fund”? How has this 
collecting society organized the administration and distribution of the annual supplementary 
remuneration? 
 
PPL are the collective management organisation responsible for administering the 20% fund in the 
UK.  
PPL held a series of in depth meetings with interested parties including phonogram producers and 
performer representatives throughout the UK IPO’s consultation period and following the final 
wording of the Statutory Instrument that brought the Term Extension provisions in to UK law. I 
attended all of those meetings. PPL have the most advanced related rights CMO data and IT systems 
in the world and immediately applied their expertise and management to providing the most 
accurate and efficient administration possible for the Supplementary Remuneration due to 
performers who are not receiving recurring payments on recordings. PPL were the first CMO in 
Europe to make a distribution on Supplementary Remuneration. (December 2015). 
PPL have done a lot of work establishing what revenue is payable and to which performers. 
Equitable remuneration is only payable to qualifying performers. e.g. because the US took a 
reservation on Article 15 of the WPPT, many US performers are non-qualifying so are not eligible for 
the performer share of equitable remuneration when their recordings are broadcast or performed in 
public in the UK. PPL have taken advice on this issue in the context of Supplementary Remuneration 
and have been advised that this criteria does not apply in that context. They are therefore paying 
through Supplementary Remuneration to a much broader range of non-featured performers 
including US performers where they are able to contact them. The precise criteria is as follows: 
Relevant performers 
  
To be entitled to supplementary remuneration for a recording that is in its extended term, a 
performer must have assigned certain rights in their performance on that recording to the record 
company.  The relevant rights are the performer’s right to consent to (a) the copying of a recording of 
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their performance, (b) the issue of copies of those recordings to the public (or the rental/lending of 
those copies), and (c) the electronic “making available” of those recordings to the public. If the 
performer assigned these rights to the record company for a recording that is now in its extended 
term, and the performer is not already entitled to a recurring payment from the record company in 
return, then the performer is potentially entitled to receive supplementary remuneration for that 
recording. (In this context, “recurring payments” do not include the equitable remuneration 
payments made to performers by PPL.) 
 Relevant revenue 
 A record company’s obligation to pay supplementary remuneration only relates to recordings from 
which they have earned UK revenue by exploiting (a) the right to copy that recording, (b) the right to 
issue copies of that recording to the public or (c) the “making available” right.  This also only relates to 
the relevant year – for example, the payments made by record companies in 2017 are only in respect 
of their relevant revenues in 2016. 
The obligation also only applies to recordings that are actually in their extended term.  It does not 
apply to other versions of the recording, if those other recordings were published later and are not 
yet in their extended term. This could cover later re-recordings of the same songs.  It could also in 
theory include recordings which have been remastered in such a way as to create a new recording 
with a new copyright term.  However, PPL has not seen any evidence to suggest that record 
companies are remastering recordings in this way deliberately in order to avoid making 
supplementary remuneration payments.  
g) How many performers represented by collecting societies have benefited so far from this right 
in each of the fiscal years following the deadline for transposition of the Directive (1 November 
2013)? 
In the first year of operation of the fund in 2015, receiving supplementary remuneration from 
phonogram producers for exploitations in 2014 of 1963 recordings, PPL received £78,924, relating to 
4,800 recordings.  They distributed monies in December 2015, with over 1,200 performers receiving 
allocations.  
In the second year (2016, receiving supplementary remuneration for exploitations in 2015 of 1963 
and 1964 recordings), PPL received £241,857, relating to 11,600 recordings.  They distributed monies 
in December 2016, with over 2,000 performers receiving allocations. 
Later in 2017, PPL will publish a final total for the 2017 year’s fund (covering exploitations in 2016 of 
1963, 1964 and 1965 recordings), which is expected to show a further significant increase in fund 
value year-on-year.  This will be distributed in December 2017. 
h) How much have collecting societies collected each year as a consequence of the 20%-fund 
provision? 
See (g) above. 
i) Following Recital 12 of the Term Extension Directive, has national law exempted micro-
enterprises from the obligation to contribute? If so, under which circumstances? 
No. 
*j)  General assessment of the 20% fund/other remarks 
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Of the four accompanying measures, this is generally functioning well with payments being made to 
PPL by phonogram producers increasing exponentially each year. PPL have done an exemplary job in 
insuring that non-featured performers are paid as accurately and promptly as possible. PPL (Public 
Performance Ltd) is the UK’s sole CMO for related rights and represents both phonogram producers 
and performers. 
However, if a phonogram producer creates a remaster of an original recording, the remaster is 
considered to create a new copyright from the date of release of the remastered recording. If the 
phonogram producer then deletes the original recording (i.e. makes the original recording no longer 
available to users and to the public) they will not be obliged to pay Supplementary Remuneration 
until 50 years after the remaster has been released. Whilst remastering has been taking place for a 
long time and often dramatically improves the sound of old recordings, the process also gives 
phonogram producers a legal avenue where the paying of Supplementary Remuneration is avoided. 
Phonogram producers contacted for the purpose of this report stated that his company had 
remastered their entire catalogue of old recordings and were therefore, quite legally, paying no 
Supplementary Remuneration.  
The creation of a new copyright due to remastering benefits both featured and non-featured 
performers as they both effectively get a new 70-year period of equitable remuneration from PPL. 
Featured performers (or their estates) also receive royalties through that new 70-year period although 
the royalty rate is likely to be low if they have not been able to renegotiate a 50-70 year old contract. 
It’s been impossible to ascertain as to whether phonogram producers are taking the Supplementary 
Remuneration ‘off the top’ and then paying featured artists royalties on effectively 80% of income or 
whether the 20% comes out of the phonogram producer’s share and thus would not affect the 
featured performer’s royalty. 
It is worth mentioning that during the legislative procedure, the UK music industry asked the UK 
Government to introduce a percentage of the phonogram producer’s 50% equitable remuneration 
instead of the 20% Supplementary Remuneration. This would have been much cleaner, simpler and 
less administratively burdensome for both phonogram producers and PPL. Performer organisations 
such as the UK Musicians Union, The MMF (Music Managers Forum) and the FAC (Featured Artists 
Coalition) were also in favour of it. The UK Government felt that whilst they could see that this 
arrangement would be preferable, they did not feel that they had the flexibility within the Directive to 
include it in the regulations. 
5. The “clean slate” provision (Art. 3.2e): how does it work in practice? 
a) Can the clean slate rule be waived by contract?  
The UK legislation is silent on this issue which is unhelpful. 
 
b) What are the mechanisms Member States have established to enforce this measure in national 
law?  
The wording in the UK legislation simply says the following: 
(9) Where a performer is entitled under an assignment agreement to recurring payments in 
consideration of the assignment, the payments must, from the end of the 50-year period, be made in 
full, regardless of any provision in the agreement which entitles the producer to withhold or deduct 
sums from the amounts payable.  
There are no mechanisms given as to how this measure is to be exercised and enforced which leaves 
phonogram producers in a state of confusion concerning their precise obligations. 
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c) Is there an obligation to inform performers of this measure? 
No. 
 
d) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use 
with performers to reflect this mandatory clause? 
The phonogram producers consulted for the purpose of this report state that they have not altered 
their model contracts to reflect the Term Extension provisions. 
 
*e) General assessment of the “clean slate” provision/other remarks 
This right is potentially useful to featured performers but phonogram producers in the UK tell me that 
they have had very few enquiries about it from performers. Universal tell me that they have been 
undergoing a full review process of artists that may have been impacted by the clean slate provision 
and will apply the provision where applicable. 
 
It is not unusual that a featured artist will be un-recouped for £100,000 or more. If the entire artist’s 
catalogue falls in the Extension Period then un-recouped balances would be fairly straight forward to 
write off. 
 
The problem is that individual recordings will come into the Extension Period two at a time, if they 
were originally released as a single, or around ten at a time if the recordings were released as an 
album. In this scenario (which is the usual scenario) 
it would be very difficult for the phonogram producer to find 50-year old accounting and write off the 
appropriate amount for that individual recording or album. (The national UK tax authority HMRC 
stipulate that commercial enterprises are obliged to keep accounting records for seven years, after 
which most businesses have them destroyed). It might be possible to pro-rate the write off. If the 
artist/band had recorded 200 tracks for the phonogram producer then the total un-recouped balance 
could be reduced by one two-hundredth of the total each time a track came in to the Extension 
Period, although that would not be accurate.  
For featured contracted performers, the appropriate artist royalty that each track generates after it 
comes in to the Extension Period, should then be payable to the featured performer(s) on the 
recording ‘regardless of any provision in the agreement which entitles the producer to withhold or 
deduct sums from the amounts payable’. It is therefore incumbent on the phonogram producer to 
identify recordings as they come in to the Extension Period and pay out royalties with no deductions 
to the contracted performers on income generated by those recordings in the Extension period. I 
have not been able to ascertain as to whether that is happening or whether such due payments are 
deducted from un-recouped balances still existing on recordings that have not entered the Extension 
Period. This needs clarification. 
There is also confusion about the definition of ‘deductions’. In the UK IPO Guidelines97 they refer to 
‘advances’ but the regulation as stated would appear to refer to all deductions.  
Another problem is that phonogram producers that have purchased old catalogues of recordings 
often ‘buy’ the artist’s un-recouped balances with the recordings, thus knowing that they will not 
                                                 
97 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/copyright-in-sound-recordings/copyright-in-sound-recordings 
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have to pay royalties to the artist until such un-recouped balances have been recouped. If the clean 
slate occurs such phonogram producers would be out of pocket. 
More could be done to make featured performers aware that this right exists. More could also be 
done to explain to phonogram producers their statutory obligations and how they should be applied. 
6. Transitional provisions (Art. 10.5 and 6, art. 10a) 
*a) Have the transitional measures of arts. 10.5, 10.6 and 10a been adequately implemented into 
national law? 
Yes. They have been adequately implemented in to UK law. 
b) Does national legislation allow performers to modify their contracts on transfer or assignment 
after the 50-year period has expired (see Art. 10a.2)? 
No. This was omitted from the UK legislation.  
Subsection 16 of the preamble of the Directive gives member states the option to provide a 
mechanism for performers receiving royalties from a phonogram producer to be able to renegotiate 
certain terms in their contracts when recordings reach 50 years. This is the one provision that would 
really help featured performers whose 50-year old royalty rates are often far lower than is normal in 
the modern era. 
It is very unfortunate for UK featured performers that the UK government decided not to include this 
provision in The Copyright and Duration of Rights in Performances Regulations 2013. 
c) Have phonogram producers (e. g. record companies) amended the model contracts they use with 
performers to reflect this? 
The phonogram producers consulted for the purpose of this report state that they have not altered 
their model contracts to reflect the Term Extension provisions. 
7. General assessment of the Directive  
*a) Are performers aware of the benefits brought about by the Directive?  
A lot more could be done to inform performers (and their estates if deceased) of the new rights 
brought about by the Directive. PPL have done an exemplary job in this regard but the phonogram 
producer trade bodies and performer representative organisations could do more. 
Do they effectively reclaim them?  
Performers do not seem to be exercising the Use It or Lose It and Clean Slate provisions in the UK. See 
Executive Summary. 
How long on average does it take for performers to receive the benefits they are entitled to? 
I can find no examples of the Use It or Lose It and Clean Slate provisions being exercised by 
performers. There is a statutory obligation on phonogram producers to operate the Clean Slate 
provisions anyway. I have not been able to ascertain if this is working effectively in the time given to 
prepare this report. 
The Supplementary Remuneration arrangements are working well. (See 4(g) above) and PPL are 
distributing income to entitled performers within the time frame stipulated in the UK legislation. The 
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chart below shows the deadlines for phonogram producers to pay PPL. PPL then pay out to the 
relevant performers in the December following the June deadline of each year. 
 
*b) What are roughly the estimated yearly benefits for (1) record producers and (2) performers, 
taking into consideration the musical repertoire affected by the term extension? In the case of 
record producers, is there any data on how these benefits have been used? 
In the time available to me to research and write this report, I have not been able to obtain such data. 
See Executive Summary. 
*c) Has the Directive had a negative impact on other stakeholders, such as users (e.g., higher prices 
in cultural goods, or lower production volume)? 
it was not possible to obtain any such information in the timeframe of the research.  
Film and television companies may find that they are paying for Master Re-use (Synchronisation) 
licences that they would not have had to license had the recordings in question been in the public 
domain. 
d) How much money (estimate) would users of music repertoires have saved each fiscal year since 1 
November 2013 if the Directive had not been adopted? 
I have asked Spotify this question but have not received any information from them to date. 
e) Have the effects of the Directive been watered down due to contractual practices? Please 
describe such practices if applicable. 
I have not seen any evidence of this in the time I have had to research and write this report. 
*f) In your opinion, have the cultural and creative sectors benefited from the term extension (e.g., 
have marketing opportunities in third countries increased? Are there more revenue streams? Have 
producers been marketing back catalogue items, and if so how is that received by users)? Please 
give reasons. 
The cultural and creative sectors have most certainly benefited from term extension, particularly 
phonogram producers. Non-featured performers are benefiting from the Supplementary 
Remuneration provision and from 20 years of additional equitable remuneration from PPL provided 
no other performer exercises the Use It or Lose It right on the recordings on which they have 
performed. Featured performers (those receiving recurring payments) have benefited less due to the 
way the Use It or Lose It provision was drafted, the complications and lack of clarity of the Clean Slate 
provision and the fact that in the UK the contract renegotiation provision was omitted. Their main 
benefit will be equitable remuneration in the extension period provided none of their fellow 
performers exercise the Use It or Lose It provision on the recordings on which they performed. Also, 
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they will receive royalties during the Extension Period but these may be low due to the age of the 
contract in which they were set. 
It was not possible to to obtain quantifiable information on increased marketing spend on back 
catalogue by phonogram producers but it should be logical that this has happened. It should also be 
expected that opportunities in other countries have increased via exclusive licences with licensees in 
those countries as well as synchronisation. 
I cannot see more (new) revenue streams, but those that do exist will increase with each year that falls 
in to the Extension Period. I have not been able to find out if online music platforms identify public 
domain recordings although I suspect they do. 
g) Have users of music repertoires become less competitive vis-à-vis companies in third countries 
due to the amount of royalties they will have to pay to performers and phonogram producers as a 
consequence of the term extension? In your opinion, can this be an obstacle for off-line / on-line 
music business models to flourish in Europe?     
I do not see this as an obstacle for this kind of services to flourish in Europe. As is well known although 
Spotify is hugely important to the global music industry it has never made a profit. Spotify has much 
larger issues to deal with around the percentage of their sales income that is paid to CMOs, 
phonogram producers and publishers. Their business model is based on the fact that with scale they 
will reach a tipping point in regard to profitability. 
h) Other remarks 
In general, the extension of copyright in sound recordings from 50 years to 70 years has been 
valuable to the creative industries in the UK and welcomed by both phonogram producers and 
performers. The extension has meant a further 20 years of exploitation for phonogram producers for 
recordings first published in 1963 and later years. For performers, however, the Directive and the way 
it has been transposed into UK Law has been less beneficial as will be explained herein. 
Whilst the performer community applaud the principle in the Directive that certain safeguards should 
be put in place to protect performers in the extension period, due to the way the Directive was 
drafted and its subsequent transposition into UK law, the four provisions to protect performers all 
have fundamental flaws. 
As can be seen above, whilst the duration of copyright protection from 50 years to 70 years has been 
very beneficial for phonogram producers, it has not been so beneficial for performers. Artist 
managers who were consulted for this report would have preferred the term to have remained at 50 
years as they could then have released their artist’s recordings in the public domain. Because it would 
have been the artist themselves releasing their own recordings (with their own authentic 
photographs and sleeve notes) the recordings would be regarded as ‘authentic’ by the public thus 
giving them the edge over any other public domain releases of the same recordings. 
There are two laws in the international picture that really protect authors and performers: 
The first is in Germany where for musical authors it is illegal to assign copyright to a third party, with 
transfer only being allowable by license. In this way the author always retains ownership of their 
works. The license could still be for life of copyright but if, for instance, the publisher went in to 
liquidation, the rights in the works would be returned to the author (the licensee). If, however, there 
had been an assignment of the works, the liquidator would sell the copyright in the works to the 
highest bidder. It would greatly assist authors and performers if this provision could be applied 
though-out Europe for both works and fixed performances. 
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The other law that really helps authors and performers is the aforementioned US reversion right. 
Although there are complications concerning the US doctrine of ‘Work Made for Hire’, 
the principle that an author or performer can have the copyright in their works and/or the related 
rights in their fixed performances transferred to them after 35 years from first publication is of 
fundamental benefit for creators. 
Both of the above provisions are simple, effective and elegant. 
Recommendations 
 
1. Supplementary Remuneration right: The Directive should be changed so that member states 
have the option of either applying the existing regulation or applying a percentage of the 
phonogram producer’s equitable remuneration income on the recording from broadcasting 
and public performance via the appropriate collective management organisation. 
2. Use It or Lose It right: This is not working and needs to be removed. It should be replaced by 
something similar to the US reversion arrangements wherein the related rights in the sound 
recording do not expire but are instead transferred to the performers. If this were done the 
performers right to equitable remuneration would continue throughout the Extension Period. 
As explained above, the existing Use It or Lose It regulations could actually be harmful to 
performers. 
3. Clean Slate right: More work needs to be done to make performers and phonogram 
producers aware that this right exists. There needs to be clarification as to how phonogram 
producers should apply their statutory obligation in regard to this right, particularly in regard 
to un-recouped balances. In addition to writing off un-recouped balances and paying out 
royalties with no deductions in the Extension Period, performers would welcome a minimum 
royalty rate in the Extension Period which would go some way to updating old contracts to 
modern industry royalty rate standards. 
4. Renegotiation right: To protect performers, it should be mandatory for all Member States to 
incorporate this right in to their national legislation so that contracts could be updated for 
income received in the modern era during the Extension Period. 
 
Stakeholders effectively contacted: 
 
Type of stakeholder Name of stakeholder Contact 
Phonogram Producer Sony Music Entertainment UK Mike Smith 
Phonogram Producer Universal Music Group Julian French 
Phonogram Producer Beggars Group Martin Mills 
Musicians Union Musicians Union UK Phil Kear 
Artist Managers trade body 
Featured Artists trade body 
UK MMF (Music Managers Forum) and 
FAC (Featured Artist Coalition) 
Jon Webster 
CMO PPL David Harmsworth 
User Spotify Kevin Brown 
Consumer Organisation Which? Policy unit 
UK Government IPO (Intellectual Property Office) Andrew Sadler 
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The objective of this study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy 
Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the 
JURI Committee, is to examine the current status quo of implementation of the 
Directive, and to carry out an in-depth review of the practices in selected 
Member States. The study provides a brief overview of the international 
framework concerning the term of protection for performers and phonogram 
producers, and analyses the main objectives and provisions of the Term 
Extension Directive. It explores in-depth the implementation and practices in 
seven selected Member States, and identifies best practices that can serve as a 
model for other EU Member States. In addition, the long term effects of the 
Directive are considered, both within the EU (in relation to relevant EU policies) 
and outside the EU (in relation to its main trading partners). 
